A connector's enabled switch is now optional: unset means on when the
connector has the server settings it needs, so Google Drive, SharePoint
and Confluence start off until their OAuth settings are present, and an
admin's explicit switch always wins. Changing only the sharing mode no
longer switches a connector on.
Members only see connectors they can use. The catalog, Add Source tiles
and Add Tool leave out anything turned off or still needing setup, except
a connector a member already has a connection to, which stays listed as
turned off so it can be managed or removed.
Migration 0038 moves every stored secret (OAuth tokens, MCP OAuth
tokens and client registrations, API keys) into the connection's
encrypted envelope, links API-key tools to one connection per distinct
credential, allows several accounts per provider, and adds
credential_mode to sources and tools. OAuth MCP tools keep resolving
each member's own token, as they did before.
docsgpt.connectors.service is now the only reader of OAuth tokens:
get_valid_token_info refreshes under a row lock and persists rotated
refresh tokens, and a revoked grant flags the connection, pauses its
sources and notifies the owner. Loaders build from a connection
(BaseConnectorLoader.from_connection), so scheduled sync covers Drive,
SharePoint and Confluence sources with no browser. S3 and Reddit keys
stay on the connection instead of in remote_data.
New endpoints: POST /api/connections, /setup, /reconnect,
/picker-token, /claim, DELETE /api/connections/<id>, per-action
permissions and MCP refresh-tools. Upload, file listing, sync and
validate-session take a connection_id; session tokens keep working for
this release. The tool executor reads credentials from the resolved
connection (owner or member mode) and pauses on a Connect card when a
connection needs signing in. docsgpt connectors reencrypt rewrites
stored credentials after a key rotation.
The connector OAuth popup posted the session token to window.opener with
a '*' target origin, so any page that opened the popup received it. An
attacker with an account on a multi-user deployment could start a flow for
their own pending session, get a victim to finish the provider consent, and
receive a token backed by the victim's Drive/SharePoint/Confluence tokens.
- Post popup results only to allowed frontend origins: the callback origin,
OIDC_FRONTEND_URL, the new CONNECTOR_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, and localhost:5173
when the callback runs on a loopback host.
- Render the success page from the callback itself so the token never
appears in a URL; callback-status ignores session_token/user_email params.
- ConnectorAuth accepts messages only from the popup it opened, on the
callback origin reported by /api/connectors/auth.
- /api/connectors/disconnect requires auth and only deletes the caller's
session.
- /api/connectors/sync and /api/remote reject session tokens the caller
does not own.
Fixes#2766
arc53-machine