4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Alex 574f96341e refactor: rename the application package to docsgpt
The backend import package is now docsgpt, the name it will carry on PyPI;
application was far too generic to install into anyone's site-packages.
git mv plus a mechanical rewrite of every import, dotted string and path
reference: 734 Python files, the compose files, Dockerfile, workflows, docs,
setup scripts, devcontainer, k8s manifests, vscode config, pytest and coverage
config, .gitignore. Behaviour is unchanged.

Kept for one release:
- A top-level application package whose meta-path finder resolves
  application.x.y to the already-imported docsgpt.x.y object, so old imports
  and entry points (celery -A application.app.celery,
  uvicorn application.asgi:asgi_app) keep working with a FutureWarning.
- Celery registers every application.* task name as an alias of its
  docsgpt.* task on start-up, so messages queued by the previous release still
  run. The redbeat key prefix moves to redbeat:docsgpt:v2: so schedule entries
  the previous release wrote are left unread instead of firing twice.

The backend image builds from the repository root (docker build -f
docsgpt/Dockerfile .) so it can ship the alias package; a root .dockerignore
allow-lists docsgpt/ and application/ and keeps caches, local data, .env
files, the sample index files and the Dockerfile out. Compose and the image
workflows point at the new context.
2026-09-07 10:20:43 +01:00
Alex a3d09e8890 fix(oidc): harden session security from PR review (CSRF, revocation, refresh)
Address the high/medium correctness findings on the OIDC/SCIM PR:

- Login CSRF / session fixation: bind `state` to a Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite=Lax
  cookie at login and require the callback to echo it, so a code+state captured
  from another browser can't silently sign a victim into the attacker's account.
- Require `exp` on session JWTs under AUTH_TYPE=oidc (require_exp), so an
  exp-less HS256 token signed with JWT_SECRET_KEY can't authenticate forever or
  outlive the denylist.
- Denylist now keys revocation on an `iat` watermark instead of a deletable
  flag: a fresh login (newer iat) self-supersedes a revocation without clearing
  it, so sessions revoked on other devices stay revoked. Drops the
  login/SCIM-reactivation denylist-clearing paths (allow_user/allow_idp_sub).
- Refresh: gate the disabled-account check on the post-grant identity (not just
  the old sub); attempt the IdP grant before consuming the refresh token and
  return a retryable 503 (restoring the token) on transient IdP errors instead
  of force-logging-out a live session.
- Gate the oidc blueprint at request time on AUTH_TYPE=oidc, so non-oidc
  deployments cleanly 404 these routes instead of 500-ing on an unset
  OIDC_ISSUER (mirrors SCIM_ENABLED).
- Surface revocation write failures: back-channel logout returns 502, and SCIM
  deactivation rolls back and returns 503, when the denylist write fails — so
  the IdP retries instead of recording a logout/deprovision that didn't revoke.
- Back-channel logout: require `jti`, run the replay check unconditionally, and
  reject stale `iat` beyond the replay-cache window.
- Make migration 0017 idempotent (IF NOT EXISTS) so re-apply can't wedge startup.
- SCIM userName matching is case-insensitive (caseExact=false) for the list
  filter and create-dedup.

Tests added/updated across test_oidc.py, test_scim.py, test_auth.py,
test_app_routes.py and the SCIM integration test.
2026-06-10 13:58:58 +01:00
Alex 8bc777a428 feat: oidc login 2026-06-09 23:24:44 +01:00
Alex d5c0322e2a chore: more tests 2026-03-30 16:13:08 +01:00