Native fs events do not propagate from Windows hosts into Linux
containers, causing Vite's HMR to stop detecting file changes.
When the DOCKER environment variable is set, Chokidar now falls back
to polling with a 300ms interval, which reliably detects changes
across the Docker volume mount boundary.
Fixes#2456
An assistant message with several produced artifacts rendered one chip each in a
non-wrapping flex row, so 3+ chips overflowed and the bubble showed a horizontal
scrollbar. Add flex-wrap + gap-y-2 (the existing per-chip mr-2 keeps the
horizontal spacing) so the chips wrap to the next line, matching the other
artifact-chip render branch.
Add Material Symbols-style SVG icons (terminal / document / document-scanner) for
code_executor, artifact_generator, and read_document so they render with an icon
like the other tools. The ToolIcon import.meta.glob resolves tool_<name>.svg by
backend tool name automatically — no registration needed.
Rename the Artifact Generator display name to "Artifact" (the internal
artifact_generator key is unchanged) and tighten the user-facing one-line
descriptions for Code Executor, Artifact, and Read Document.
Enable code_executor and artifact_generator by default in chats (added to
DEFAULT_CHAT_TOOLS) — they load via the synthetic-id path user- and
conversation-scoped like scheduler, and persist artifacts (no user_tools FK).
Make read_document an internal agent-builtin flagged workflow_only so it appears
only in the workflow builder, not the classic agent picker or the Add-Tool
catalog (reuses the builtin synthetic-id path; still run-scoped and authz-gated).
Per decision, default-on code_executor runs sandboxed code without an approval
prompt (the sandbox is the trust boundary); this is documented in settings and
the threat model, and multi-tenant deployments should add per-tenant isolation
(Daytona / gVisor / egress policy).
Wrap a storage read in a context manager (close the file handle), add a comment
on the expected SandboxCapacityError in the churn test, and unify the
artifacts-routes test on a single import style. Also annotate the intentional
per-session sandbox workspace path with # nosec B108 (controlled dir inside the
runner container, not an insecure shared temp file).
When code_executor or read_document is given an input that doesn't resolve to an
existing artifact, it now falls back to the caller's own chat attachments,
bridges the referenced one into a conversation-scoped artifact (idempotent,
server-computed size/sha256, quota-respected), and stages it. This is lazy —
plain chat uploads are never bridged, only a file a tool actually references —
and conversation-scoped only (workflow nodes bridge attachments up front).
The match is confined to the request's own attachments and re-verified against
the user-scoped attachments repo, so a model-supplied name/id can only ever reach
the caller's own files. Only the current request's attachments are reachable (the
attachments table has no conversation column); prior-turn files are a follow-up.
Remove the integration tests that launch a real Jupyter Kernel Gateway or hit
Daytona (artifact_generator / code_executor / workflow-code-node e2e, the gateway
integration test, and the Daytona live test) — these belong in a separate e2e PR
with proper harnessing. The ephemeral-Postgres integration tests (artifacts
repository, run-scoped + input-document authz) stay: they run in CI without any
external service and hold the cross-tenant coverage. Trim the now-unused
test-only deps (jupyter-kernel-gateway, ipykernel, websocket-client); keep
jupyter-client for the retained kernelspec-resolution test.
Make the doc-driven Preview flow usable and surface every produced artifact:
- A Preview submit with attachments but no text now runs the workflow (opt-in on
MessageInput; no filler text is injected), so a doc-driven workflow can be run
by attaching its documents.
- The builder's global Escape no longer tears down the whole Preview/drawer, and
no longer fires from inside text fields.
- The Preview drawer has a visible close button, and the upload toast moves off
the attach/send controls (to the left) while the Preview is open.
- A turn that produces multiple artifacts now renders one chip per artifact
(labelled by tool, indexed when several), instead of exposing only the last.
The code node's Input files and the agent node's Documents now render the same
NodeDocumentsControl: an All/None/Choose toggle, a multiselect of upstream
document/artifact refs, and a free-text add-ref escape (a typed A1/id appears as
a removable chip). The control owns its toggle state so Choose is reachable from
an empty selection — retiring the per-node parent flag. File passing stays
agent-only; the code node keeps its inputs field name and stages the selected
refs as files in the sandbox.
Replace the sandbox Docling extractor with read_document, backed by the in-process
backend parser (the same one ingestion uses) and offloaded to a dedicated
'parsing' Celery queue so it can run on GPU-capable workers with predictable RAM.
The tool resolves the input ref under the run-scoped gate, enqueues the parse,
and awaits it with a timeout (degrading to an error rather than hanging); the
worker independently re-resolves the artifact through the same gate and never
trusts a raw path. Untrusted files get the upload path's safeguards (extension
whitelist, size cap, sanitized temp file, cleanup). Options: output
(markdown/text/structured/chunks), ocr, pages, engine, max_chars, include_tables,
persist, json_schema. The workflow native-file 'extract' fallback now uses the
same worker path, so document parsing no longer needs the sandbox and works on
every backend.
Also fixes the branch's periodic-task test (the sandbox reaper made it 12) and
points the dev and e2e Celery workers at the parsing queue.
Clicking "Choose…" with nothing selected now opens the document picker. The
mode was derived purely from the stored input_documents, so an empty selection
read back as None and the picker never appeared — leaving per-node document
selection unreachable unless a value was already set. An explicit per-node flag
now keeps Choose mode active even when empty, without leaking across nodes.
An input_documents entry with no matching upstream option (a renamed or deleted
upstream output variable, or a literal ref) now appears as a removable chip in
the agent node's Choose-mode document selector instead of silently vanishing,
so the stored selection stays visible and editable.
Adds withChosenDocumentOptions to merge stored selections into the multiselect
options, with tests.
The agent-node panel gains a Documents section (All input docs / None / Choose
upstream document variables) and a file-passing selector (auto / native /
extract), writing the input_documents and file_passing config the engine
consumes. Selections persist as bare state-variable names so they resolve
against run state; the toggle, chosen docs, and file-passing mode re-derive from
the stored config on reload. Reuses the existing multiselect, select, and
upstream-variable enumeration.
Known minor: an input_documents entry whose upstream variable was renamed or
deleted is preserved in config but not shown as a removable chip in Choose mode.
An agent node can list input_documents (short refs like A1, a literal "*" for all
inputs, or state variables holding refs produced by an upstream node). The engine
resolves each through the run-scoped artifact gate and feeds it to the node's LLM
natively when the model supports the format (PDFs included via the provider's
image synthesis), otherwise extracts it to text with Docling. A file_passing
policy (auto/native/extract) and per-node count + per-file byte caps bound cost;
the native decision uses the same supported-types source the provider handler
uses, so a document is never silently dropped. Bytes never enter run state.
Add code execution as an attack surface and an isolation threat: untrusted
LLM-authored code runs in the sandbox, and the self-hosted Jupyter runner is a
single trust domain (shared container/uid). Record the mitigations (approval
gating, state passed as data not code, scrubbed kernel secrets, 0700 workspaces,
network-layer egress) and that per-tenant isolation means the Daytona
per-session-VM backend or running the runner under gVisor.
The classic prompt renderer now passes artifact_parent={conversation_id} so a
normal agent's prompt can resolve a prior-turn artifact with
{{ artifacts.artifact(id) }}, scoped to its own conversation (parent-derived
authz; a missing conversation_id safely yields an empty lookup). This makes the
artifacts variable surfaced in the agent builder functional, and is the parent
wiring an agent-as-tool / subagent feature would also rely on.
Add the run input-documents variable to the workflow builder's variable
dropdown (workflow input) and the artifact-by-id lookup to both the workflow
builder and the agent prompt builder, so the variables exposed by the shared
template namespaces are discoverable. agent.input_documents is workflow-only
(injected from run state) and stays out of the agent builder, which would
render it empty.
Run each kernel under a scrubbed environment so untrusted code can never read
the host's secrets. A custom 'docsgpt-python' kernelspec launches ipykernel
through a wrapper that keeps only what the kernel needs (PATH, HOME, LANG, and
the Jupyter runtime/data dirs), dropping API keys, tokens, the database URL, and
the gateway token. The app selects this kernel by name via SANDBOX_KERNEL_NAME,
so the distinct name is never shadowed by the stock python3 spec. Per-session
workspaces are created mode 0700 (defense in depth under the shared uid). The
README documents the runner as a single trust domain and points to the Daytona
backend for per-tenant isolation.
When an executed tool call raises, append the assistant message carrying the
tool_calls before the tool error result, mirroring the success path. Previously
only the tool result was appended, leaving a tool message with no preceding
tool_calls parent, which made the next provider completion reject the request.
Every tool_call id in a batch is now answered even when some calls fail.
Let workflow runs consume and produce documents end to end: bridge uploaded
attachments into run-scoped artifacts so nodes receive the input documents
(with a per-run cap and server-computed size/sha256, and the run row pre-created
so produced artifacts are authorized during the run); emit the run id to the
client and add a builder panel that lists, previews, and downloads a run's
artifacts; and allow attaching documents to a Preview run via the existing
upload flow.
Also fixes issues a compliance workflow surfaced: attachment ownership now keys
on the raw identity instead of a sanitized one (the sanitized form could not be
read back and could collide across users); workflow code nodes read prior state
from a state.json data file instead of templating it into the program, so
untrusted document content can never be interpolated into executed code;
structured node output wrapped in code fences is recovered; and the live
speech-to-text ownership check compares the raw identity.
Stamp the engine's workflow_run_id into a workflow agent node's tool config, so
artifact_generator, code_executor, and document_extractor address artifacts by
the workflow run. An artifact (and its short ref like A1) created by one agent
node is then visible to a later code node and editable by a later agent node in
the same run - enabling an 'agent generates, a code node transforms, a second
agent edits' flow. Workflow agent nodes carry no conversation id, so only the
run scope applies.
Add an html kind to the artifact generator: it renders a styled HTML report from
a stored JSON spec (title + heading/paragraph/list/table/code blocks), producing
text/html bytes the sidebar already previews inline in the sandboxed iframe,
while keeping the spec as the source of truth so edit and rewrite make real
versions. So a single artifact both renders inline and versions conversationally.
The renderer is a fixed program fed the spec as data, and every spec text value
is HTML-escaped into the output.
Pavel