Logins, role grants and provisioning were audited from the first release;
creating and deleting sources, agents, agent keys and conversations were not.
An operator reviewing the trail could see who signed in but not who deleted
the source they were asking about.
Adds docsgpt/api/audit.py: one helper that records an event inside the
caller's transaction, in a savepoint, swallowing failures -- an audit write
must never be able to fail the action it describes -- and tolerating the
absence of a Flask request so a Celery task can record too.
Events added: source.created (upload and wiki), source.deleted,
source.reingested, agent.created, agent.updated, agent.deleted,
agent.key_regenerated, conversation.deleted, conversation.deleted_all.
agent.updated records field names only, never values, which can carry prompts
and credentials.
The same module carries the event -> category map (identity / access / config
/ data) that the admin activity feed filters on.
A resource restriction was checked on ids in the request, not on what the
addressed row pulls in or belongs to. Closed:
- Workflow writes for tokens restricted on sources, tools or prompts (a graph
names those inside its nodes), and attaching a workflow to an agent unless
the token is restricted on workflows too.
- Chat for tools-restricted tokens (chat executes tools; rejected at token
creation as well), and agent-less chat for tokens restricted on prompts or
workflows.
- conversation_id on chat: it must belong to the agent being run, or to no
agent for agent-less chat. Otherwise the server continued, appended to, or
resumed pending tool calls of another agent's conversation.
- Schedules for tokens restricted on anything but agents; schedule-id routes
for every restricted token.
- Conversations and analytics for every restricted token, not only
agent-restricted ones.
Also: create, first publish and adopt return the agent API key masked to a
token without agents:keys; token ids must be canonical UUIDs (urn:uuid: gave
a 500); an expired token is reported as expired; token creation takes a
per-user advisory lock so the cap cannot be raced; admin revoke-sessions
writes a pat_revoked event per token. The UI drops a row whose revoke returns
404 and does not offer a tools restriction next to chat:run.
A central rule table maps each route and method to the scope a token needs;
a route that is not listed cannot be called with a token, and a test fails
when a registered route is left unclassified. Token management, admin, team
management, sign-in, device pairing and OAuth handshakes are never token
reachable, and a token never carries the admin role.
A token restricted to specific agents, sources, prompts, tools or workflows
is held to its allowlist: ids are checked wherever a route carries them,
listings are filtered, creation is refused, and routes whose rows cannot be
tied to the allowlist are closed. Agent import checks the resolved target.
PinAgent looked agents up with no ownership, share or team predicate, and
PinnedAgents returned those rows through a hand-rolled dict that bypassed
the blanking _format_agent_output applies. Anyone holding an agent id --
a share-link recipient learns the real UUID -- could pin it and keep
reading its name, description, prompt, tools, type, status and masked key
after the share was revoked.
Add _user_may_pin: the owner, a team grantee, a recipient of a still-live
share link, or a system template. PinAgent checks it before pinning and
PinnedAgents re-checks every row on read, so a revoked grant drops out of
the list instead of persisting. Unpinning stays open regardless of current
access, or a revoked share would strand a pin the user cannot clear. The
masked key is now owner-only, matching _format_agent_output.
Adds the first cross-user pin tests: every existing one pinned the
caller's own agent.
Review follow-ups:
- The agents list and the pinned list dropped agents that had neither a
source nor a retriever. Publishing such an agent is now allowed, so it
vanished from the list right after publish. Both filters are gone; a
source-less agent skips retrieval and is still runnable. Tests cover
both listings.
- The agent form selected an uploaded source by diffing the source
catalog before and after the upload, which would also pick up any
source created or shared in the meantime. Upload now passes the id of
the source it created to onSuccessfulUpload, and the form selects only
that id.
The sources list used to start with a fake "Default" entry that had no id
and, at run time, meant "no source, skip retrieval". The agent form
pre-selected it, snapped back to it when the last source was deselected,
and refused to publish without it, so a new agent always looked like it
had a knowledge base when it had none.
Backend
- /api/sources returns only ingested sources; no placeholder row.
- Publishing an agent no longer requires a source on create or update.
The legacy "default" value is still accepted and maps to NULL.
Frontend
- The agent source picker starts empty, can be cleared, and shows a hint
that a source-less agent answers from the model and its tools only.
- The picker groups sources into "Your sources" and "Shared with team"
when any team-shared source exists, shows "N sources selected" for a
multi-selection, and gets the same "Go to Sources" / "Upload new"
footer as the chat picker. A source uploaded from the form is selected
when it lands.
- Source selection serialisation and the picker id live in one helper
shared with the chat picker; the four copies in the form are gone.
- The client no longer seeds a placeholder source in the store, and the
dead auto-select of a "default" document is removed.
The backend import package is now docsgpt, the name it will carry on PyPI;
application was far too generic to install into anyone's site-packages.
git mv plus a mechanical rewrite of every import, dotted string and path
reference: 734 Python files, the compose files, Dockerfile, workflows, docs,
setup scripts, devcontainer, k8s manifests, vscode config, pytest and coverage
config, .gitignore. Behaviour is unchanged.
Kept for one release:
- A top-level application package whose meta-path finder resolves
application.x.y to the already-imported docsgpt.x.y object, so old imports
and entry points (celery -A application.app.celery,
uvicorn application.asgi:asgi_app) keep working with a FutureWarning.
- Celery registers every application.* task name as an alias of its
docsgpt.* task on start-up, so messages queued by the previous release still
run. The redbeat key prefix moves to redbeat:docsgpt:v2: so schedule entries
the previous release wrote are left unread instead of firing twice.
The backend image builds from the repository root (docker build -f
docsgpt/Dockerfile .) so it can ship the alias package; a root .dockerignore
allow-lists docsgpt/ and application/ and keeps caches, local data, .env
files, the sample index files and the Dockerfile out. Compose and the image
workflows point at the new context.
arc53-machine