Improve outbound URL validation (#10833)

This commit is contained in:
Andras Bacsai authored and GitHub committed 2026-07-02 15:02:37 +02:00
commit bed058b826
12 files changed
+440 -85

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+18 -1
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@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
namespace App\Jobs;
use App\Notifications\Dto\DiscordMessage;
use App\Rules\SafeWebhookUrl;
use Illuminate\Bus\Queueable;
use Illuminate\Contracts\Queue\ShouldBeEncrypted;
use Illuminate\Contracts\Queue\ShouldQueue;
@@ -10,6 +11,8 @@ use Illuminate\Foundation\Bus\Dispatchable;
use Illuminate\Queue\InteractsWithQueue;
use Illuminate\Queue\SerializesModels;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Http;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Log;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Validator;
class SendMessageToDiscordJob implements ShouldBeEncrypted, ShouldQueue
{
@@ -41,6 +44,20 @@ class SendMessageToDiscordJob implements ShouldBeEncrypted, ShouldQueue
*/
public function handle(): void
{
Http::post($this->webhookUrl, $this->message->toPayload());
$validator = Validator::make(
['webhook_url' => $this->webhookUrl],
['webhook_url' => ['required', 'url', new SafeWebhookUrl]]
);
if ($validator->fails()) {
Log::warning('SendMessageToDiscordJob: blocked unsafe webhook URL', [
'url' => $this->webhookUrl,
'errors' => $validator->errors()->all(),
]);
return;
}
Http::withOptions(['allow_redirects' => false])->post($this->webhookUrl, $this->message->toPayload());
}
}
+19 -2
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@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
namespace App\Jobs;
use App\Notifications\Dto\SlackMessage;
use App\Rules\SafeWebhookUrl;
use Illuminate\Bus\Queueable;
use Illuminate\Contracts\Queue\ShouldBeEncrypted;
use Illuminate\Contracts\Queue\ShouldQueue;
@@ -10,6 +11,8 @@ use Illuminate\Foundation\Bus\Dispatchable;
use Illuminate\Queue\InteractsWithQueue;
use Illuminate\Queue\SerializesModels;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Http;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Log;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Validator;
class SendMessageToSlackJob implements ShouldBeEncrypted, ShouldQueue
{
@@ -34,6 +37,20 @@ class SendMessageToSlackJob implements ShouldBeEncrypted, ShouldQueue
public function handle(): void
{
$validator = Validator::make(
['webhook_url' => $this->webhookUrl],
['webhook_url' => ['required', 'url', new SafeWebhookUrl]]
);
if ($validator->fails()) {
Log::warning('SendMessageToSlackJob: blocked unsafe webhook URL', [
'url' => $this->webhookUrl,
'errors' => $validator->errors()->all(),
]);
return;
}
if ($this->isSlackWebhook()) {
$this->sendToSlack();
@@ -64,7 +81,7 @@ class SendMessageToSlackJob implements ShouldBeEncrypted, ShouldQueue
private function sendToSlack(): void
{
Http::post($this->webhookUrl, [
Http::withOptions(['allow_redirects' => false])->post($this->webhookUrl, [
'text' => $this->message->title,
'blocks' => [
[
@@ -106,7 +123,7 @@ class SendMessageToSlackJob implements ShouldBeEncrypted, ShouldQueue
{
$username = config('app.name');
Http::post($this->webhookUrl, [
Http::withOptions(['allow_redirects' => false])->post($this->webhookUrl, [
'username' => $username,
'attachments' => [
[
+1 -1
View File
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ class SendWebhookJob implements ShouldBeEncrypted, ShouldQueue
]);
}
$response = Http::post($this->webhookUrl, $this->payload);
$response = Http::withOptions(['allow_redirects' => false])->post($this->webhookUrl, $this->payload);
if (isDev()) {
ray('Webhook response', [
+1
View File
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ class S3Storage extends BaseModel
'http' => [
'connect_timeout' => self::CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
'timeout' => self::REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
'allow_redirects' => false,
],
]);
// Test the connection by listing files with ListObjectsV2 (S3)
+122 -24
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,11 @@ use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Log;
class SafeExternalUrl implements ValidationRule
{
/**
* @param (Closure(string): array<int, string>)|null $resolver
*/
public function __construct(private ?Closure $resolver = null) {}
/**
* Run the validation rule.
*
@@ -38,44 +43,137 @@ class SafeExternalUrl implements ValidationRule
}
$host = strtolower($host);
$hostForIpCheck = $this->normalizeHostForIpCheck($host);
$hostForDns = rtrim($hostForIpCheck, '.');
// Block well-known internal hostnames
$internalHosts = ['localhost', '0.0.0.0', '::1'];
if (in_array($host, $internalHosts) || str_ends_with($host, '.local') || str_ends_with($host, '.internal')) {
Log::warning('External URL points to internal host', [
'attribute' => $attribute,
'url' => $value,
'host' => $host,
'ip' => request()->ip(),
'user_id' => auth()->id(),
]);
if (in_array($hostForDns, $internalHosts, true) || str_ends_with($hostForDns, '.local') || str_ends_with($hostForDns, '.internal')) {
$this->logBlockedHost($attribute, $value, $host);
$fail('The :attribute must not point to internal hosts.');
return;
}
// Resolve hostname to IP and block private/reserved ranges
$ip = gethostbyname($host);
if (filter_var($hostForIpCheck, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP)) {
if (! $this->isPublicIp($hostForIpCheck)) {
$this->logBlockedIp($attribute, $value, $host, $hostForIpCheck);
$fail('The :attribute must not point to a private or reserved IP address.');
// gethostbyname returns the original hostname on failure (e.g. unresolvable)
if ($ip === $host && ! filter_var($host, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP)) {
return;
}
return;
}
$resolvedIps = $this->resolveHost($hostForDns);
if ($resolvedIps === []) {
$fail('The :attribute host could not be resolved.');
return;
}
if (! filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE)) {
Log::warning('External URL resolves to private or reserved IP', [
'attribute' => $attribute,
'url' => $value,
'host' => $host,
'resolved_ip' => $ip,
'ip' => request()->ip(),
'user_id' => auth()->id(),
]);
$fail('The :attribute must not point to a private or reserved IP address.');
foreach ($resolvedIps as $resolvedIp) {
if (! $this->isPublicIp($resolvedIp)) {
$this->logBlockedIp($attribute, $value, $host, $resolvedIp);
$fail('The :attribute must not point to a private or reserved IP address.');
return;
return;
}
}
}
private function normalizeHostForIpCheck(string $host): string
{
return (str_starts_with($host, '[') && str_ends_with($host, ']'))
? substr($host, 1, -1)
: $host;
}
/**
* @return array<int, string>
*/
private function resolveHost(string $host): array
{
if ($this->resolver instanceof Closure) {
return array_values(array_filter(($this->resolver)($host), fn (string $ip): bool => filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP) !== false));
}
$records = @dns_get_record($host, DNS_A | DNS_AAAA);
if ($records === false) {
$records = [];
}
$ips = [];
foreach ($records as $record) {
foreach (['ip', 'ipv6'] as $key) {
if (isset($record[$key]) && filter_var($record[$key], FILTER_VALIDATE_IP)) {
$ips[] = $record[$key];
}
}
}
$ipv4Addresses = @gethostbynamel($host);
if (is_array($ipv4Addresses)) {
foreach ($ipv4Addresses as $ip) {
if (filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP)) {
$ips[] = $ip;
}
}
}
return array_values(array_unique($ips));
}
private function isPublicIp(string $ip): bool
{
$embeddedIpv4 = $this->extractIpv4FromMappedIpv6($ip);
if ($embeddedIpv4 !== null) {
return filter_var($embeddedIpv4, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE) !== false;
}
return filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE) !== false;
}
private function extractIpv4FromMappedIpv6(string $ip): ?string
{
$packed = @inet_pton($ip);
if ($packed === false || strlen($packed) !== 16) {
return null;
}
$prefix = substr($packed, 0, 12);
if ($prefix !== str_repeat("\0", 10)."\xff\xff") {
return null;
}
$parts = unpack('C4', substr($packed, 12, 4));
if ($parts === false) {
return null;
}
return implode('.', $parts);
}
private function logBlockedHost(string $attribute, string $url, string $host): void
{
Log::warning('External URL points to internal host', [
'attribute' => $attribute,
'url' => $url,
'host' => $host,
'ip' => request()->ip(),
'user_id' => auth()->id(),
]);
}
private function logBlockedIp(string $attribute, string $url, string $host, string $resolvedIp): void
{
Log::warning('External URL resolves to private or reserved IP', [
'attribute' => $attribute,
'url' => $url,
'host' => $host,
'resolved_ip' => $resolvedIp,
'ip' => request()->ip(),
'user_id' => auth()->id(),
]);
}
}
+154 -37
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@@ -8,6 +8,11 @@ use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Log;
class SafeWebhookUrl implements ValidationRule
{
/**
* @param (Closure(string): array<int, string>)|null $resolver
*/
public function __construct(private ?Closure $resolver = null) {}
/**
* Run the validation rule.
*
@@ -39,63 +44,175 @@ class SafeWebhookUrl implements ValidationRule
}
$host = strtolower($host);
$hostForIpCheck = $this->normalizeHostForIpCheck($host);
$hostForDns = rtrim($hostForIpCheck, '.');
// Strip IPv6 brackets (e.g. "[::1]" -> "::1") before IP checks so bracketed
// literals can't sneak past filter_var FILTER_VALIDATE_IP.
$hostForIpCheck = (str_starts_with($host, '[') && str_ends_with($host, ']'))
? substr($host, 1, -1)
: $host;
// Block well-known dangerous hostnames
$blockedHosts = ['localhost', '0.0.0.0', '::1'];
if (in_array($hostForIpCheck, $blockedHosts) || str_ends_with($host, '.internal')) {
Log::warning('Webhook URL points to blocked host', [
'attribute' => $attribute,
'host' => $host,
'ip' => request()->ip(),
'user_id' => auth()->id(),
]);
if (in_array($hostForDns, $blockedHosts, true) || str_ends_with($hostForDns, '.internal')) {
$this->logBlockedHost($attribute, $host);
$fail('The :attribute must not point to localhost or internal hosts.');
return;
}
// Block loopback (127.0.0.0/8) and link-local/metadata (169.254.0.0/16) when IP is provided directly
if (filter_var($hostForIpCheck, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP) && ($this->isLoopback($hostForIpCheck) || $this->isLinkLocal($hostForIpCheck))) {
Log::warning('Webhook URL points to blocked IP range', [
'attribute' => $attribute,
'host' => $host,
'ip' => request()->ip(),
'user_id' => auth()->id(),
]);
$fail('The :attribute must not point to loopback or link-local addresses.');
if (filter_var($hostForIpCheck, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP)) {
if ($this->isBlockedIp($hostForIpCheck)) {
$this->logBlockedIp($attribute, $host, $hostForIpCheck);
$fail('The :attribute must not point to loopback or link-local addresses.');
return;
}
return;
}
$resolvedIps = $this->resolveHost($hostForDns);
foreach ($resolvedIps as $resolvedIp) {
if ($this->isBlockedIp($resolvedIp)) {
$this->logBlockedIp($attribute, $host, $resolvedIp);
$fail('The :attribute must not point to loopback or link-local addresses.');
return;
}
}
}
private function isLoopback(string $ip): bool
private function normalizeHostForIpCheck(string $host): string
{
return (str_starts_with($host, '[') && str_ends_with($host, ']'))
? substr($host, 1, -1)
: $host;
}
/**
* @return array<int, string>
*/
private function resolveHost(string $host): array
{
if ($this->resolver instanceof Closure) {
return array_values(array_filter(($this->resolver)($host), fn (string $ip): bool => filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP) !== false));
}
$records = @dns_get_record($host, DNS_A | DNS_AAAA);
if ($records === false) {
$records = [];
}
$ips = [];
foreach ($records as $record) {
foreach (['ip', 'ipv6'] as $key) {
if (isset($record[$key]) && filter_var($record[$key], FILTER_VALIDATE_IP)) {
$ips[] = $record[$key];
}
}
}
$ipv4Addresses = @gethostbynamel($host);
if (is_array($ipv4Addresses)) {
foreach ($ipv4Addresses as $ip) {
if (filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP)) {
$ips[] = $ip;
}
}
}
return array_values(array_unique($ips));
}
private function isBlockedIp(string $ip): bool
{
$embeddedIpv4 = $this->extractIpv4FromMappedIpv6($ip);
if ($embeddedIpv4 !== null) {
return $this->isBlockedIpv4($embeddedIpv4);
}
if (filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_IPV4)) {
return $this->isBlockedIpv4($ip);
}
return $this->isBlockedIpv6($ip);
}
private function isBlockedIpv4(string $ip): bool
{
// 127.0.0.0/8, 0.0.0.0
if ($ip === '0.0.0.0' || str_starts_with($ip, '127.')) {
return true;
}
// IPv6 loopback
$normalized = @inet_pton($ip);
return $normalized !== false && $normalized === inet_pton('::1');
}
private function isLinkLocal(string $ip): bool
{
// 169.254.0.0/16 — covers cloud metadata at 169.254.169.254
if (! filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_IPV4)) {
$long = ip2long($ip);
if ($long === false) {
return false;
}
$long = ip2long($ip);
$unsigned = sprintf('%u', $long);
$linkLocalStart = sprintf('%u', ip2long('169.254.0.0'));
$linkLocalEnd = sprintf('%u', ip2long('169.254.255.255'));
return $long !== false && ($long >> 16) === (ip2long('169.254.0.0') >> 16);
return $unsigned >= $linkLocalStart && $unsigned <= $linkLocalEnd;
}
private function isBlockedIpv6(string $ip): bool
{
$packed = @inet_pton($ip);
if ($packed === false) {
return false;
}
if ($packed === inet_pton('::1') || $packed === inet_pton('::')) {
return true;
}
$bytes = unpack('C16', $packed);
if ($bytes === false) {
return false;
}
$firstByte = $bytes[1];
$secondByte = $bytes[2];
// fe80::/10 link-local and fc00::/7 unique local addresses.
return ($firstByte === 0xFE && ($secondByte & 0xC0) === 0x80)
|| (($firstByte & 0xFE) === 0xFC);
}
private function extractIpv4FromMappedIpv6(string $ip): ?string
{
$packed = @inet_pton($ip);
if ($packed === false || strlen($packed) !== 16) {
return null;
}
$prefix = substr($packed, 0, 12);
if ($prefix !== str_repeat("\0", 10)."\xff\xff") {
return null;
}
$parts = unpack('C4', substr($packed, 12, 4));
if ($parts === false) {
return null;
}
return implode('.', $parts);
}
private function logBlockedHost(string $attribute, string $host): void
{
Log::warning('Webhook URL points to blocked host', [
'attribute' => $attribute,
'host' => $host,
'ip' => request()->ip(),
'user_id' => auth()->id(),
]);
}
private function logBlockedIp(string $attribute, string $host, string $blockedIp): void
{
Log::warning('Webhook URL points to blocked IP range', [
'attribute' => $attribute,
'host' => $host,
'resolved_ip' => $blockedIp,
'ip' => request()->ip(),
'user_id' => auth()->id(),
]);
}
}