fix: harden TrustHosts middleware and use base_url() for password reset links

- Fix circular cache dependency in TrustHosts where handle() checked cache
  before hosts() could populate it, causing host validation to never activate
- Validate both Host and X-Forwarded-Host headers against trusted hosts list
  (X-Forwarded-Host is checked before TrustProxies applies it to the request)
- Use base_url() instead of url() for password reset link generation so the
  URL is derived from server-side config (FQDN / public IP) instead of the
  request context
- Strip port from X-Forwarded-Host before matching (e.g. host:443 → host)
- Add tests for host validation, cache population, and reset URL generation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Andras BacsaiandClaude Opus 4.6 committed 2026-03-26 18:39:54 +01:00
1 parent 5ed77f337a
commit e1d4b4682e
4 files changed
+321 -13

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+57 -2
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@@ -30,14 +30,44 @@ class TrustHosts extends Middleware
return $next($request);
}
// Eagerly call hosts() to populate the cache (fixes circular dependency
// where handle() checked cache before hosts() could populate it via
// Cache::remember, causing host validation to never activate)
$this->hosts();
// Skip host validation if no FQDN is configured (initial setup)
$fqdnHost = Cache::get('instance_settings_fqdn_host');
if ($fqdnHost === '' || $fqdnHost === null) {
return $next($request);
}
// For all other routes, use parent's host validation
return parent::handle($request, $next);
// Validate the request host against trusted hosts explicitly.
// We check manually instead of relying on Symfony's lazy getHost() validation,
// which can be bypassed if getHost() was already called earlier in the pipeline.
$trustedHosts = array_filter($this->hosts());
// Collect all hosts to validate: the actual Host header, plus X-Forwarded-Host
// if present. We must check X-Forwarded-Host here because this middleware runs
// BEFORE TrustProxies, which would later apply X-Forwarded-Host to the request.
$hostsToValidate = [strtolower(trim($request->getHost()))];
$forwardedHost = $request->headers->get('X-Forwarded-Host');
if ($forwardedHost) {
// X-Forwarded-Host can be a comma-separated list; validate the first (client-facing) value.
// Strip port if present (e.g. "coolify.example.com:443" → "coolify.example.com")
// to match the trusted hosts list which stores hostnames without ports.
$forwardedHostValue = strtolower(trim(explode(',', $forwardedHost)[0]));
$forwardedHostValue = preg_replace('/:\d+$/', '', $forwardedHostValue);
$hostsToValidate[] = $forwardedHostValue;
}
foreach ($hostsToValidate as $hostToCheck) {
if (! $this->isHostTrusted($hostToCheck, $trustedHosts)) {
return response('Bad Host', 400);
}
}
return $next($request);
}
/**
@@ -100,4 +130,29 @@ class TrustHosts extends Middleware
return array_filter($trustedHosts);
}
/**
* Check if a host matches the trusted hosts list.
*
* Regex patterns (from allSubdomainsOfApplicationUrl, starting with ^)
* are matched with preg_match. Literal hostnames use exact comparison
* only — they are NOT passed to preg_match, which would treat unescaped
* dots as wildcards and match unanchored substrings.
*
* @param array<int, string> $trustedHosts
*/
protected function isHostTrusted(string $host, array $trustedHosts): bool
{
foreach ($trustedHosts as $pattern) {
if (str_starts_with($pattern, '^')) {
if (@preg_match('{'.$pattern.'}i', $host)) {
return true;
}
} elseif ($host === $pattern) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
}
@@ -67,9 +67,12 @@ class ResetPassword extends Notification
return call_user_func(static::$createUrlCallback, $notifiable, $this->token);
}
return url(route('password.reset', [
$path = route('password.reset', [
'token' => $this->token,
'email' => $notifiable->getEmailForPasswordReset(),
], false));
], false);
// Use server-side config (FQDN / public IP) instead of request host
return rtrim(base_url(), '/').$path;
}
}