diff --git a/internal/tools/credential_context.go b/internal/tools/credential_context.go
index 5fe54a33..0d5d3b48 100644
--- a/internal/tools/credential_context.go
+++ b/internal/tools/credential_context.go
@@ -42,9 +42,10 @@ func GenerateCredentialContext(creds []store.SecureCLIBinary) string {
 		b.WriteString("\n")
 	}
 
-	b.WriteString("### When a command is blocked:\n")
-	b.WriteString("Tell the user: \"This operation requires admin approval and cannot be performed automatically.\"\n")
-	b.WriteString("Do NOT attempt workarounds to bypass blocked commands.\n")
+	b.WriteString("### When a credentialed CLI command is blocked:\n")
+	b.WriteString("This section applies ONLY to commands that return a `[CREDENTIALED EXEC]` error.\n")
+	b.WriteString("Tell the user: \"This credentialed CLI operation is blocked by policy and may require admin approval.\"\n")
+	b.WriteString("Do NOT attempt workarounds to bypass blocked credentialed CLI commands.\n")
 	return b.String()
 }
 
diff --git a/internal/tools/credential_context_test.go b/internal/tools/credential_context_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4f52503d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/tools/credential_context_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+package tools
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/store"
+)
+
+// TestGenerateCredentialContext_BlockedSectionScopedToMarker pins the wording
+// that scopes the "blocked command" guidance to credentialed-CLI errors only.
+// The LLM must see: (a) a header that says "credentialed CLI command",
+// (b) the literal `[CREDENTIALED EXEC]` marker, and (c) the qualifier
+// "credentialed CLI operation" — not the bare phrase from previous wording.
+func TestGenerateCredentialContext_BlockedSectionScopedToMarker(t *testing.T) {
+	creds := []store.SecureCLIBinary{{
+		BinaryName:  "gh",
+		Description: "GitHub CLI",
+	}}
+
+	out := GenerateCredentialContext(creds)
+
+	wantContains := []string{
+		"### When a credentialed CLI command is blocked:",
+		"[CREDENTIALED EXEC]",
+		"credentialed CLI operation",
+	}
+	for _, s := range wantContains {
+		if !strings.Contains(out, s) {
+			t.Errorf("expected output to contain %q, but it did not.\nOutput:\n%s", s, out)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Old unqualified wording must not survive — that wording over-generalized
+	// to plain shell exec failures and caused unjustified pre-refusals.
+	dontWant := "Tell the user: \"This operation requires admin approval"
+	if strings.Contains(out, dontWant) {
+		t.Errorf("output still contains unqualified wording %q.\nOutput:\n%s", dontWant, out)
+	}
+}