feat(bitrix24): imbot.v2 migration, 2-way media, openline sender-tag echo, and hardening (#1236)

* refactor(bitrix24): rename "Path B" framing to maintainer-specified naming [B24:2794]

Per maintainer hard rule #10 (no generic "Path A/B" framing) from PR #1061
review. The Bitrix24 MCP auto-onboard flow is Bitrix-specific glue
("Bitrix24 OAuth -> existing mcp_user_credentials bridge"), NOT a generic
MCP architecture pattern.

Naming convention applied consistently:
- First mention per file: full "Bitrix24 OAuth -> existing
  mcp_user_credentials bridge" (matches maintainer comment verbatim).
- Subsequent mentions in same file: shortened "mcp_user_credentials bridge".
- Test/log context referencing literal endpoint /api/auto-onboard: keep
  "auto-onboard" reference (it's the actual API endpoint name).

Changes are documentation-only:
- Rename in code comments + test descriptions + plan docs.
- Clarify framing in mcp_client.go + provisioner.go doc comments to
  emphasize Bitrix-specific glue (not generic MCP infra).
- Reuse existing mcp_user_credentials table + MCPServerStore methods
  (no schema / store / abstraction change).

Files:
- cmd/gateway.go (factory registration doc)
- internal/channels/bitrix24/{channel,factory,mcp_client,provisioner}.go
- internal/channels/bitrix24/{mcp_client,provisioner}_test.go
- plan/goclaw-mcp-integration.md (21 occurrences)

Verified: go build + MCP-related tests pass (TestProvision*,
TestInitMCPProvisioner*, TestMCPClient*).

Phase 1 of Path C execution per
plans/reports/decision-log-260519-1555-bitrix24-pr-fork-decision.md.

* fix: confine outbound media paths to agent workspace [B24:2794]

Tool MEDIA:<path> output reached channel file-upload sinks (Bitrix
imbot.v2.File.upload, Telegram sendDocument, etc.) verbatim via
parseMediaResult, with no workspace-boundary check. A malicious or buggy
tool emitting MEDIA:/etc/passwd could exfiltrate arbitrary files to chat.

Extract the EvalSymlinks+Rel containment from extractMediaFromContent into
a shared confineToWorkspace helper and apply it at the parseMediaResult
sink in processToolResult. Fixing at the source/egress boundary protects
every channel at once rather than per-channel. Paths that escape the
workspace are dropped and logged (security.media_path_rejected).

Add TestConfineToWorkspace (boundary unit) and
TestParseMediaResultConfinedToWorkspace (sink regression for H2).

* feat(bitrix24): support inbound + outbound media via imbot.v2 File API [B24:2794]

Bitrix24 channel was text-only; attachments were parsed but dropped.
- Inbound: download chat files via imbot.v2.File.download (one-time URL),
  forward to the agent with MIME preserved (internal/channels/bitrix24/download.go).
- Outbound: upload agent media to the chat via imbot.v2.File.upload
  (internal/channels/bitrix24/send_media.go).
- Add BaseChannel.HandleMessageMedia to preserve MIME/filename through the bus.
- Per-channel media_max_mb cap (default 20) applies to both directions.

Tests: 92 pass (internal/channels/bitrix24 + internal/channels), go vet clean (PG + sqliteonly).

* refactor(bitrix24): migrate messaging/bot-list/unregister to imbot v2 API [B24:2794]

Move outbound REST calls to the imbot v2 family (keeps register on v1):
- imbot.message.add -> imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send (fields.message shape, live-verified)
- imbot.bot.list (+ legacy imbot.list fallback) -> imbot.v2.Bot.list; add botListRows
  to normalize the v2 {bots:[...]} envelope, legacy array, and id-keyed map forms
- imbot.unregister -> imbot.v2.Bot.unregister

Bot registration stays on v1 imbot.register: v2 imbot.v2.Bot.register changes the
event-delivery model (per-event handler URLs -> eventMode), which would require
rewriting the inbound event parser. No user-facing behavior change.

Tests: bitrix24 package green; go vet ./... clean.

* feat(bitrix24): route whisper via v1 SKIP_CONNECTOR + add v2 replyId [B24:2794]

Bot was leaking HiddenMessage (whisper) replies to the external Zalo
connector because every outbound call went through imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send,
which has no equivalent of the v1 SKIP_CONNECTOR flag. Branch the outbound
path on inbound visibility:

  whisper → imbot.message.add + SKIP_CONNECTOR=Y  (v1, send_v1.go)
  public  → imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send + fields.replyId  (v2, send_v2.go)

Pipeline:
  events.go        parse data[PARAMS][PARAMS][COMPONENT_ID]=HiddenMessage
                   into EventParams.IsHiddenMessage (form + JSON variants)
  handle.go        set bitrix_visibility on InboundMessage.Metadata
  consumer         forward visibility + message_id into OutboundMessage
  send.go          resolveSendOptions + sendChunk dispatcher +
                   shared callWithRateLimitRetry helper
  metadata_keys.go single source of truth for the keys + values

Defaults preserve pre-refactor behaviour: callers that don't populate
bitrix_visibility still go through v2 public, and replyId is omitted
unless a numeric bitrix_message_id arrives in metadata.

Tests:
  TestParseEvent_FormURLEncoded_IsHiddenMessage  (3 cases)
  TestParseEvent_JSON_IsHiddenMessage             (3 cases)
  TestResolveSendOptions                          (8 cases)
  TestSend_BranchesOnVisibility                   (4 cases)

* feat(bitrix24): openline sender-tag echo on replies [B24:2794]

Openline sender-tag echo (this change):
- Capture the connector sender tag ("[name #id]:" or "[name] #id:") from
  inbound openline group messages, strip it from the body the agent sees,
  and re-prepend the canonical "[name] #id:" form to the reply so the Open
  Channel connector routes the answer back to the right external user.
- New sender_prefix.go helper (+ test) accepts both inbound layouts and
  emits one canonical form; scoped to messages carrying the tag, so plain
  chats are unaffected.
- metadata_keys.go: MetaKeySenderPrefix; handle.go capture/strip/stash;
  gateway_consumer_normal.go forwards the key; send.go prepends it on the
  first chunk before chunking.

Bundled bitrix24 channel-core work already on this branch:
- handle.go: @mention is the sole trigger for both staff and connector
  customers; unmentioned traffic is dropped (was: drop all connector msgs).
- isGroupMessageType: treat SONET_GROUP "B" as a group.
- handle_test.go, mcp_client_test.go: cover the above.

* feat(bitrix24): accept colon-less openline sender tag, echo [name] #id [B24:2794]

The Open Channel connector dropped the trailing colon from its sender tag:
inbound now arrives as "[Name] #id <msg>" (was "[Name] #id: <msg>"). The
id-bearing patterns required the colon, so the tag fell through to the
name-only branch and the reply echoed "[Name]" — dropping the #id the
connector needs to route the answer back.

- sender_prefix.go: make the trailing ":" optional on both id layouts
  ([name #id] / [name] #id, with or without colon) and echo the canonical
  "[name] #id" (no colon) to match the connector's current format. Bare
  "[name]" (no id) still echoes "[name]" for Open Channel only.
- handle.go: gate the bare name-only layout to Open Channel (isOpenChannel)
  so ordinary group chats starting with "[x] ..." are left untouched.
- sender_prefix_test.go: cover colon/no-colon x id-inside/id-outside, the
  name-only openline case, and the non-openline no-op.

* fix: security and robustness fixes from the bitrix24 channel review [B24:2794]

- download.go: block redirect-based SSRF on inbound media. CheckRedirect
  re-validates each hop (http(s) only, reject private/loopback/link-local
  hosts, cap hops); the initial portal-domain pin is no longer bypassable
  via a 3xx to an internal service. Public-host redirects still allowed.
- handle.go: extract/echo the openline sender tag only for Open Channel
  sessions (was: any group chat), removing bogus prefixes in CRM group
  chats and narrowing the forged-tag misroute surface.
- loop_tools.go + loop_media.go: confine result.Media to the agent / team /
  tenant-allowed roots (new confineToAnyRoot) before a channel uploads it,
  so a prompt-injected out-of-workspace path (e.g. /etc/passwd) cannot
  exfiltrate, while legitimate cross-workspace media (team files, delegatee
  output) still flows.
- send_media.go: bounded outbound read via io.LimitReader replaces the
  os.Stat + os.ReadFile pair, closing the TOCTOU size-cap bypass; cap a
  single message's outbound attachments at 10 (mirrors inbound).
- register.go: paginate imbot.v2.Bot.list (limit/offset + hasNextPage,
  capped at 40 pages) so verify/lookup see bots past the first 50.
- mcp_client.go: redact access_token / refresh_token / client_secret from an
  echoed MCP error body before it is logged or returned (+ test).

* fix(security): validate resolved dial IP on Bitrix media redirects [B24:2794]

The inbound media download redirect guard only string-checked the redirect
hostname (isPrivateOrLoopback on req.URL.Hostname()), so a redirect to a public
hostname that resolves to 127.0.0.1 / 169.254.169.254 / an RFC1918 address — or a
DNS-rebinding swap between check and dial — still passed the guard and the client
would connect. Reported in PR review.

Add security.NewRedirectFollowingSafeClient: it follows redirects but validates
the RESOLVED destination IP of every hop at dial time via net.Dialer.Control,
reusing the existing blocked-CIDR list. The IP it checks is the IP actually
dialed, so both redirect-to-internal and DNS rebinding are refused, while
legitimate public CDN redirects still succeed. download.go now uses it instead of
the hostname-string guard.

Tests: deterministic dial-control table (loopback / link-local / private /
multicast / unspecified / public, v4 + v6), malformed/non-IP addr, test bypass,
loopback-dial-blocked client wiring, and redirect cap + scheme checks.

* feat(bitrix24): per-participant Zalo openline identity from 3-token sender tag [B24:2794]

Parse the connector's "[Name] #uid #msgId" sender tag so each external
customer in a shared Open Channel group gets its own contact + USER.md
instead of collapsing onto the connector proxy id. Identity minting is
gated on IS_CONNECTOR=Y to reject operator forged tags. Echo back the
msgId only ("#msgId") on replies; keep the legacy single-number and
name-only layouts unchanged. Zero DB migration.

- sender_prefix.go: parseOpenlineSenderTag() classifies 3-token / legacy / name-only
- handle.go: synthetic senderID "openlines:{instance}:{chat}:{uid}" + participant_user_id metadata, gated on FromIsConnector
- gateway_consumer_normal.go: deriveGroupUserID() routes participant -> per-person scope, group fallback otherwise
- send.go: buildAddressMention numeric-id guard so synthetic ids don't emit invalid [USER=...] BBCode
- MetaKeyMessageID kept as Bitrix MESSAGE_ID (drives v2 fields.replyId); connector msgId surfaced only via echo prefix

---------

Co-authored-by: DangTinh311 <dangtinh31193@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Chinh Dang <chinhdang@192.168.68.104>

plan/goclaw-mcp-integration.md

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
 
 > Kế hoạch tích hợp MCP `mcp-bx-syn` với GoClaw chatbot để enforce per-user ACL khi user chat với bot Bitrix24.
 >
-> **Status**: ✅ Both sides implemented. Path B (access_token as auth anchor) shipped end-to-end. Remaining work is operational (backfill, marketplace rollout, Phase E shared-credential support for Open Channel).
+> **Status**: ✅ Both sides implemented. "Bitrix24 OAuth → existing `mcp_user_credentials` bridge" (auto-onboard via access_token as auth anchor — Bitrix-specific glue, not a generic MCP architecture pattern) shipped end-to-end. Remaining work is operational (backfill, marketplace rollout, Phase E shared-credential support for Open Channel).
 >
 > **Owner**: dangt
-> **Last updated**: 2026-04-23 (rev5: Path B shipped — ADMIN_TOKEN removed, mapping table dropped, notify + rate limit + audit log added)
+> **Last updated**: 2026-04-23 (rev5: mcp_user_credentials bridge shipped — ADMIN_TOKEN removed, mapping table dropped, notify + rate limit + audit log added)
 
 ---
 
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 **Mục tiêu**: Mỗi user trong Bitrix chat với bot GoClaw → MCP `mcp-bx-syn` gọi Bitrix REST với token của **chính user đó** (enforce ACL tự nhiên). Triển khai an toàn ở quy mô marketplace: mỗi portal cài app độc lập, không có shared secret giữa MCP và GoClaw.
 
 **Phạm vi (đã triển khai)**:
-- Endpoint `POST /api/auto-onboard` trên MCP (Path B — xác thực bằng Bitrix `access_token` thay vì `ADMIN_TOKEN`)
+- Endpoint `POST /api/auto-onboard` trên MCP (mcp_user_credentials bridge — xác thực bằng Bitrix `access_token` thay vì `ADMIN_TOKEN`)
 - Lazy provisioning hook trong custom Bitrix24 channel của GoClaw
 - Persist per-user OAuth tokens vào MCPUserCredentials để MCP proxy gọi REST API theo user
 - Rate limit + audit log trên endpoint
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 
 ## 2. Quyết định đã chốt (Rev5)
 
-- ✅ **Path B**: MCP xác thực mỗi call `/api/auto-onboard` bằng cách gọi Bitrix `profile` với `access_token` do caller supply, so khớp `profile.ID` với `bitrix_user_id`. Không cần `ADMIN_TOKEN` shared giữa GoClaw và MCP.
+- ✅ **mcp_user_credentials bridge**: MCP xác thực mỗi call `/api/auto-onboard` bằng cách gọi Bitrix `profile` với `access_token` do caller supply, so khớp `profile.ID` với `bitrix_user_id`. Không cần `ADMIN_TOKEN` shared giữa GoClaw và MCP.
   - Đổi so với Rev4 (dùng `ADMIN_TOKEN` Bearer) vì không scale cho marketplace: mỗi portal chạy GoClaw riêng không thể share 1 secret với MCP worker.
 - ✅ **Reject 404 `tenant_not_installed`** nếu portal chưa cài MCP app.
 - ✅ **Idempotent theo `(tenant.domain, bitrix_user_id)`** — lần 2 refresh tokens, trả cùng USR_.
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ Agent gọi MCP tool → Manager.resolveServerCredentials() inject
 | MCP `profile` (không `user.get`) vì không yêu cầu `user` scope | ✅ | `src/auth/bitrix-user-verify.ts` |
 | `ensureFreshToken` re-verify hourly + dismiss khi fail | ✅ | `src/auth/token-manager.ts` |
 | GoClaw KHÔNG còn phụ thuộc ADMIN_TOKEN | ✅ | commit `07b48ef0` (goclaw-deploy/dev) |
-| GoClaw channel đã wire Path B từ commit phase C | ✅ | commit `ea09c1ba` (goclaw-deploy/dev) |
+| GoClaw channel đã wire mcp_user_credentials bridge từ commit phase C | ✅ | commit `ea09c1ba` (goclaw-deploy/dev) |
 
 ---
 
@@ -123,15 +123,15 @@ Agent gọi MCP tool → Manager.resolveServerCredentials() inject
 
 ### 4.1 MCP side — schema (không migration mới)
 
-Schema gốc đã đủ. Các bảng Path B dùng:
+Schema gốc đã đủ. Các bảng mcp_user_credentials bridge dùng:
 
 | Bảng | Cột liên quan | Dùng cho |
 |---|---|---|
 | `tenants` | `domain UNIQUE` | `findTenantByDomain` — 404 gate |
 | `users` | `tenant_id`, `bitrix_user_id TEXT`, `UNIQUE(tenant_id, bitrix_user_id)`, `access_token`, `refresh_token`, `token_expires_at`, `token_version` | Upsert theo (tenant, bitrix_user_id); lưu OAuth tokens để proxy Bitrix REST |
-| `users` (Phase 04 columns, reuse) | `user_status` (`active`/`dismissed`), `last_verified_at` (unix seconds) | Đã có từ Phase 04; Path B reuse cho `ensureFreshToken` re-verify + dismiss flow |
+| `users` (Phase 04 columns, reuse) | `user_status` (`active`/`dismissed`), `last_verified_at` (unix seconds) | Đã có từ Phase 04; mcp_user_credentials bridge reuse cho `ensureFreshToken` re-verify + dismiss flow |
 | `api_keys` | `user_id`, `key`, `label`, `active` | Mint USR_ label `"goclaw-bot"`; `deactivateUserApiKeys` set `active=0` khi dismiss |
-| `auto_onboard_audit` (mới — Path B) | `id`, `domain`, `bitrix_user_id`, `event`, `actor`, `metadata`, `created_at` | Audit trail cho `/api/auto-onboard` — mọi call (success + fail) ghi 1 row. Event taxonomy: `success`/`rate_limited`/`invalid_bitrix_user`/`bitrix_unreachable`/`tenant_not_installed`/`bad_request` |
+| `auto_onboard_audit` (mới — mcp_user_credentials bridge) | `id`, `domain`, `bitrix_user_id`, `event`, `actor`, `metadata`, `created_at` | Audit trail cho `/api/auto-onboard` — mọi call (success + fail) ghi 1 row. Event taxonomy: `success`/`rate_limited`/`invalid_bitrix_user`/`bitrix_unreachable`/`tenant_not_installed`/`bad_request` |
 
 ### 4.2 GoClaw side — schema (KHÔNG migration mới) ✅
 
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ Schema gốc đã đủ. Các bảng Path B dùng:
 
 ## 5. MCP side — `/api/auto-onboard` endpoint ✅ IMPLEMENTED
 
-### 5.1 HTTP contract (rev5 — Path B)
+### 5.1 HTTP contract (rev5 — mcp_user_credentials bridge)
 
 **Route**: `POST /api/auto-onboard`
 
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ Content-Type: application/json
 
 ### 5.3 Re-verify defence-in-depth (`src/auth/token-manager.ts`)
 
-Path B xác thực 1 lần lúc onboard; nhưng nếu user bị deactive trên Bitrix sau khi onboard, USR_ vẫn sống. Mitigation:
+mcp_user_credentials bridge xác thực 1 lần lúc onboard; nhưng nếu user bị deactive trên Bitrix sau khi onboard, USR_ vẫn sống. Mitigation:
 
 - `ensureFreshToken()` chạy trên **mỗi** MCP call (via `resolveApiAuth` → `OAuthAuthContext`).
 - Nếu `last_verified_at > 1h` → gọi `verifyBitrixActive` lại:
@@ -238,11 +238,11 @@ Kết quả: user bị xoá khỏi Bitrix → trong vòng 1h MCP key của họ
 
 | File | Action | Status |
 |---|---|---|
-| `src/api/auto-onboard.ts` | Rewrite — Path B (verify + rate limit + audit) | ✅ |
+| `src/api/auto-onboard.ts` | Rewrite — mcp_user_credentials bridge (verify + rate limit + audit) | ✅ |
 | `src/auth/bitrix-user-verify.ts` | Create — `verifyBitrixActive` via `profile` | ✅ |
 | `src/auth/token-manager.ts` | Modify — hook re-verify vào `ensureFreshToken` | ✅ |
 | `src/db/queries.ts` | Modify — thêm `logAutoOnboardEvent`, `updateUserVerifyStatus`, `deactivateUserApiKeys` | ✅ |
-| `src/db/schema.sql` | Modify — thêm bảng `auto_onboard_audit` (Path B audit). `users.user_status` + `last_verified_at` đã có từ Phase 04 | ✅ |
+| `src/db/schema.sql` | Modify — thêm bảng `auto_onboard_audit` (mcp_user_credentials bridge audit). `users.user_status` + `last_verified_at` đã có từ Phase 04 | ✅ |
 | `src/api/api-router.ts` | Modify — route `POST /auto-onboard` (no auth gate) | ✅ |
 | `wrangler.toml` | Modify — `RATE_LIMIT_KV` binding + drop `ADMIN_TOKEN` dependency | ✅ |
 
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ Không đụng health state — channel vẫn Green vì routing vẫn work.
 |---|---|---|
 | `internal/channels/bitrix24/channel.go` | Modify — add `mcpStore/mcpClient/mcpServerID/mcpProvMu/mcpDebounce/notifyMu/notifyDebounce/nameCacheMu/nameCache` fields | `ea09c1ba` (phase C) |
 | `internal/channels/bitrix24/factory.go` | Modify — `FactoryWithPortalStoreAndMCP` variant + half-config validation; `bitrixCreds` empty struct | `ea09c1ba`, `07b48ef0` |
-| `internal/channels/bitrix24/mcp_client.go` | Create — thin HTTP client; Path B no-auth | `ea09c1ba`, `07b48ef0` |
+| `internal/channels/bitrix24/mcp_client.go` | Create — thin HTTP client; mcp_user_credentials bridge no-auth | `ea09c1ba`, `07b48ef0` |
 | `internal/channels/bitrix24/provisioner.go` | Create — `provisionIfMissing` + `notifyUserOfMCPIssueOnce` + sentinel errors | `ea09c1ba`, `07b48ef0` |
 | `internal/channels/bitrix24/contact_enrich.go` | Create — lazy `user.get` cache cho display_name | `ea09c1ba` |
 | `internal/channels/bitrix24/handle.go` | Modify — call `provisionIfMissing` trước `HandleMessage` | `ea09c1ba` |
@@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ Không đụng health state — channel vẫn Green vì routing vẫn work.
 | Secret | Dùng cho | Rev5 status |
 |---|---|---|
 | `BITRIX_CLIENT_ID` / `BITRIX_CLIENT_SECRET` | OAuth dance (install + refresh) | Giữ nguyên |
-| ~~`ADMIN_TOKEN`~~ | ~~Auth `/api/auto-onboard`~~ | **Bỏ** (Path B không cần) |
+| ~~`ADMIN_TOKEN`~~ | ~~Auth `/api/auto-onboard`~~ | **Bỏ** (mcp_user_credentials bridge không cần) |
 | `ENCRYPTION_KEY` | D1 field encryption | Giữ nguyên |
 | KV binding `RATE_LIMIT_KV` | Rate limit `/api/auto-onboard` | **Mới** |
 
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ Không cần env var riêng cho MCP integration. Tất cả config sống trong
 
 ## 8. Test plan
 
-### 8.1 Unit test MCP side (Path B)
+### 8.1 Unit test MCP side (mcp_user_credentials bridge)
 
 1. Body invalid JSON → 400 `bad_request` + audit row `reason:"invalid_json"`
 2. Thiếu `domain` / `bitrix_user_id` / `access_token` / `refresh_token` → 400 + audit `missing:"<field>"`
@@ -531,10 +531,10 @@ Không cần env var riêng cho MCP integration. Tất cả config sống trong
 
 ## 9. Rollout sequence
 
-### ✅ Phase A — MCP Path B shipped
+### ✅ Phase A — MCP mcp_user_credentials bridge shipped
 - [x] Schema: thêm bảng `auto_onboard_audit` (Phase 04 đã có sẵn `user_status` + `last_verified_at` — reuse, không migrate lại)
 - [x] `verifyBitrixActive` via `profile` (thay cơ chế `user.get?FILTER[ID]=…&ACTIVE=true` cũ)
-- [x] `/api/auto-onboard` rewrite Path B (bỏ Bearer ADMIN_TOKEN gate)
+- [x] `/api/auto-onboard` rewrite mcp_user_credentials bridge (bỏ Bearer ADMIN_TOKEN gate)
 - [x] Rate limit KV + audit log
 - [x] Hook `verifyBitrixActive` vào `ensureFreshToken` (re-verify hourly — cơ chế hourly đã có Phase 04, chỉ đổi backend verify)
 - [x] Deploy + smoke test (end-to-end user#62)
@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ Không cần env var riêng cho MCP integration. Tất cả config sống trong
 
 ## 10. Security considerations
 
-### 10.1 Path B auth anchor
+### 10.1 mcp_user_credentials bridge auth anchor
 
 - **Trust boundary**: MCP tin `access_token` là thật vì Bitrix `profile` xác nhận nó thuộc user nào. Attacker muốn mint USR_ cho user X phải có access_token hợp lệ của user X — mà access_token chỉ leak được nếu Bitrix portal đã bị compromise (trong trường hợp đó attacker đã có quyền cao hơn nhiều so với USR_).
 - Không còn "master key" → không có rotate periodic; cũng không có single point of credential leak.
@@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ Không cần env var riêng cho MCP integration. Tất cả config sống trong
 
 ## 12. Changelog
 
-- **2026-04-23 (rev5)**: Path B shipped end-to-end. Bỏ ADMIN_TOKEN.
+- **2026-04-23 (rev5)**: mcp_user_credentials bridge shipped end-to-end. Bỏ ADMIN_TOKEN.
   - MCP side: `/api/auto-onboard` rewrite dùng `verifyBitrixActive(profile)` làm auth anchor thay vì Bearer ADMIN_TOKEN. Thêm rate limit KV (600/min IP + 120/min domain), audit log `auto_onboard_audit`. Hourly re-verify trong `ensureFreshToken` để revoke USR_ của user bị dismiss khỏi Bitrix.
   - GoClaw side: `mcpClient` bỏ `adminToken` field + Authorization header. `provisioner.go` bỏ `resolveMCPAdminToken` + 2 env consts (`GOCLAW_BITRIX_MCP_ADMIN_TOKEN`, `BITRIX_MCP_ADMIN_TOKEN`). `bitrixCreds` chuyển về empty struct. UI form drop `mcp_admin_token` field. (commit `07b48ef0`)
   - Bỏ bảng mapping `bitrix_mcp_user_mapping` khỏi plan — reuse partner's `mcp_user_credentials` store. Tiết kiệm ~300 LOC: interface + 2 store impls + migration + SchemaVersion bump.