diff --git a/docs/09-security.md b/docs/09-security.md
index e9bfb4a4..1e7d65d0 100644
--- a/docs/09-security.md
+++ b/docs/09-security.md
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ flowchart TD
     S3 --> ALLOW["Allow request"]
 ```
 
-**MCP stdio validation** -- Admin-created, imported, tested, and on-demand-discovered MCP server configs pass `internal/mcp.ValidateServerConfig()` before any temporary or persistent client process is created. `stdio` configs are restricted to allowlisted runtime basenames, reject shell metacharacters and eval/import flags, and block remote loader/script/package execution modes such as `node --loader`, `python -m`, `deno`/`bun` remote refs, `npx`/`uvx`/`pipx` package targets, `uv --with`, `npm exec`, `go run`, `cargo install`, and `dotnet tool install`. SSE and streamable-HTTP transports use the SSRF validator above.
+**MCP stdio validation** -- Admin-created, imported, tested, and on-demand-discovered MCP server configs pass `internal/mcp.ValidateServerConfig()` before any temporary or persistent client process is created. `stdio` configs are restricted to bare allowlisted runtime names resolved from `PATH`; path-bearing commands such as `./node`, `tools/node`, `/tmp/node`, or `.\\node.exe` are rejected to prevent wrapper substitution. Arguments reject shell metacharacters and eval/import flags, and block remote loader/script/package execution modes such as `node --loader`, `python -m`, `deno`/`bun` remote refs, `npx`/`uvx`/`pipx` package targets, `uv --with`, `npm exec`, `go run`, `cargo install`, and `dotnet tool install`. SSE and streamable-HTTP transports use the SSRF validator above.
 
 **Path traversal**: `resolvePath()` applies `filepath.Clean()` then `HasPrefix()` to ensure all paths stay within the workspace. With `restrict = true`, any path outside the workspace is blocked.
 
diff --git a/internal/mcp/validation.go b/internal/mcp/validation.go
index 050c64c7..6d8194b8 100644
--- a/internal/mcp/validation.go
+++ b/internal/mcp/validation.go
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"net/url"
 	"os"
 	"regexp"
+	"sort"
 	"strings"
 
 	"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/security"
@@ -74,17 +75,15 @@ func ValidateCommand(cmd string) error {
 
 	basename := commandBasename(cmd)
 
-	// Allow absolute paths to known commands
-	if strings.HasPrefix(cmd, "/") || strings.ContainsAny(cmd, `/\`) {
-		if !allowedCommands[basename] {
-			return fmt.Errorf("command %q not in allowlist", basename)
-		}
-		return nil
+	// Only bare runtime names are accepted. Path-bearing commands can point at
+	// workspace-controlled wrappers named after an allowlisted runtime.
+	if strings.ContainsAny(cmd, `/\`) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("command must be a bare allowlisted runtime name, not a path")
 	}
 
 	// Bare command must be in allowlist
 	if !allowedCommands[basename] {
-		return fmt.Errorf("command %q not in allowlist (allowed: node, npx, python, python3, ruby, go, java, uvx, uv, pipx, deno, bun)", basename)
+		return fmt.Errorf("command %q not in allowlist (allowed: %s)", basename, allowedCommandNames())
 	}
 	return nil
 }
@@ -145,6 +144,15 @@ func commandBasename(command string) string {
 	return base
 }
 
+func allowedCommandNames() string {
+	names := make([]string, 0, len(allowedCommands))
+	for name := range allowedCommands {
+		names = append(names, name)
+	}
+	sort.Strings(names)
+	return strings.Join(names, ", ")
+}
+
 func validateNodeArgs(args []string) error {
 	for i, arg := range args {
 		if isFlag(arg, "-p", "--print", "--loader", "--experimental-loader") {
diff --git a/internal/mcp/validation_test.go b/internal/mcp/validation_test.go
index 7ab6244a..c756f059 100644
--- a/internal/mcp/validation_test.go
+++ b/internal/mcp/validation_test.go
@@ -30,13 +30,14 @@ func TestValidateCommand_Injection_Rejected(t *testing.T) {
 		{"not in allowlist", "sh", true},
 		{"not in allowlist bash", "bash", true},
 		{"valid node", "node", false},
+		{"valid node exe basename", "node.exe", false},
 		{"valid npx", "npx", false},
 		{"valid python", "python", false},
 		{"valid python3", "python3", false},
 		{"valid uvx", "uvx", false},
 		{"valid deno", "deno", false},
 		{"valid bun", "bun", false},
-		{"valid absolute path", "/usr/local/bin/node", false},
+		{"absolute path to runtime rejected", "/usr/local/bin/node", true},
 		{"empty command", "", false},
 	}
 	for _, tt := range tests {
@@ -52,6 +53,41 @@ func TestValidateCommand_Injection_Rejected(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestValidateCommand_PathBearingRuntimeRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []string{
+		"./node",
+		"tools/node",
+		"./python",
+		`.\node.exe`,
+		`tools\node.exe`,
+		"/tmp/node",
+		"/workspace/node",
+		`C:\tmp\node.exe`,
+	}
+
+	for _, command := range tests {
+		t.Run(command, func(t *testing.T) {
+			if err := ValidateCommand(command); err == nil {
+				t.Fatalf("ValidateCommand(%q) accepted path-bearing runtime", command)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestValidateCommand_AllowedCommandsErrorIsComplete(t *testing.T) {
+	err := ValidateCommand("sh")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("ValidateCommand accepted disallowed command")
+	}
+
+	msg := err.Error()
+	for _, want := range []string{"cargo", "dotnet", "npm", "php", "python2"} {
+		if !strings.Contains(msg, want) {
+			t.Fatalf("allowlist error %q missing %q", msg, want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 func TestValidateArgs_DangerousPatterns_Rejected(t *testing.T) {
 	tests := []struct {
 		name    string