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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Duc Nguyenandntduc
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bb7712a9ff |
fix(collaboration): harden delegated task isolation (#1486)
* feat(collaboration): isolate delegated artifacts and child runs Isolate delegated inputs and outputs behind secure artifact exchange lifecycles. Scope Agent Link tasks by tenant and root agent, and enforce delegation spawn-tree boundaries. Add process-wide child-run admission and preserve logical media paths across native, MCP, and sandbox execution. * fix(collaboration): harden delegated task isolation Enforce tenant and root-agent task scope across migrations and stores. Add exactly-once async completion delivery, delegated sandbox boundaries, and confined artifact and media recovery across runtime surfaces. * fix(collaboration): recover interrupted async tasks * fix(collaboration): normalize persisted child-run status --------- Co-authored-by: ntduc <ntduc@cpp.ai.vn> |
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bd5adc61c8 |
feat(bitrix24): imbot.v2 migration, 2-way media, openline sender-tag echo, and hardening (#1236)
* refactor(bitrix24): rename "Path B" framing to maintainer-specified naming [B24:2794] Per maintainer hard rule #10 (no generic "Path A/B" framing) from PR #1061 review. The Bitrix24 MCP auto-onboard flow is Bitrix-specific glue ("Bitrix24 OAuth -> existing mcp_user_credentials bridge"), NOT a generic MCP architecture pattern. Naming convention applied consistently: - First mention per file: full "Bitrix24 OAuth -> existing mcp_user_credentials bridge" (matches maintainer comment verbatim). - Subsequent mentions in same file: shortened "mcp_user_credentials bridge". - Test/log context referencing literal endpoint /api/auto-onboard: keep "auto-onboard" reference (it's the actual API endpoint name). Changes are documentation-only: - Rename in code comments + test descriptions + plan docs. - Clarify framing in mcp_client.go + provisioner.go doc comments to emphasize Bitrix-specific glue (not generic MCP infra). - Reuse existing mcp_user_credentials table + MCPServerStore methods (no schema / store / abstraction change). Files: - cmd/gateway.go (factory registration doc) - internal/channels/bitrix24/{channel,factory,mcp_client,provisioner}.go - internal/channels/bitrix24/{mcp_client,provisioner}_test.go - plan/goclaw-mcp-integration.md (21 occurrences) Verified: go build + MCP-related tests pass (TestProvision*, TestInitMCPProvisioner*, TestMCPClient*). Phase 1 of Path C execution per plans/reports/decision-log-260519-1555-bitrix24-pr-fork-decision.md. * fix: confine outbound media paths to agent workspace [B24:2794] Tool MEDIA:<path> output reached channel file-upload sinks (Bitrix imbot.v2.File.upload, Telegram sendDocument, etc.) verbatim via parseMediaResult, with no workspace-boundary check. A malicious or buggy tool emitting MEDIA:/etc/passwd could exfiltrate arbitrary files to chat. Extract the EvalSymlinks+Rel containment from extractMediaFromContent into a shared confineToWorkspace helper and apply it at the parseMediaResult sink in processToolResult. Fixing at the source/egress boundary protects every channel at once rather than per-channel. Paths that escape the workspace are dropped and logged (security.media_path_rejected). Add TestConfineToWorkspace (boundary unit) and TestParseMediaResultConfinedToWorkspace (sink regression for H2). * feat(bitrix24): support inbound + outbound media via imbot.v2 File API [B24:2794] Bitrix24 channel was text-only; attachments were parsed but dropped. - Inbound: download chat files via imbot.v2.File.download (one-time URL), forward to the agent with MIME preserved (internal/channels/bitrix24/download.go). - Outbound: upload agent media to the chat via imbot.v2.File.upload (internal/channels/bitrix24/send_media.go). - Add BaseChannel.HandleMessageMedia to preserve MIME/filename through the bus. - Per-channel media_max_mb cap (default 20) applies to both directions. Tests: 92 pass (internal/channels/bitrix24 + internal/channels), go vet clean (PG + sqliteonly). * refactor(bitrix24): migrate messaging/bot-list/unregister to imbot v2 API [B24:2794] Move outbound REST calls to the imbot v2 family (keeps register on v1): - imbot.message.add -> imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send (fields.message shape, live-verified) - imbot.bot.list (+ legacy imbot.list fallback) -> imbot.v2.Bot.list; add botListRows to normalize the v2 {bots:[...]} envelope, legacy array, and id-keyed map forms - imbot.unregister -> imbot.v2.Bot.unregister Bot registration stays on v1 imbot.register: v2 imbot.v2.Bot.register changes the event-delivery model (per-event handler URLs -> eventMode), which would require rewriting the inbound event parser. No user-facing behavior change. Tests: bitrix24 package green; go vet ./... clean. * feat(bitrix24): route whisper via v1 SKIP_CONNECTOR + add v2 replyId [B24:2794] Bot was leaking HiddenMessage (whisper) replies to the external Zalo connector because every outbound call went through imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send, which has no equivalent of the v1 SKIP_CONNECTOR flag. Branch the outbound path on inbound visibility: whisper → imbot.message.add + SKIP_CONNECTOR=Y (v1, send_v1.go) public → imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send + fields.replyId (v2, send_v2.go) Pipeline: events.go parse data[PARAMS][PARAMS][COMPONENT_ID]=HiddenMessage into EventParams.IsHiddenMessage (form + JSON variants) handle.go set bitrix_visibility on InboundMessage.Metadata consumer forward visibility + message_id into OutboundMessage send.go resolveSendOptions + sendChunk dispatcher + shared callWithRateLimitRetry helper metadata_keys.go single source of truth for the keys + values Defaults preserve pre-refactor behaviour: callers that don't populate bitrix_visibility still go through v2 public, and replyId is omitted unless a numeric bitrix_message_id arrives in metadata. Tests: TestParseEvent_FormURLEncoded_IsHiddenMessage (3 cases) TestParseEvent_JSON_IsHiddenMessage (3 cases) TestResolveSendOptions (8 cases) TestSend_BranchesOnVisibility (4 cases) * feat(bitrix24): openline sender-tag echo on replies [B24:2794] Openline sender-tag echo (this change): - Capture the connector sender tag ("[name #id]:" or "[name] #id:") from inbound openline group messages, strip it from the body the agent sees, and re-prepend the canonical "[name] #id:" form to the reply so the Open Channel connector routes the answer back to the right external user. - New sender_prefix.go helper (+ test) accepts both inbound layouts and emits one canonical form; scoped to messages carrying the tag, so plain chats are unaffected. - metadata_keys.go: MetaKeySenderPrefix; handle.go capture/strip/stash; gateway_consumer_normal.go forwards the key; send.go prepends it on the first chunk before chunking. Bundled bitrix24 channel-core work already on this branch: - handle.go: @mention is the sole trigger for both staff and connector customers; unmentioned traffic is dropped (was: drop all connector msgs). - isGroupMessageType: treat SONET_GROUP "B" as a group. - handle_test.go, mcp_client_test.go: cover the above. * feat(bitrix24): accept colon-less openline sender tag, echo [name] #id [B24:2794] The Open Channel connector dropped the trailing colon from its sender tag: inbound now arrives as "[Name] #id <msg>" (was "[Name] #id: <msg>"). The id-bearing patterns required the colon, so the tag fell through to the name-only branch and the reply echoed "[Name]" — dropping the #id the connector needs to route the answer back. - sender_prefix.go: make the trailing ":" optional on both id layouts ([name #id] / [name] #id, with or without colon) and echo the canonical "[name] #id" (no colon) to match the connector's current format. Bare "[name]" (no id) still echoes "[name]" for Open Channel only. - handle.go: gate the bare name-only layout to Open Channel (isOpenChannel) so ordinary group chats starting with "[x] ..." are left untouched. - sender_prefix_test.go: cover colon/no-colon x id-inside/id-outside, the name-only openline case, and the non-openline no-op. * fix: security and robustness fixes from the bitrix24 channel review [B24:2794] - download.go: block redirect-based SSRF on inbound media. CheckRedirect re-validates each hop (http(s) only, reject private/loopback/link-local hosts, cap hops); the initial portal-domain pin is no longer bypassable via a 3xx to an internal service. Public-host redirects still allowed. - handle.go: extract/echo the openline sender tag only for Open Channel sessions (was: any group chat), removing bogus prefixes in CRM group chats and narrowing the forged-tag misroute surface. - loop_tools.go + loop_media.go: confine result.Media to the agent / team / tenant-allowed roots (new confineToAnyRoot) before a channel uploads it, so a prompt-injected out-of-workspace path (e.g. /etc/passwd) cannot exfiltrate, while legitimate cross-workspace media (team files, delegatee output) still flows. - send_media.go: bounded outbound read via io.LimitReader replaces the os.Stat + os.ReadFile pair, closing the TOCTOU size-cap bypass; cap a single message's outbound attachments at 10 (mirrors inbound). - register.go: paginate imbot.v2.Bot.list (limit/offset + hasNextPage, capped at 40 pages) so verify/lookup see bots past the first 50. - mcp_client.go: redact access_token / refresh_token / client_secret from an echoed MCP error body before it is logged or returned (+ test). * fix(security): validate resolved dial IP on Bitrix media redirects [B24:2794] The inbound media download redirect guard only string-checked the redirect hostname (isPrivateOrLoopback on req.URL.Hostname()), so a redirect to a public hostname that resolves to 127.0.0.1 / 169.254.169.254 / an RFC1918 address — or a DNS-rebinding swap between check and dial — still passed the guard and the client would connect. Reported in PR review. Add security.NewRedirectFollowingSafeClient: it follows redirects but validates the RESOLVED destination IP of every hop at dial time via net.Dialer.Control, reusing the existing blocked-CIDR list. The IP it checks is the IP actually dialed, so both redirect-to-internal and DNS rebinding are refused, while legitimate public CDN redirects still succeed. download.go now uses it instead of the hostname-string guard. Tests: deterministic dial-control table (loopback / link-local / private / multicast / unspecified / public, v4 + v6), malformed/non-IP addr, test bypass, loopback-dial-blocked client wiring, and redirect cap + scheme checks. * feat(bitrix24): per-participant Zalo openline identity from 3-token sender tag [B24:2794] Parse the connector's "[Name] #uid #msgId" sender tag so each external customer in a shared Open Channel group gets its own contact + USER.md instead of collapsing onto the connector proxy id. Identity minting is gated on IS_CONNECTOR=Y to reject operator forged tags. Echo back the msgId only ("#msgId") on replies; keep the legacy single-number and name-only layouts unchanged. Zero DB migration. - sender_prefix.go: parseOpenlineSenderTag() classifies 3-token / legacy / name-only - handle.go: synthetic senderID "openlines:{instance}:{chat}:{uid}" + participant_user_id metadata, gated on FromIsConnector - gateway_consumer_normal.go: deriveGroupUserID() routes participant -> per-person scope, group fallback otherwise - send.go: buildAddressMention numeric-id guard so synthetic ids don't emit invalid [USER=...] BBCode - MetaKeyMessageID kept as Bitrix MESSAGE_ID (drives v2 fields.replyId); connector msgId surfaced only via echo prefix --------- Co-authored-by: DangTinh311 <dangtinh31193@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Chinh Dang <chinhdang@192.168.68.104> |
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viettranx
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4988f57a9c |
fix(agent): revert path-normalizing dedup and symlink-resolved storage
Two pieces of the review-hardening turned out to be risky in production: 1. deduplicateMedia used filepath.Abs on each MediaResult.Path to normalize the dedup key. filepath.Abs depends on the process CWD, which varies across deployment environments. In containers with a non-standard CWD, relative paths from parseMediaResult were being rewritten into keys that could collide with or differ from absolute paths from tools — leading to legitimate media entries being silently eaten. 2. extractMediaFromContent overwrote the stored path with the EvalSymlinks-resolved path. When the workspace is a bind-mount or contains ancestor symlinks, the stored path diverged from what the tool originally wrote and queued into rs.mediaResults, so dedup against tool-origin entries failed and the same file could be delivered twice (or fail altogether if the resolved path wasn't reachable from the downstream reader's FS view). Revert both to exact-string behavior. Keep EvalSymlinks for the containment check only — the symlink-escape P0 remains closed, but the stored path now matches what the tool wrote. |
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viettranx
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3b445d6856 |
fix(agent): close symlink escape + path-alias dedup + TTS mime type
Review of the medium-batch landed this session surfaced three issues:
P0 — symlink-ancestor escape in extractMediaFromContent. The lexical
filepath.Rel check passed "<ws>/shared/secret" when "shared" was a
symlink pointing outside the workspace. EvalSymlinks the resolved path
(and the workspace root, since macOS uses /var → /private/var) before
the Rel containment check. Leaf symlinks still rejected by Lstat.
P1 — duplicate attachments from path aliases. parseMediaResult stores
raw tool output ("./tts/x.mp3"); extractMediaFromContent stores Abs+
Clean ("<ws>/tts/x.mp3"). deduplicateMedia's exact-string map let both
through. Normalize the dedup key via filepath.Abs + Clean so the
sources collapse.
P1 — TTS Result.Media used the non-standard "audio/mp3" via
"audio/"+Extension. SynthResult.MimeType is already populated by every
provider with the RFC-3003 "audio/mpeg" (or "audio/ogg" for opus).
Prefer it; keep the extension concat as empty-string fallback.
Tests: add symlink-leaf-rejected and ancestor-symlink-escape cases to
lock the P0 behavior.
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viettranx
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3ed3fd9832 |
fix(agent): extract MEDIA: paths from LLM response before sanitize
When a tool returns its artifact via ForLLM "MEDIA:<path>" and the LLM echoes that path in its final response (PDF from exec/weasyprint, TTS bridged through claude_cli MCP, etc.), sanitize stripped the token without populating rs.mediaResults — attachments never reached the channel. Add extractMediaFromContent() and call it right before SanitizeAssistantContent. Tight security: workspace must be set, relative paths resolve against workspace, absolute paths must stay inside workspace (blocks ../ escapes and sibling-tenant access), file must exist and be a regular file. Dedup prevents duplicates when a tool already populated Result.Media. Closes #882 |
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viettranx
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70f3e1f5d5 |
feat(tools): auto-deliver write_file results as channel attachments
Flip write_file deliver param default from false to true so result files (reports, articles, generated content) are automatically sent as document attachments to chat channels without requiring explicit LLM opt-in. Add .md MIME type to mimeFromExt for proper markdown file delivery. |
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Viet Tran
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9a9744077e |
refactor(teams): v2 system cleanup — remove legacy tools, fix followup, add events API (#210)
Major refactoring of the team system with multiple improvements:
## Removed legacy delegation tools
- Delete `delegate.go`, `delegate_async.go`, `delegate_sync.go`, `delegate_events.go`,
`delegate_policy.go`, `delegate_prep.go`, `delegate_state.go`, `delegate_search_tool.go`
- Delete `evaluate_loop_tool.go`, `handoff_tool.go`
- Remove all references and registrations from tool manager and policy
- Clean up TEAM_PLAYBOOK_IDEAS.md and TEAM_SYSTEM.md (moved to docs)
## Rename await_reply → ask_user
- Rename action `await_reply` → `ask_user`, `clear_followup` → `clear_ask_user`
- Rename functions `executeAwaitReply` → `executeAskUser`, `executeClearFollowup` → `executeClearAskUser`
- Update system prompt with stronger wording to prevent model misuse
- Model was confusing "await_reply" with general waiting; "ask_user" is unambiguous
## Fix auto-followup false positives
- Add `HasActiveMemberTasks(ctx, teamID, excludeAgentID)` store method
- Guard `autoSetFollowup()` in consumer: skip when lead has active member tasks
- Prevents auto-followup when lead is orchestrating teammates (not waiting for user)
## Task identifier zero-padding
- Change format from `T-1-xxxx` → `T-001-xxxx` (3-digit minimum)
## Refactor workspace WS handlers to filesystem-only
- Rewrite `teams.workspace.list/read/delete` to use pure filesystem (os.ReadDir/ReadFile/Remove)
- Remove DB dependency from workspace WS handlers
- Consistent with storage handler and workspace tools
- Simplify TeamWorkspaceFile type and frontend hook
## Add team events listing API
- New WS method `teams.events.list` with team_id, limit, offset params
- New HTTP endpoint `GET /v1/teams/{id}/events` with bearer auth
- New `ListTeamEvents(ctx, teamID, limit, offset)` store method
- JOIN with team_tasks for team-wide event filtering
## Extract team access policy
- New `team_access_policy.go` — centralized team tool access control
## Migration 000019: team_id columns
- Add team_id foreign key columns to relevant tables
## Other improvements
- Add team_id propagation through agent loop, tracing, sessions
- Update i18n locale files (en/vi/zh) for new tool labels
- Update frontend builtin-tools page and require-setup component
- Bump RequiredSchemaVersion for migration 000019
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viettranxandClaude Opus 4.6
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7d211fa796 |
refactor: split 7 large Go files into smaller files per package
Pure cut-and-paste of functions/methods into separate files within the same package — no logic changes. Reduces file sizes for readability. - loop.go (1312→856) → loop_types.go, loop_compact.go, loop_media.go, loop_utils.go - delegate.go (687→171) → delegate_sync.go, delegate_async.go, delegate_prep.go - browser.go (605→154) → browser_tabs.go, browser_page.go, browser_remote.go - teams.go (602→170) → teams_crud.go, teams_members.go - web_fetch_convert.go (572→176) → web_fetch_convert_handlers.go, web_fetch_convert_utils.go - resolver.go (543→373) → resolver_helpers.go - sessions.go (536→157) → sessions_tokens.go, sessions_ops.go, sessions_list.go Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |