A reasoning model emits nothing at all while thinking, so the wait for the
response's FIRST byte — not any streaming timeout — decides whether its answer
is reachable. At 180s a large-prompt reasoning request routinely lost that race:
the gateway reported "http2: timeout awaiting response headers" while the
router's own usage log showed the same request completing normally moments later
(promptTokens=77194 -> completionTokens=2789). The request was healthy; only the
deadline was short.
Raise it to 300s. The value is deliberately modest rather than generous because
it is multiplied twice downstream: RetryDo wraps every provider call with
Attempts: 3, and a workflow step requeues up to MaxTaskDispatches times on top
of that, so 300s is already ~45min of worst-case wall clock per step.
Removing the timeout entirely was considered and rejected. Agent run contexts
come from scheduler queue.go via context.WithCancel, so they carry no deadline —
this transport timeout is the only thing bounding a request that never answers.
Without it a silently dead connection would hold its scheduler lane until the OS
TCP keepalive expired, and workflow requeue could not rescue it because requeue
only fires when a run ends. The doc comment claiming the design could "rely on
ctx deadlines" was wrong and is corrected here.
Tests lock the sizing from both sides (must exceed the latency that failed, must
not exceed the ceiling the retry math was sized against) and assert the retry
multiplier itself has not drifted.
Co-authored-by: nguyenha935 <nguyenha935@users.noreply.github.com>
A single dispatch goroutine delivered every reply in the process — every
channel, every user — each Send blocking the next. One media upload of a
few seconds froze all outbound traffic for that long, and sustained
throughput was capped at one Send round-trip regardless of lane capacity.
The ordering that loop actually protected is per-conversation: a run emits
block replies, retry notices and a final answer to one ChatID, and those
must arrive in that order. A global order was never required.
Dispatch now shards on channel+ChatID. A conversation always maps to the
same shard and is delivered serially there, so the ordering guarantee is
unchanged, while unrelated conversations proceed in parallel.
GOCLAW_OUTBOUND_SHARDS tunes the worker count (default 8).
Temp media needed a real fix to go with it. Serial dispatch deduped it
implicitly — the first delivery removed the file, and a later message
carrying the same path found os.Stat failing and skipped it. Across
concurrent shards that check alone is a TOCTOU race, so claims are now
taken atomically and released after the send.
Also makes the pool limits that bound this path configurable, defaults
unchanged: GOCLAW_PG_MAX_OPEN_CONNS / GOCLAW_PG_MAX_IDLE_CONNS, and
GOCLAW_HTTP_MAX_IDLE_CONNS / GOCLAW_HTTP_MAX_IDLE_CONNS_PER_HOST. The
per-host limit binds when one provider takes nearly all traffic: every
request past it pays a fresh TCP+TLS handshake, which a deployment
raising LaneMain needs to be able to lift.
bufio.Scanner has a fixed max-token size (SSEScanBufMax, 1MB). Codex's
native image_generation streams a full base64 image in a SINGLE SSE
data line (response.image_generation_call.partial_image and the final
image_generation_call item), which regularly exceeds 1MB for anything
larger than a thumbnail. Scanner.Scan() then fails with:
stream read error: bufio.Scanner: token too long
killing the whole turn after the model already generated the image.
Replace bufio.Scanner with bufio.Reader.ReadString, which grows to fit
a line of any length instead of erroring past a fixed cap. SSEScanBufMax
is now unused and removed; SSEScanBufInit is reused as the reader's
initial buffer size.
* fix(sandbox): avoid shell in FsBridge writes
Replace sh -c with interpolated path by shell-free 'tee -- <path>' argv form,
piping content via stdin. Prevents command injection through filenames
containing shell metacharacters inside the sandbox container.
Co-authored-by: evgyur <evgyur@gmail.com>
* fix(security): fail-closed on pairing DB errors across channels
On IsPaired lookup error, deny instead of granting access. Covers the shared
CheckDMPolicy/CheckGroupPolicy helpers (Slack/Discord/Feishu/WhatsApp/Zalo) and
the four inline Telegram pairing checks.
Co-authored-by: Srini <srinis.k@gmail.com>
* fix(security): harden provider URL validation against SSRF
Enforce scheme check for all provider types; restrict local types (ollama,
claude_cli, acp) to an explicit localhost allowlist instead of skipping checks;
resolve remote hostnames and reject any IP in a private/reserved range via the
shared security.IsBlocked CIDR list (covers loopback, link-local, metadata,
multicast, and unspecified 0.0.0.0/::). Closes the wildcard-DNS bypass and the
local-type escape hatch. Operator opt-in via GOCLAW_ALLOW_PRIVATE_PROVIDER_URLS.
Exports security.IsBlocked as the single source of truth for blocked ranges.
Co-authored-by: Linh Vo Van <linh.vo@e-cq.net>
* feat(pipeline): add fail-closed tool call authorization gate
Gate tool execution against the server-side AllowedTools allowlist built from the
RBAC/tenant-aware filtered tool set. Resolve the tool-call prefix before the
allowlist lookup so prefixed agents are not wrongly blocked, re-check deny on lazy
MCP activation, and expand IsDenied to cover aliased tool names.
Co-authored-by: Huy Doan <tui@pm.me>
* fix(security): expand file-serve deny-list defense-in-depth
Add absolute-path deny prefixes (/home, /Users, /srv, /var/lib, /var/www, /opt)
and an explicit fail-closed log when no file-serving boundary is configured.
Co-authored-by: Linh Vo Van <linh.vo@e-cq.net>
* fix(providers): allow claude cli executable paths
Refs: #1185
---------
Co-authored-by: evgyur <evgyur@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Srini <srinis.k@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Linh Vo Van <linh.vo@e-cq.net>
Co-authored-by: Huy Doan <tui@pm.me>
Clark Cant