SSRF protection resolves a hostname and judges the resulting IP. That
model assumes DNS resolution describes where the traffic actually goes,
which stops being true behind a TUN/fake-IP proxy: every query is answered
with a synthetic address out of a reserved range, and the proxy then
routes that address to the real public host. The IP is a handle, not a
destination.
In that environment web_fetch rejects ordinary public sites — observed
with news.sina.cn resolving to 198.18.0.236 — and no configuration can
fix it, because the block list is compiled in. The agent then burns
iterations retrying URLs that can never succeed.
GOCLAW_SSRF_ALLOWED_CIDRS lets an operator name the ranges their proxy
hands out. Empty by default, so nothing changes for deployments that do
not set it, and the accepted and refused entries are both logged at
startup — this widens what LLM- and admin-supplied URLs can reach, so it
should be visible.
Ranges an SSRF actually targets can never be allowlisted: link-local
(including cloud metadata at 169.254.169.254), multicast and unspecified
are refused at parse time, in either direction, so neither an exact entry
nor a wider range that swallows one gets through.
Applied inside isBlocked rather than only in validate() because
NewSafeClient re-checks the pinned IP at dial time through the same
function — relaxing just the pre-flight check would pass validation and
then fail to connect.
internal/tools carries its own private-range list for web_fetch and
web_search, separate from this package and not identical to it. It has to
consult the same setting, or relaxing one gate leaves the other rejecting
the very traffic the operator permitted. Unifying the two lists is left
alone here; it is a wider change than this one.
Co-authored-by: Conner Mo <connermo@ConnerdeMacBook-Pro.local>
Add RFC 2544 benchmarking range (198.18.0.0/15) and reserved range
(240.0.0.0/4) to both SSRF blocklists (security package + web_fetch
tool) to prevent internal network access via these special-use IPs.
Closes#1218
Registering a remote MCP server (sse/streamable-http) whose hostname
resolves to a private IP is rejected at config-validation time by the
SSRF guard, with no production escape hatch -- the only bypass is a
test-only loopback flag. Self-hosted MCP servers on a private network
are therefore unregisterable, even though the runtime MCP client
connects to them fine (Test Connection succeeds and lists tools; only
create/update input validation blocks).
Add an opt-in, operator-configured allowlist (GOCLAW_MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS,
empty by default) of trusted hostnames exempt from the private/loopback
IP block during MCP server URL validation only:
- security.ValidateAllowingHosts(url, allowedHosts): like Validate but
skips the private/loopback block for allowlisted hostnames. The
cloud-metadata/link-local (169.254/fe80), multicast and unspecified
ranges are never exempted, even for allowlisted hosts.
- mcp.SetAllowedHosts wires the operator allowlist into ValidateURL /
ValidateServerConfig; default empty => no behavior change.
- web_fetch / webhook / redirect SSRF paths are unchanged (those stay
agent-influenced and fully guarded).
Matching is case-insensitive on the pre-resolution hostname.
* fix(sandbox): avoid shell in FsBridge writes
Replace sh -c with interpolated path by shell-free 'tee -- <path>' argv form,
piping content via stdin. Prevents command injection through filenames
containing shell metacharacters inside the sandbox container.
Co-authored-by: evgyur <evgyur@gmail.com>
* fix(security): fail-closed on pairing DB errors across channels
On IsPaired lookup error, deny instead of granting access. Covers the shared
CheckDMPolicy/CheckGroupPolicy helpers (Slack/Discord/Feishu/WhatsApp/Zalo) and
the four inline Telegram pairing checks.
Co-authored-by: Srini <srinis.k@gmail.com>
* fix(security): harden provider URL validation against SSRF
Enforce scheme check for all provider types; restrict local types (ollama,
claude_cli, acp) to an explicit localhost allowlist instead of skipping checks;
resolve remote hostnames and reject any IP in a private/reserved range via the
shared security.IsBlocked CIDR list (covers loopback, link-local, metadata,
multicast, and unspecified 0.0.0.0/::). Closes the wildcard-DNS bypass and the
local-type escape hatch. Operator opt-in via GOCLAW_ALLOW_PRIVATE_PROVIDER_URLS.
Exports security.IsBlocked as the single source of truth for blocked ranges.
Co-authored-by: Linh Vo Van <linh.vo@e-cq.net>
* feat(pipeline): add fail-closed tool call authorization gate
Gate tool execution against the server-side AllowedTools allowlist built from the
RBAC/tenant-aware filtered tool set. Resolve the tool-call prefix before the
allowlist lookup so prefixed agents are not wrongly blocked, re-check deny on lazy
MCP activation, and expand IsDenied to cover aliased tool names.
Co-authored-by: Huy Doan <tui@pm.me>
* fix(security): expand file-serve deny-list defense-in-depth
Add absolute-path deny prefixes (/home, /Users, /srv, /var/lib, /var/www, /opt)
and an explicit fail-closed log when no file-serving boundary is configured.
Co-authored-by: Linh Vo Van <linh.vo@e-cq.net>
* fix(providers): allow claude cli executable paths
Refs: #1185
---------
Co-authored-by: evgyur <evgyur@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Srini <srinis.k@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Linh Vo Van <linh.vo@e-cq.net>
Co-authored-by: Huy Doan <tui@pm.me>
Phase 2 (a587231b) advertised SSRF hardening for the http hook handler
but the supporting `internal/security` package was never created, so the
production HTTPHandler fell back to a bare http.Client and admin-config
webhooks could probe loopback / link-local / RFC1918 / cloud-metadata.
- internal/security/ssrf.go: Validate(rawURL) parses + resolves once,
rejects loopback/link-local/private/multicast/unspecified + 169.254.169.254;
NewSafeClient(timeout) returns an http.Client whose DialContext pins the
resolved IP from context (defense-in-depth re-checks the dialed IP) and
refuses redirects (CheckRedirect = ErrUseLastResponse)
- internal/hooks/handlers/http_handler.go: call Validate before each request,
attach pinned IP via security.WithPinnedIP(ctx, ip)
- cmd/gateway_managed.go: construct HTTPHandler with
Client: security.NewSafeClient(10*time.Second)
- tests: 13 new ssrf_test.go cases (every block category + redirect refused
+ dial pinned); existing http_test.go retrofitted with
security.SetAllowLoopbackForTest helper for httptest.NewServer
- plan: phase-02 Step 2a marked done with reference to this commit
Refs: GitHub Issue #875
