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* refactor(bitrix24): rename "Path B" framing to maintainer-specified naming [B24:2794] Per maintainer hard rule #10 (no generic "Path A/B" framing) from PR #1061 review. The Bitrix24 MCP auto-onboard flow is Bitrix-specific glue ("Bitrix24 OAuth -> existing mcp_user_credentials bridge"), NOT a generic MCP architecture pattern. Naming convention applied consistently: - First mention per file: full "Bitrix24 OAuth -> existing mcp_user_credentials bridge" (matches maintainer comment verbatim). - Subsequent mentions in same file: shortened "mcp_user_credentials bridge". - Test/log context referencing literal endpoint /api/auto-onboard: keep "auto-onboard" reference (it's the actual API endpoint name). Changes are documentation-only: - Rename in code comments + test descriptions + plan docs. - Clarify framing in mcp_client.go + provisioner.go doc comments to emphasize Bitrix-specific glue (not generic MCP infra). - Reuse existing mcp_user_credentials table + MCPServerStore methods (no schema / store / abstraction change). Files: - cmd/gateway.go (factory registration doc) - internal/channels/bitrix24/{channel,factory,mcp_client,provisioner}.go - internal/channels/bitrix24/{mcp_client,provisioner}_test.go - plan/goclaw-mcp-integration.md (21 occurrences) Verified: go build + MCP-related tests pass (TestProvision*, TestInitMCPProvisioner*, TestMCPClient*). Phase 1 of Path C execution per plans/reports/decision-log-260519-1555-bitrix24-pr-fork-decision.md. * fix: confine outbound media paths to agent workspace [B24:2794] Tool MEDIA:<path> output reached channel file-upload sinks (Bitrix imbot.v2.File.upload, Telegram sendDocument, etc.) verbatim via parseMediaResult, with no workspace-boundary check. A malicious or buggy tool emitting MEDIA:/etc/passwd could exfiltrate arbitrary files to chat. Extract the EvalSymlinks+Rel containment from extractMediaFromContent into a shared confineToWorkspace helper and apply it at the parseMediaResult sink in processToolResult. Fixing at the source/egress boundary protects every channel at once rather than per-channel. Paths that escape the workspace are dropped and logged (security.media_path_rejected). Add TestConfineToWorkspace (boundary unit) and TestParseMediaResultConfinedToWorkspace (sink regression for H2). * feat(bitrix24): support inbound + outbound media via imbot.v2 File API [B24:2794] Bitrix24 channel was text-only; attachments were parsed but dropped. - Inbound: download chat files via imbot.v2.File.download (one-time URL), forward to the agent with MIME preserved (internal/channels/bitrix24/download.go). - Outbound: upload agent media to the chat via imbot.v2.File.upload (internal/channels/bitrix24/send_media.go). - Add BaseChannel.HandleMessageMedia to preserve MIME/filename through the bus. - Per-channel media_max_mb cap (default 20) applies to both directions. Tests: 92 pass (internal/channels/bitrix24 + internal/channels), go vet clean (PG + sqliteonly). * refactor(bitrix24): migrate messaging/bot-list/unregister to imbot v2 API [B24:2794] Move outbound REST calls to the imbot v2 family (keeps register on v1): - imbot.message.add -> imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send (fields.message shape, live-verified) - imbot.bot.list (+ legacy imbot.list fallback) -> imbot.v2.Bot.list; add botListRows to normalize the v2 {bots:[...]} envelope, legacy array, and id-keyed map forms - imbot.unregister -> imbot.v2.Bot.unregister Bot registration stays on v1 imbot.register: v2 imbot.v2.Bot.register changes the event-delivery model (per-event handler URLs -> eventMode), which would require rewriting the inbound event parser. No user-facing behavior change. Tests: bitrix24 package green; go vet ./... clean. * feat(bitrix24): route whisper via v1 SKIP_CONNECTOR + add v2 replyId [B24:2794] Bot was leaking HiddenMessage (whisper) replies to the external Zalo connector because every outbound call went through imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send, which has no equivalent of the v1 SKIP_CONNECTOR flag. Branch the outbound path on inbound visibility: whisper → imbot.message.add + SKIP_CONNECTOR=Y (v1, send_v1.go) public → imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send + fields.replyId (v2, send_v2.go) Pipeline: events.go parse data[PARAMS][PARAMS][COMPONENT_ID]=HiddenMessage into EventParams.IsHiddenMessage (form + JSON variants) handle.go set bitrix_visibility on InboundMessage.Metadata consumer forward visibility + message_id into OutboundMessage send.go resolveSendOptions + sendChunk dispatcher + shared callWithRateLimitRetry helper metadata_keys.go single source of truth for the keys + values Defaults preserve pre-refactor behaviour: callers that don't populate bitrix_visibility still go through v2 public, and replyId is omitted unless a numeric bitrix_message_id arrives in metadata. Tests: TestParseEvent_FormURLEncoded_IsHiddenMessage (3 cases) TestParseEvent_JSON_IsHiddenMessage (3 cases) TestResolveSendOptions (8 cases) TestSend_BranchesOnVisibility (4 cases) * feat(bitrix24): openline sender-tag echo on replies [B24:2794] Openline sender-tag echo (this change): - Capture the connector sender tag ("[name #id]:" or "[name] #id:") from inbound openline group messages, strip it from the body the agent sees, and re-prepend the canonical "[name] #id:" form to the reply so the Open Channel connector routes the answer back to the right external user. - New sender_prefix.go helper (+ test) accepts both inbound layouts and emits one canonical form; scoped to messages carrying the tag, so plain chats are unaffected. - metadata_keys.go: MetaKeySenderPrefix; handle.go capture/strip/stash; gateway_consumer_normal.go forwards the key; send.go prepends it on the first chunk before chunking. Bundled bitrix24 channel-core work already on this branch: - handle.go: @mention is the sole trigger for both staff and connector customers; unmentioned traffic is dropped (was: drop all connector msgs). - isGroupMessageType: treat SONET_GROUP "B" as a group. - handle_test.go, mcp_client_test.go: cover the above. * feat(bitrix24): accept colon-less openline sender tag, echo [name] #id [B24:2794] The Open Channel connector dropped the trailing colon from its sender tag: inbound now arrives as "[Name] #id <msg>" (was "[Name] #id: <msg>"). The id-bearing patterns required the colon, so the tag fell through to the name-only branch and the reply echoed "[Name]" — dropping the #id the connector needs to route the answer back. - sender_prefix.go: make the trailing ":" optional on both id layouts ([name #id] / [name] #id, with or without colon) and echo the canonical "[name] #id" (no colon) to match the connector's current format. Bare "[name]" (no id) still echoes "[name]" for Open Channel only. - handle.go: gate the bare name-only layout to Open Channel (isOpenChannel) so ordinary group chats starting with "[x] ..." are left untouched. - sender_prefix_test.go: cover colon/no-colon x id-inside/id-outside, the name-only openline case, and the non-openline no-op. * fix: security and robustness fixes from the bitrix24 channel review [B24:2794] - download.go: block redirect-based SSRF on inbound media. CheckRedirect re-validates each hop (http(s) only, reject private/loopback/link-local hosts, cap hops); the initial portal-domain pin is no longer bypassable via a 3xx to an internal service. Public-host redirects still allowed. - handle.go: extract/echo the openline sender tag only for Open Channel sessions (was: any group chat), removing bogus prefixes in CRM group chats and narrowing the forged-tag misroute surface. - loop_tools.go + loop_media.go: confine result.Media to the agent / team / tenant-allowed roots (new confineToAnyRoot) before a channel uploads it, so a prompt-injected out-of-workspace path (e.g. /etc/passwd) cannot exfiltrate, while legitimate cross-workspace media (team files, delegatee output) still flows. - send_media.go: bounded outbound read via io.LimitReader replaces the os.Stat + os.ReadFile pair, closing the TOCTOU size-cap bypass; cap a single message's outbound attachments at 10 (mirrors inbound). - register.go: paginate imbot.v2.Bot.list (limit/offset + hasNextPage, capped at 40 pages) so verify/lookup see bots past the first 50. - mcp_client.go: redact access_token / refresh_token / client_secret from an echoed MCP error body before it is logged or returned (+ test). * fix(security): validate resolved dial IP on Bitrix media redirects [B24:2794] The inbound media download redirect guard only string-checked the redirect hostname (isPrivateOrLoopback on req.URL.Hostname()), so a redirect to a public hostname that resolves to 127.0.0.1 / 169.254.169.254 / an RFC1918 address — or a DNS-rebinding swap between check and dial — still passed the guard and the client would connect. Reported in PR review. Add security.NewRedirectFollowingSafeClient: it follows redirects but validates the RESOLVED destination IP of every hop at dial time via net.Dialer.Control, reusing the existing blocked-CIDR list. The IP it checks is the IP actually dialed, so both redirect-to-internal and DNS rebinding are refused, while legitimate public CDN redirects still succeed. download.go now uses it instead of the hostname-string guard. Tests: deterministic dial-control table (loopback / link-local / private / multicast / unspecified / public, v4 + v6), malformed/non-IP addr, test bypass, loopback-dial-blocked client wiring, and redirect cap + scheme checks. * feat(bitrix24): per-participant Zalo openline identity from 3-token sender tag [B24:2794] Parse the connector's "[Name] #uid #msgId" sender tag so each external customer in a shared Open Channel group gets its own contact + USER.md instead of collapsing onto the connector proxy id. Identity minting is gated on IS_CONNECTOR=Y to reject operator forged tags. Echo back the msgId only ("#msgId") on replies; keep the legacy single-number and name-only layouts unchanged. Zero DB migration. - sender_prefix.go: parseOpenlineSenderTag() classifies 3-token / legacy / name-only - handle.go: synthetic senderID "openlines:{instance}:{chat}:{uid}" + participant_user_id metadata, gated on FromIsConnector - gateway_consumer_normal.go: deriveGroupUserID() routes participant -> per-person scope, group fallback otherwise - send.go: buildAddressMention numeric-id guard so synthetic ids don't emit invalid [USER=...] BBCode - MetaKeyMessageID kept as Bitrix MESSAGE_ID (drives v2 fields.replyId); connector msgId surfaced only via echo prefix --------- Co-authored-by: DangTinh311 <dangtinh31193@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Chinh Dang <chinhdang@192.168.68.104>
242 lines
7.4 KiB
Go
242 lines
7.4 KiB
Go
package bitrix24
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"time"
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)
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// validReq returns a baseline rev4 autoOnboardRequest with all required
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// fields populated so tests only need to override the field under test.
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func validReq() autoOnboardRequest {
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return autoOnboardRequest{
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Domain: "acme.bitrix24.com",
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BitrixUserID: "7",
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AccessToken: "at-tok",
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RefreshToken: "rt-tok",
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ExpiresIn: 3600,
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}
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}
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func TestMCPClient_AutoOnboard_Success(t *testing.T) {
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var gotPath, gotAuth, gotCT string
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var gotBody autoOnboardRequest
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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gotPath = r.URL.Path
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gotAuth = r.Header.Get("Authorization")
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gotCT = r.Header.Get("Content-Type")
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body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
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_ = json.Unmarshal(body, &gotBody)
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"api_key":"k-secret","user_id":"mcp-u-42","tenant_id":"mcp-t-1","created":true}`))
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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c := newMCPClient(srv.URL, 2*time.Second)
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req := validReq()
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req.DisplayName = "Alice"
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resp, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), req)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
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}
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if resp.APIKey != "k-secret" || resp.UserID != "mcp-u-42" || resp.TenantID != "mcp-t-1" || !resp.Created {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected resp: %+v", resp)
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}
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if gotPath != "/api/auto-onboard" {
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t.Fatalf("wrong path: %q", gotPath)
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}
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// Auto-onboard contract: no Authorization header — MCP server authenticates
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// via the caller-supplied Bitrix access_token in the body, not a bearer token.
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if gotAuth != "" {
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t.Fatalf("expected no Authorization header for auto-onboard, got: %q", gotAuth)
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}
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if gotCT != "application/json" {
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t.Fatalf("wrong content-type: %q", gotCT)
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}
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if gotBody.Domain != "acme.bitrix24.com" || gotBody.BitrixUserID != "7" ||
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gotBody.AccessToken != "at-tok" || gotBody.RefreshToken != "rt-tok" ||
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gotBody.ExpiresIn != 3600 || gotBody.DisplayName != "Alice" {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected body: %+v", gotBody)
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}
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}
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func TestMCPClient_AutoOnboard_4xxNoRetry(t *testing.T) {
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calls := 0
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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calls++
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte("invalid_bitrix_user"))
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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c := newMCPClient(srv.URL, time.Second)
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_, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), validReq())
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("expected error on 401")
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}
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if calls != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("expected no retry on 4xx, saw %d calls", calls)
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}
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if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "401") {
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t.Fatalf("error should mention status: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestMCPClient_AutoOnboard_5xxRetriesOnce(t *testing.T) {
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calls := 0
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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calls++
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if calls == 1 {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadGateway)
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return
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"api_key":"k","user_id":"u","tenant_id":"t","created":false}`))
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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c := newMCPClient(srv.URL, time.Second)
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resp, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), validReq())
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("expected success after retry: %v", err)
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}
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if resp.APIKey != "k" {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected resp: %+v", resp)
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}
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if calls != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("expected 2 calls (initial + retry), got %d", calls)
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}
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}
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func TestMCPClient_AutoOnboard_RejectsEmptyAPIKey(t *testing.T) {
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"api_key":"","user_id":"u","tenant_id":"t"}`))
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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c := newMCPClient(srv.URL, time.Second)
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_, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), validReq())
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("expected error on incomplete response")
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}
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if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "incomplete") {
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t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestMCPClient_AutoOnboard_TenantNotInstalled(t *testing.T) {
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"tenant_not_installed","domain":"acme.bitrix24.com"}`))
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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c := newMCPClient(srv.URL, time.Second)
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_, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), validReq())
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("expected error on 404 tenant_not_installed")
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}
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if !errors.Is(err, ErrTenantNotInstalled) {
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t.Fatalf("expected ErrTenantNotInstalled sentinel, got: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestMCPClient_AutoOnboard_404OtherBodyFallsThroughAs4xx(t *testing.T) {
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// 404 with a different body shape should surface as a generic 4xx,
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// not the ErrTenantNotInstalled sentinel.
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`not json at all`))
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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c := newMCPClient(srv.URL, time.Second)
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_, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), validReq())
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("expected generic 4xx error")
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}
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if errors.Is(err, ErrTenantNotInstalled) {
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t.Fatalf("generic 404 must not map to ErrTenantNotInstalled: %v", err)
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}
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if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "404") {
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t.Fatalf("expected 404 in error: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestMCPClient_AutoOnboard_RejectsMissingConfig(t *testing.T) {
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// Empty base URL
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c := newMCPClient("", time.Second)
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if _, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), validReq()); err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("expected error on missing base URL")
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}
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// Missing request fields (empty)
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c = newMCPClient("http://x", time.Second)
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if _, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), autoOnboardRequest{}); err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("expected error on empty request")
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}
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// Missing access token
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r := validReq()
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r.AccessToken = ""
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if _, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), r); err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("expected error on missing access token")
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}
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// Missing refresh token
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r = validReq()
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r.RefreshToken = ""
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if _, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), r); err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("expected error on missing refresh token")
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}
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// Missing domain
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r = validReq()
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r.Domain = ""
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if _, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), r); err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("expected error on missing domain")
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}
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// Missing bitrix user id
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r = validReq()
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r.BitrixUserID = ""
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if _, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), r); err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("expected error on missing bitrix_user_id")
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}
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}
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func TestIsGroupMessageType(t *testing.T) {
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cases := map[string]bool{
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"P": false,
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"private": false,
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"": false,
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" p ": false,
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"C": true,
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"c": true,
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"chat": true,
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"CHAT": true,
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"O": true,
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"open": true,
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// "X" = entity-bound group chat (Tasks, Workgroups). Observed on
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// real ONIMBOTMESSAGEADD payloads where CHAT_ENTITY_TYPE=TASKS_TASK
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// and CHAT_USER_COUNT>1.
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"X": true,
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"x": true,
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" X ": true,
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// "B" = Bitrix workgroup / Collab (SONET_GROUP) chat. Observed on
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// real ONIMBOTMESSAGEADD payloads where CHAT_TYPE=B and
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// CHAT_ENTITY_TYPE=SONET_GROUP; multi-user with @mention gating.
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"B": true,
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"b": true,
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" B ": true,
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"unknown": false,
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}
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for input, want := range cases {
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if got := isGroupMessageType(input); got != want {
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t.Errorf("isGroupMessageType(%q) = %v, want %v", input, got, want)
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}
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}
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}
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