Files
bd5adc61c8 feat(bitrix24): imbot.v2 migration, 2-way media, openline sender-tag echo, and hardening (#1236)
* refactor(bitrix24): rename "Path B" framing to maintainer-specified naming [B24:2794]

Per maintainer hard rule #10 (no generic "Path A/B" framing) from PR #1061
review. The Bitrix24 MCP auto-onboard flow is Bitrix-specific glue
("Bitrix24 OAuth -> existing mcp_user_credentials bridge"), NOT a generic
MCP architecture pattern.

Naming convention applied consistently:
- First mention per file: full "Bitrix24 OAuth -> existing
  mcp_user_credentials bridge" (matches maintainer comment verbatim).
- Subsequent mentions in same file: shortened "mcp_user_credentials bridge".
- Test/log context referencing literal endpoint /api/auto-onboard: keep
  "auto-onboard" reference (it's the actual API endpoint name).

Changes are documentation-only:
- Rename in code comments + test descriptions + plan docs.
- Clarify framing in mcp_client.go + provisioner.go doc comments to
  emphasize Bitrix-specific glue (not generic MCP infra).
- Reuse existing mcp_user_credentials table + MCPServerStore methods
  (no schema / store / abstraction change).

Files:
- cmd/gateway.go (factory registration doc)
- internal/channels/bitrix24/{channel,factory,mcp_client,provisioner}.go
- internal/channels/bitrix24/{mcp_client,provisioner}_test.go
- plan/goclaw-mcp-integration.md (21 occurrences)

Verified: go build + MCP-related tests pass (TestProvision*,
TestInitMCPProvisioner*, TestMCPClient*).

Phase 1 of Path C execution per
plans/reports/decision-log-260519-1555-bitrix24-pr-fork-decision.md.

* fix: confine outbound media paths to agent workspace [B24:2794]

Tool MEDIA:<path> output reached channel file-upload sinks (Bitrix
imbot.v2.File.upload, Telegram sendDocument, etc.) verbatim via
parseMediaResult, with no workspace-boundary check. A malicious or buggy
tool emitting MEDIA:/etc/passwd could exfiltrate arbitrary files to chat.

Extract the EvalSymlinks+Rel containment from extractMediaFromContent into
a shared confineToWorkspace helper and apply it at the parseMediaResult
sink in processToolResult. Fixing at the source/egress boundary protects
every channel at once rather than per-channel. Paths that escape the
workspace are dropped and logged (security.media_path_rejected).

Add TestConfineToWorkspace (boundary unit) and
TestParseMediaResultConfinedToWorkspace (sink regression for H2).

* feat(bitrix24): support inbound + outbound media via imbot.v2 File API [B24:2794]

Bitrix24 channel was text-only; attachments were parsed but dropped.
- Inbound: download chat files via imbot.v2.File.download (one-time URL),
  forward to the agent with MIME preserved (internal/channels/bitrix24/download.go).
- Outbound: upload agent media to the chat via imbot.v2.File.upload
  (internal/channels/bitrix24/send_media.go).
- Add BaseChannel.HandleMessageMedia to preserve MIME/filename through the bus.
- Per-channel media_max_mb cap (default 20) applies to both directions.

Tests: 92 pass (internal/channels/bitrix24 + internal/channels), go vet clean (PG + sqliteonly).

* refactor(bitrix24): migrate messaging/bot-list/unregister to imbot v2 API [B24:2794]

Move outbound REST calls to the imbot v2 family (keeps register on v1):
- imbot.message.add -> imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send (fields.message shape, live-verified)
- imbot.bot.list (+ legacy imbot.list fallback) -> imbot.v2.Bot.list; add botListRows
  to normalize the v2 {bots:[...]} envelope, legacy array, and id-keyed map forms
- imbot.unregister -> imbot.v2.Bot.unregister

Bot registration stays on v1 imbot.register: v2 imbot.v2.Bot.register changes the
event-delivery model (per-event handler URLs -> eventMode), which would require
rewriting the inbound event parser. No user-facing behavior change.

Tests: bitrix24 package green; go vet ./... clean.

* feat(bitrix24): route whisper via v1 SKIP_CONNECTOR + add v2 replyId [B24:2794]

Bot was leaking HiddenMessage (whisper) replies to the external Zalo
connector because every outbound call went through imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send,
which has no equivalent of the v1 SKIP_CONNECTOR flag. Branch the outbound
path on inbound visibility:

  whisper → imbot.message.add + SKIP_CONNECTOR=Y  (v1, send_v1.go)
  public  → imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send + fields.replyId  (v2, send_v2.go)

Pipeline:
  events.go        parse data[PARAMS][PARAMS][COMPONENT_ID]=HiddenMessage
                   into EventParams.IsHiddenMessage (form + JSON variants)
  handle.go        set bitrix_visibility on InboundMessage.Metadata
  consumer         forward visibility + message_id into OutboundMessage
  send.go          resolveSendOptions + sendChunk dispatcher +
                   shared callWithRateLimitRetry helper
  metadata_keys.go single source of truth for the keys + values

Defaults preserve pre-refactor behaviour: callers that don't populate
bitrix_visibility still go through v2 public, and replyId is omitted
unless a numeric bitrix_message_id arrives in metadata.

Tests:
  TestParseEvent_FormURLEncoded_IsHiddenMessage  (3 cases)
  TestParseEvent_JSON_IsHiddenMessage             (3 cases)
  TestResolveSendOptions                          (8 cases)
  TestSend_BranchesOnVisibility                   (4 cases)

* feat(bitrix24): openline sender-tag echo on replies [B24:2794]

Openline sender-tag echo (this change):
- Capture the connector sender tag ("[name #id]:" or "[name] #id:") from
  inbound openline group messages, strip it from the body the agent sees,
  and re-prepend the canonical "[name] #id:" form to the reply so the Open
  Channel connector routes the answer back to the right external user.
- New sender_prefix.go helper (+ test) accepts both inbound layouts and
  emits one canonical form; scoped to messages carrying the tag, so plain
  chats are unaffected.
- metadata_keys.go: MetaKeySenderPrefix; handle.go capture/strip/stash;
  gateway_consumer_normal.go forwards the key; send.go prepends it on the
  first chunk before chunking.

Bundled bitrix24 channel-core work already on this branch:
- handle.go: @mention is the sole trigger for both staff and connector
  customers; unmentioned traffic is dropped (was: drop all connector msgs).
- isGroupMessageType: treat SONET_GROUP "B" as a group.
- handle_test.go, mcp_client_test.go: cover the above.

* feat(bitrix24): accept colon-less openline sender tag, echo [name] #id [B24:2794]

The Open Channel connector dropped the trailing colon from its sender tag:
inbound now arrives as "[Name] #id <msg>" (was "[Name] #id: <msg>"). The
id-bearing patterns required the colon, so the tag fell through to the
name-only branch and the reply echoed "[Name]" — dropping the #id the
connector needs to route the answer back.

- sender_prefix.go: make the trailing ":" optional on both id layouts
  ([name #id] / [name] #id, with or without colon) and echo the canonical
  "[name] #id" (no colon) to match the connector's current format. Bare
  "[name]" (no id) still echoes "[name]" for Open Channel only.
- handle.go: gate the bare name-only layout to Open Channel (isOpenChannel)
  so ordinary group chats starting with "[x] ..." are left untouched.
- sender_prefix_test.go: cover colon/no-colon x id-inside/id-outside, the
  name-only openline case, and the non-openline no-op.

* fix: security and robustness fixes from the bitrix24 channel review [B24:2794]

- download.go: block redirect-based SSRF on inbound media. CheckRedirect
  re-validates each hop (http(s) only, reject private/loopback/link-local
  hosts, cap hops); the initial portal-domain pin is no longer bypassable
  via a 3xx to an internal service. Public-host redirects still allowed.
- handle.go: extract/echo the openline sender tag only for Open Channel
  sessions (was: any group chat), removing bogus prefixes in CRM group
  chats and narrowing the forged-tag misroute surface.
- loop_tools.go + loop_media.go: confine result.Media to the agent / team /
  tenant-allowed roots (new confineToAnyRoot) before a channel uploads it,
  so a prompt-injected out-of-workspace path (e.g. /etc/passwd) cannot
  exfiltrate, while legitimate cross-workspace media (team files, delegatee
  output) still flows.
- send_media.go: bounded outbound read via io.LimitReader replaces the
  os.Stat + os.ReadFile pair, closing the TOCTOU size-cap bypass; cap a
  single message's outbound attachments at 10 (mirrors inbound).
- register.go: paginate imbot.v2.Bot.list (limit/offset + hasNextPage,
  capped at 40 pages) so verify/lookup see bots past the first 50.
- mcp_client.go: redact access_token / refresh_token / client_secret from an
  echoed MCP error body before it is logged or returned (+ test).

* fix(security): validate resolved dial IP on Bitrix media redirects [B24:2794]

The inbound media download redirect guard only string-checked the redirect
hostname (isPrivateOrLoopback on req.URL.Hostname()), so a redirect to a public
hostname that resolves to 127.0.0.1 / 169.254.169.254 / an RFC1918 address — or a
DNS-rebinding swap between check and dial — still passed the guard and the client
would connect. Reported in PR review.

Add security.NewRedirectFollowingSafeClient: it follows redirects but validates
the RESOLVED destination IP of every hop at dial time via net.Dialer.Control,
reusing the existing blocked-CIDR list. The IP it checks is the IP actually
dialed, so both redirect-to-internal and DNS rebinding are refused, while
legitimate public CDN redirects still succeed. download.go now uses it instead of
the hostname-string guard.

Tests: deterministic dial-control table (loopback / link-local / private /
multicast / unspecified / public, v4 + v6), malformed/non-IP addr, test bypass,
loopback-dial-blocked client wiring, and redirect cap + scheme checks.

* feat(bitrix24): per-participant Zalo openline identity from 3-token sender tag [B24:2794]

Parse the connector's "[Name] #uid #msgId" sender tag so each external
customer in a shared Open Channel group gets its own contact + USER.md
instead of collapsing onto the connector proxy id. Identity minting is
gated on IS_CONNECTOR=Y to reject operator forged tags. Echo back the
msgId only ("#msgId") on replies; keep the legacy single-number and
name-only layouts unchanged. Zero DB migration.

- sender_prefix.go: parseOpenlineSenderTag() classifies 3-token / legacy / name-only
- handle.go: synthetic senderID "openlines:{instance}:{chat}:{uid}" + participant_user_id metadata, gated on FromIsConnector
- gateway_consumer_normal.go: deriveGroupUserID() routes participant -> per-person scope, group fallback otherwise
- send.go: buildAddressMention numeric-id guard so synthetic ids don't emit invalid [USER=...] BBCode
- MetaKeyMessageID kept as Bitrix MESSAGE_ID (drives v2 fields.replyId); connector msgId surfaced only via echo prefix

---------

Co-authored-by: DangTinh311 <dangtinh31193@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Chinh Dang <chinhdang@192.168.68.104>
2026-06-22 14:23:34 +07:00

242 lines
7.4 KiB
Go

package bitrix24
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
// validReq returns a baseline rev4 autoOnboardRequest with all required
// fields populated so tests only need to override the field under test.
func validReq() autoOnboardRequest {
return autoOnboardRequest{
Domain: "acme.bitrix24.com",
BitrixUserID: "7",
AccessToken: "at-tok",
RefreshToken: "rt-tok",
ExpiresIn: 3600,
}
}
func TestMCPClient_AutoOnboard_Success(t *testing.T) {
var gotPath, gotAuth, gotCT string
var gotBody autoOnboardRequest
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
gotPath = r.URL.Path
gotAuth = r.Header.Get("Authorization")
gotCT = r.Header.Get("Content-Type")
body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
_ = json.Unmarshal(body, &gotBody)
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"api_key":"k-secret","user_id":"mcp-u-42","tenant_id":"mcp-t-1","created":true}`))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := newMCPClient(srv.URL, 2*time.Second)
req := validReq()
req.DisplayName = "Alice"
resp, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if resp.APIKey != "k-secret" || resp.UserID != "mcp-u-42" || resp.TenantID != "mcp-t-1" || !resp.Created {
t.Fatalf("unexpected resp: %+v", resp)
}
if gotPath != "/api/auto-onboard" {
t.Fatalf("wrong path: %q", gotPath)
}
// Auto-onboard contract: no Authorization header — MCP server authenticates
// via the caller-supplied Bitrix access_token in the body, not a bearer token.
if gotAuth != "" {
t.Fatalf("expected no Authorization header for auto-onboard, got: %q", gotAuth)
}
if gotCT != "application/json" {
t.Fatalf("wrong content-type: %q", gotCT)
}
if gotBody.Domain != "acme.bitrix24.com" || gotBody.BitrixUserID != "7" ||
gotBody.AccessToken != "at-tok" || gotBody.RefreshToken != "rt-tok" ||
gotBody.ExpiresIn != 3600 || gotBody.DisplayName != "Alice" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected body: %+v", gotBody)
}
}
func TestMCPClient_AutoOnboard_4xxNoRetry(t *testing.T) {
calls := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
calls++
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("invalid_bitrix_user"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := newMCPClient(srv.URL, time.Second)
_, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), validReq())
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error on 401")
}
if calls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected no retry on 4xx, saw %d calls", calls)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "401") {
t.Fatalf("error should mention status: %v", err)
}
}
func TestMCPClient_AutoOnboard_5xxRetriesOnce(t *testing.T) {
calls := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
calls++
if calls == 1 {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadGateway)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"api_key":"k","user_id":"u","tenant_id":"t","created":false}`))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := newMCPClient(srv.URL, time.Second)
resp, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), validReq())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected success after retry: %v", err)
}
if resp.APIKey != "k" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected resp: %+v", resp)
}
if calls != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 calls (initial + retry), got %d", calls)
}
}
func TestMCPClient_AutoOnboard_RejectsEmptyAPIKey(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"api_key":"","user_id":"u","tenant_id":"t"}`))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := newMCPClient(srv.URL, time.Second)
_, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), validReq())
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error on incomplete response")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "incomplete") {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
}
func TestMCPClient_AutoOnboard_TenantNotInstalled(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"error":"tenant_not_installed","domain":"acme.bitrix24.com"}`))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := newMCPClient(srv.URL, time.Second)
_, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), validReq())
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error on 404 tenant_not_installed")
}
if !errors.Is(err, ErrTenantNotInstalled) {
t.Fatalf("expected ErrTenantNotInstalled sentinel, got: %v", err)
}
}
func TestMCPClient_AutoOnboard_404OtherBodyFallsThroughAs4xx(t *testing.T) {
// 404 with a different body shape should surface as a generic 4xx,
// not the ErrTenantNotInstalled sentinel.
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`not json at all`))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := newMCPClient(srv.URL, time.Second)
_, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), validReq())
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected generic 4xx error")
}
if errors.Is(err, ErrTenantNotInstalled) {
t.Fatalf("generic 404 must not map to ErrTenantNotInstalled: %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "404") {
t.Fatalf("expected 404 in error: %v", err)
}
}
func TestMCPClient_AutoOnboard_RejectsMissingConfig(t *testing.T) {
// Empty base URL
c := newMCPClient("", time.Second)
if _, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), validReq()); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error on missing base URL")
}
// Missing request fields (empty)
c = newMCPClient("http://x", time.Second)
if _, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), autoOnboardRequest{}); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error on empty request")
}
// Missing access token
r := validReq()
r.AccessToken = ""
if _, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), r); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error on missing access token")
}
// Missing refresh token
r = validReq()
r.RefreshToken = ""
if _, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), r); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error on missing refresh token")
}
// Missing domain
r = validReq()
r.Domain = ""
if _, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), r); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error on missing domain")
}
// Missing bitrix user id
r = validReq()
r.BitrixUserID = ""
if _, err := c.autoOnboard(context.Background(), r); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error on missing bitrix_user_id")
}
}
func TestIsGroupMessageType(t *testing.T) {
cases := map[string]bool{
"P": false,
"private": false,
"": false,
" p ": false,
"C": true,
"c": true,
"chat": true,
"CHAT": true,
"O": true,
"open": true,
// "X" = entity-bound group chat (Tasks, Workgroups). Observed on
// real ONIMBOTMESSAGEADD payloads where CHAT_ENTITY_TYPE=TASKS_TASK
// and CHAT_USER_COUNT>1.
"X": true,
"x": true,
" X ": true,
// "B" = Bitrix workgroup / Collab (SONET_GROUP) chat. Observed on
// real ONIMBOTMESSAGEADD payloads where CHAT_TYPE=B and
// CHAT_ENTITY_TYPE=SONET_GROUP; multi-user with @mention gating.
"B": true,
"b": true,
" B ": true,
"unknown": false,
}
for input, want := range cases {
if got := isGroupMessageType(input); got != want {
t.Errorf("isGroupMessageType(%q) = %v, want %v", input, got, want)
}
}
}