mirror of
https://github.com/tiennm99/goclaw.git
synced 2026-10-13 04:14:56 +00:00
* refactor(bitrix24): rename "Path B" framing to maintainer-specified naming [B24:2794] Per maintainer hard rule #10 (no generic "Path A/B" framing) from PR #1061 review. The Bitrix24 MCP auto-onboard flow is Bitrix-specific glue ("Bitrix24 OAuth -> existing mcp_user_credentials bridge"), NOT a generic MCP architecture pattern. Naming convention applied consistently: - First mention per file: full "Bitrix24 OAuth -> existing mcp_user_credentials bridge" (matches maintainer comment verbatim). - Subsequent mentions in same file: shortened "mcp_user_credentials bridge". - Test/log context referencing literal endpoint /api/auto-onboard: keep "auto-onboard" reference (it's the actual API endpoint name). Changes are documentation-only: - Rename in code comments + test descriptions + plan docs. - Clarify framing in mcp_client.go + provisioner.go doc comments to emphasize Bitrix-specific glue (not generic MCP infra). - Reuse existing mcp_user_credentials table + MCPServerStore methods (no schema / store / abstraction change). Files: - cmd/gateway.go (factory registration doc) - internal/channels/bitrix24/{channel,factory,mcp_client,provisioner}.go - internal/channels/bitrix24/{mcp_client,provisioner}_test.go - plan/goclaw-mcp-integration.md (21 occurrences) Verified: go build + MCP-related tests pass (TestProvision*, TestInitMCPProvisioner*, TestMCPClient*). Phase 1 of Path C execution per plans/reports/decision-log-260519-1555-bitrix24-pr-fork-decision.md. * fix: confine outbound media paths to agent workspace [B24:2794] Tool MEDIA:<path> output reached channel file-upload sinks (Bitrix imbot.v2.File.upload, Telegram sendDocument, etc.) verbatim via parseMediaResult, with no workspace-boundary check. A malicious or buggy tool emitting MEDIA:/etc/passwd could exfiltrate arbitrary files to chat. Extract the EvalSymlinks+Rel containment from extractMediaFromContent into a shared confineToWorkspace helper and apply it at the parseMediaResult sink in processToolResult. Fixing at the source/egress boundary protects every channel at once rather than per-channel. Paths that escape the workspace are dropped and logged (security.media_path_rejected). Add TestConfineToWorkspace (boundary unit) and TestParseMediaResultConfinedToWorkspace (sink regression for H2). * feat(bitrix24): support inbound + outbound media via imbot.v2 File API [B24:2794] Bitrix24 channel was text-only; attachments were parsed but dropped. - Inbound: download chat files via imbot.v2.File.download (one-time URL), forward to the agent with MIME preserved (internal/channels/bitrix24/download.go). - Outbound: upload agent media to the chat via imbot.v2.File.upload (internal/channels/bitrix24/send_media.go). - Add BaseChannel.HandleMessageMedia to preserve MIME/filename through the bus. - Per-channel media_max_mb cap (default 20) applies to both directions. Tests: 92 pass (internal/channels/bitrix24 + internal/channels), go vet clean (PG + sqliteonly). * refactor(bitrix24): migrate messaging/bot-list/unregister to imbot v2 API [B24:2794] Move outbound REST calls to the imbot v2 family (keeps register on v1): - imbot.message.add -> imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send (fields.message shape, live-verified) - imbot.bot.list (+ legacy imbot.list fallback) -> imbot.v2.Bot.list; add botListRows to normalize the v2 {bots:[...]} envelope, legacy array, and id-keyed map forms - imbot.unregister -> imbot.v2.Bot.unregister Bot registration stays on v1 imbot.register: v2 imbot.v2.Bot.register changes the event-delivery model (per-event handler URLs -> eventMode), which would require rewriting the inbound event parser. No user-facing behavior change. Tests: bitrix24 package green; go vet ./... clean. * feat(bitrix24): route whisper via v1 SKIP_CONNECTOR + add v2 replyId [B24:2794] Bot was leaking HiddenMessage (whisper) replies to the external Zalo connector because every outbound call went through imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send, which has no equivalent of the v1 SKIP_CONNECTOR flag. Branch the outbound path on inbound visibility: whisper → imbot.message.add + SKIP_CONNECTOR=Y (v1, send_v1.go) public → imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send + fields.replyId (v2, send_v2.go) Pipeline: events.go parse data[PARAMS][PARAMS][COMPONENT_ID]=HiddenMessage into EventParams.IsHiddenMessage (form + JSON variants) handle.go set bitrix_visibility on InboundMessage.Metadata consumer forward visibility + message_id into OutboundMessage send.go resolveSendOptions + sendChunk dispatcher + shared callWithRateLimitRetry helper metadata_keys.go single source of truth for the keys + values Defaults preserve pre-refactor behaviour: callers that don't populate bitrix_visibility still go through v2 public, and replyId is omitted unless a numeric bitrix_message_id arrives in metadata. Tests: TestParseEvent_FormURLEncoded_IsHiddenMessage (3 cases) TestParseEvent_JSON_IsHiddenMessage (3 cases) TestResolveSendOptions (8 cases) TestSend_BranchesOnVisibility (4 cases) * feat(bitrix24): openline sender-tag echo on replies [B24:2794] Openline sender-tag echo (this change): - Capture the connector sender tag ("[name #id]:" or "[name] #id:") from inbound openline group messages, strip it from the body the agent sees, and re-prepend the canonical "[name] #id:" form to the reply so the Open Channel connector routes the answer back to the right external user. - New sender_prefix.go helper (+ test) accepts both inbound layouts and emits one canonical form; scoped to messages carrying the tag, so plain chats are unaffected. - metadata_keys.go: MetaKeySenderPrefix; handle.go capture/strip/stash; gateway_consumer_normal.go forwards the key; send.go prepends it on the first chunk before chunking. Bundled bitrix24 channel-core work already on this branch: - handle.go: @mention is the sole trigger for both staff and connector customers; unmentioned traffic is dropped (was: drop all connector msgs). - isGroupMessageType: treat SONET_GROUP "B" as a group. - handle_test.go, mcp_client_test.go: cover the above. * feat(bitrix24): accept colon-less openline sender tag, echo [name] #id [B24:2794] The Open Channel connector dropped the trailing colon from its sender tag: inbound now arrives as "[Name] #id <msg>" (was "[Name] #id: <msg>"). The id-bearing patterns required the colon, so the tag fell through to the name-only branch and the reply echoed "[Name]" — dropping the #id the connector needs to route the answer back. - sender_prefix.go: make the trailing ":" optional on both id layouts ([name #id] / [name] #id, with or without colon) and echo the canonical "[name] #id" (no colon) to match the connector's current format. Bare "[name]" (no id) still echoes "[name]" for Open Channel only. - handle.go: gate the bare name-only layout to Open Channel (isOpenChannel) so ordinary group chats starting with "[x] ..." are left untouched. - sender_prefix_test.go: cover colon/no-colon x id-inside/id-outside, the name-only openline case, and the non-openline no-op. * fix: security and robustness fixes from the bitrix24 channel review [B24:2794] - download.go: block redirect-based SSRF on inbound media. CheckRedirect re-validates each hop (http(s) only, reject private/loopback/link-local hosts, cap hops); the initial portal-domain pin is no longer bypassable via a 3xx to an internal service. Public-host redirects still allowed. - handle.go: extract/echo the openline sender tag only for Open Channel sessions (was: any group chat), removing bogus prefixes in CRM group chats and narrowing the forged-tag misroute surface. - loop_tools.go + loop_media.go: confine result.Media to the agent / team / tenant-allowed roots (new confineToAnyRoot) before a channel uploads it, so a prompt-injected out-of-workspace path (e.g. /etc/passwd) cannot exfiltrate, while legitimate cross-workspace media (team files, delegatee output) still flows. - send_media.go: bounded outbound read via io.LimitReader replaces the os.Stat + os.ReadFile pair, closing the TOCTOU size-cap bypass; cap a single message's outbound attachments at 10 (mirrors inbound). - register.go: paginate imbot.v2.Bot.list (limit/offset + hasNextPage, capped at 40 pages) so verify/lookup see bots past the first 50. - mcp_client.go: redact access_token / refresh_token / client_secret from an echoed MCP error body before it is logged or returned (+ test). * fix(security): validate resolved dial IP on Bitrix media redirects [B24:2794] The inbound media download redirect guard only string-checked the redirect hostname (isPrivateOrLoopback on req.URL.Hostname()), so a redirect to a public hostname that resolves to 127.0.0.1 / 169.254.169.254 / an RFC1918 address — or a DNS-rebinding swap between check and dial — still passed the guard and the client would connect. Reported in PR review. Add security.NewRedirectFollowingSafeClient: it follows redirects but validates the RESOLVED destination IP of every hop at dial time via net.Dialer.Control, reusing the existing blocked-CIDR list. The IP it checks is the IP actually dialed, so both redirect-to-internal and DNS rebinding are refused, while legitimate public CDN redirects still succeed. download.go now uses it instead of the hostname-string guard. Tests: deterministic dial-control table (loopback / link-local / private / multicast / unspecified / public, v4 + v6), malformed/non-IP addr, test bypass, loopback-dial-blocked client wiring, and redirect cap + scheme checks. * feat(bitrix24): per-participant Zalo openline identity from 3-token sender tag [B24:2794] Parse the connector's "[Name] #uid #msgId" sender tag so each external customer in a shared Open Channel group gets its own contact + USER.md instead of collapsing onto the connector proxy id. Identity minting is gated on IS_CONNECTOR=Y to reject operator forged tags. Echo back the msgId only ("#msgId") on replies; keep the legacy single-number and name-only layouts unchanged. Zero DB migration. - sender_prefix.go: parseOpenlineSenderTag() classifies 3-token / legacy / name-only - handle.go: synthetic senderID "openlines:{instance}:{chat}:{uid}" + participant_user_id metadata, gated on FromIsConnector - gateway_consumer_normal.go: deriveGroupUserID() routes participant -> per-person scope, group fallback otherwise - send.go: buildAddressMention numeric-id guard so synthetic ids don't emit invalid [USER=...] BBCode - MetaKeyMessageID kept as Bitrix MESSAGE_ID (drives v2 fields.replyId); connector msgId surfaced only via echo prefix --------- Co-authored-by: DangTinh311 <dangtinh31193@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Chinh Dang <chinhdang@192.168.68.104>
566 lines
17 KiB
Go
566 lines
17 KiB
Go
package bitrix24
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"unicode/utf8"
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"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/bus"
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)
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func TestChunkText_ShortStaysOneChunk(t *testing.T) {
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got := chunkText("hello world", 100)
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if len(got) != 1 || got[0] != "hello world" {
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t.Errorf("short text should not be split: %v", got)
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}
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}
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func TestChunkText_EmptyReturnsNil(t *testing.T) {
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if got := chunkText("", 100); got != nil {
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t.Errorf("empty input should return nil, got %v", got)
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}
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if got := chunkText(" \t\n ", 100); got != nil {
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t.Errorf("whitespace-only should return nil, got %v", got)
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}
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}
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func TestChunkText_PrefersNewlineBoundary(t *testing.T) {
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text := "line1\nline2\nline3-longer"
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got := chunkText(text, 10)
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if len(got) < 2 {
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t.Fatalf("expected at least 2 chunks, got %v", got)
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}
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// First chunk must end at a line boundary — never mid-word.
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if strings.Contains(got[0], "line3") {
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t.Errorf("first chunk overflowed past boundary: %q", got[0])
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}
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}
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func TestChunkText_PrefersWhitespaceWhenNoNewline(t *testing.T) {
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text := "one two three four five"
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got := chunkText(text, 8)
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if len(got) < 2 {
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t.Fatalf("expected multi-chunk, got %v", got)
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}
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// Rejoin without losing characters.
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rejoined := strings.Join(got, " ")
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// Allow whitespace shifting but every non-space rune from input must survive.
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origLetters := strings.ReplaceAll(text, " ", "")
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gotLetters := strings.ReplaceAll(rejoined, " ", "")
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if origLetters != gotLetters {
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t.Errorf("chunking lost characters: %q → %q", text, rejoined)
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}
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}
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func TestChunkText_HardBreakForLongWord(t *testing.T) {
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// No newline, no whitespace — must hard-break on rune boundary.
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text := strings.Repeat("a", 50)
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got := chunkText(text, 10)
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if len(got) < 5 {
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t.Fatalf("expected at least 5 chunks, got %d: %v", len(got), got)
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}
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for i, c := range got {
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if utf8.RuneCountInString(c) > 10 {
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t.Errorf("chunk %d exceeds limit (%d runes): %q", i, utf8.RuneCountInString(c), c)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestChunkText_UnicodeSafe(t *testing.T) {
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// Vietnamese text — each character takes 2-3 bytes in UTF-8. The byte-
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// length is > limit but the rune-count should stay within.
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text := "Xin chào tôi là trợ lý AI đây là tin nhắn siêu dài"
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got := chunkText(text, 10)
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for i, c := range got {
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if utf8.RuneCountInString(c) > 10 {
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t.Errorf("chunk %d has %d runes, limit 10: %q", i, utf8.RuneCountInString(c), c)
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}
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if !utf8.ValidString(c) {
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t.Errorf("chunk %d is not valid UTF-8", i)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestChunkText_LimitZeroUsesDefault(t *testing.T) {
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// When limit is <= 0 we should fall back to 4000 — so a short string
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// stays in one chunk.
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got := chunkText("hi", 0)
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if len(got) != 1 || got[0] != "hi" {
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t.Errorf("zero limit: got %v", got)
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}
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}
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func TestSliceRunes(t *testing.T) {
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h, tail := sliceRunes("abcdef", 3)
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if h != "abc" || tail != "def" {
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t.Errorf("sliceRunes(abcdef, 3) = (%q, %q); want (abc, def)", h, tail)
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}
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// n >= rune count → whole string returned as head.
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h, tail = sliceRunes("abc", 10)
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if h != "abc" || tail != "" {
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t.Errorf("sliceRunes(abc, 10) = (%q, %q); want (abc, '')", h, tail)
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}
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// Unicode: Vietnamese "xin" → 3 runes, bytes differ.
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h, tail = sliceRunes("xinchào", 3)
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if h != "xin" || tail != "chào" {
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t.Errorf("unicode slice: (%q, %q); want (xin, chào)", h, tail)
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}
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}
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func TestFindChunkBoundary_NewlinePreferred(t *testing.T) {
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// Newline at byte index 5, space at 11. Must cut AFTER newline (index 6).
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s := "line1\nmore content here"
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cut := findChunkBoundary(s, 15)
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if cut != 6 {
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t.Errorf("cut = %d; want 6 (after newline)", cut)
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}
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}
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func TestFindChunkBoundary_WhitespaceFallback(t *testing.T) {
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// No newline. Cut should land right after the last space inside `limit`.
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s := "one two three four"
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cut := findChunkBoundary(s, 8)
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// First 8 runes: "one two " — last space at index 7, cut = 8.
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if cut != 8 {
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t.Errorf("cut = %d; want 8 (after space)", cut)
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}
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}
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func TestFindChunkBoundary_HardBreakNoBoundaries(t *testing.T) {
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s := "abcdefghij"
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cut := findChunkBoundary(s, 5)
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if cut != 5 {
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t.Errorf("hard break cut = %d; want 5", cut)
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}
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}
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func TestIsRateLimitErr(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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err error
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want bool
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}{
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{"nil", nil, false},
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{"plain error", errors.New("generic"), false},
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{"QUERY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED", &APIError{Code: "QUERY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED"}, true},
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{"OPERATION_TIME_LIMIT", &APIError{Code: "OPERATION_TIME_LIMIT"}, true},
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{"other code", &APIError{Code: "expired_token"}, false},
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}
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for _, tc := range cases {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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if got := isRateLimitErr(tc.err); got != tc.want {
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t.Errorf("isRateLimitErr(%v) = %v; want %v", tc.err, got, tc.want)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func TestSend_NotRunningErrors(t *testing.T) {
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fs := newFakeStore()
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resetWebhookRouterForTest()
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defer resetWebhookRouterForTest()
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fn := FactoryWithPortalStore(fs, "")
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ch, err := fn("b1", nil,
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[]byte(`{"portal":"p","bot_code":"c","bot_name":"n"}`),
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bus.New(), nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("factory: %v", err)
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}
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// Channel not started — IsRunning() == false.
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err = ch.Send(context.Background(), bus.OutboundMessage{ChatID: "1", Content: "hi"})
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if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not running") {
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t.Errorf("expected 'not running' error, got %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestSend_MissingChatID(t *testing.T) {
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fs := newFakeStore()
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resetWebhookRouterForTest()
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defer resetWebhookRouterForTest()
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fn := FactoryWithPortalStore(fs, "")
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ch, err := fn("b1", nil,
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[]byte(`{"portal":"p","bot_code":"c","bot_name":"n"}`),
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bus.New(), nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("factory: %v", err)
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}
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bc := ch.(*Channel)
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// Hack: pretend we're initialised without going through Start.
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bc.SetRunning(true)
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bc.startMu.Lock()
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bc.botID = 1
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bc.client = NewClient("portal.bitrix24.com", nil)
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bc.startMu.Unlock()
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err = ch.Send(context.Background(), bus.OutboundMessage{ChatID: " ", Content: "hi"})
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if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "chat_id") {
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t.Errorf("expected missing chat_id error, got %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestSend_EmptyContentIsNoOp(t *testing.T) {
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fs := newFakeStore()
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resetWebhookRouterForTest()
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defer resetWebhookRouterForTest()
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fn := FactoryWithPortalStore(fs, "")
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ch, err := fn("b1", nil,
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[]byte(`{"portal":"p","bot_code":"c","bot_name":"n"}`),
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bus.New(), nil)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("factory: %v", err)
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}
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bc := ch.(*Channel)
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bc.SetRunning(true)
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bc.startMu.Lock()
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bc.botID = 1
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bc.client = NewClient("portal.bitrix24.com", nil)
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bc.startMu.Unlock()
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// No content, no media — must not attempt any HTTP call.
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if err := ch.Send(context.Background(), bus.OutboundMessage{ChatID: "42", Content: " "}); err != nil {
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t.Errorf("empty content should be no-op, got %v", err)
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}
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}
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// TestResolveSendOptions verifies the Metadata → sendOptions decoding that
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// Send() uses to pick v1 whisper vs v2 public and to thread replyId into
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// the v2 fields object. Defaults must preserve pre-refactor behaviour
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// (public, no replyId) so any caller missing the keys still works.
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func TestResolveSendOptions(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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meta map[string]string
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wantVisibility string
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wantReplyToMID int
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}{
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{
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name: "empty metadata defaults to public",
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meta: nil,
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wantVisibility: VisibilityPublic,
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wantReplyToMID: 0,
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},
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{
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name: "whisper visibility",
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meta: map[string]string{MetaKeyVisibility: VisibilityWhisper},
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wantVisibility: VisibilityWhisper,
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wantReplyToMID: 0,
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},
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{
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name: "explicit public visibility",
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meta: map[string]string{MetaKeyVisibility: VisibilityPublic},
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wantVisibility: VisibilityPublic,
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wantReplyToMID: 0,
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},
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{
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name: "unknown visibility value falls back to public",
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meta: map[string]string{MetaKeyVisibility: "secret"},
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wantVisibility: VisibilityPublic,
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wantReplyToMID: 0,
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},
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{
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name: "valid numeric message_id parsed for replyToMID",
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meta: map[string]string{MetaKeyMessageID: "297178"},
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wantVisibility: VisibilityPublic,
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wantReplyToMID: 297178,
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},
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{
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name: "non-numeric message_id ignored",
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meta: map[string]string{MetaKeyMessageID: "abc"},
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wantVisibility: VisibilityPublic,
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wantReplyToMID: 0,
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},
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{
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name: "zero message_id ignored",
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meta: map[string]string{MetaKeyMessageID: "0"},
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wantVisibility: VisibilityPublic,
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wantReplyToMID: 0,
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},
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{
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name: "whisper with replyToMID still captures both",
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meta: map[string]string{
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MetaKeyVisibility: VisibilityWhisper,
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MetaKeyMessageID: "12345",
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},
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wantVisibility: VisibilityWhisper,
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wantReplyToMID: 12345,
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},
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}
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for _, tc := range cases {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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opts := resolveSendOptions(tc.meta)
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if opts.visibility != tc.wantVisibility {
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t.Errorf("visibility = %q; want %q", opts.visibility, tc.wantVisibility)
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}
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if opts.replyToMID != tc.wantReplyToMID {
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t.Errorf("replyToMID = %d; want %d", opts.replyToMID, tc.wantReplyToMID)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// TestSend_BranchesOnVisibility wires Send() through the HTTP-layer stub
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// (captureRT) so we can assert exactly which Bitrix REST method got
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// invoked and what params were on the wire. Public visibility → v2;
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// whisper visibility → v1 with SKIP_CONNECTOR=Y. The matrix also covers
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// replyId propagation on v2 and its absence on v1.
|
|
func TestSend_BranchesOnVisibility(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cases := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
metadata map[string]string
|
|
wantPath string
|
|
wantFormChecks map[string]string // exact form-key → expected value
|
|
notWantKeys []string // form keys that must be absent
|
|
}{
|
|
{
|
|
name: "whisper routes to v1 imbot.message.add with SKIP_CONNECTOR=Y",
|
|
metadata: map[string]string{
|
|
MetaKeyVisibility: VisibilityWhisper,
|
|
MetaKeyMessageID: "297178", // v1 ignores replyId so must NOT appear
|
|
},
|
|
wantPath: "/rest/imbot.message.add.json",
|
|
wantFormChecks: map[string]string{
|
|
"BOT_ID": "1",
|
|
"DIALOG_ID": "chat4878",
|
|
"MESSAGE": "hi from bot",
|
|
"SKIP_CONNECTOR": "Y",
|
|
},
|
|
notWantKeys: []string{
|
|
"fields[replyId]",
|
|
"replyId",
|
|
"botId",
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "public with replyId routes to v2 + fields[replyId]",
|
|
metadata: map[string]string{
|
|
MetaKeyVisibility: VisibilityPublic,
|
|
MetaKeyMessageID: "297196",
|
|
},
|
|
wantPath: "/rest/imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send.json",
|
|
wantFormChecks: map[string]string{
|
|
"botId": "1",
|
|
"dialogId": "chat4878",
|
|
"fields[message]": "hi from bot",
|
|
"fields[replyId]": "297196",
|
|
},
|
|
notWantKeys: []string{
|
|
"SKIP_CONNECTOR",
|
|
"BOT_ID",
|
|
"MESSAGE",
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "public without message_id routes to v2 without replyId",
|
|
metadata: map[string]string{MetaKeyVisibility: VisibilityPublic},
|
|
wantPath: "/rest/imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send.json",
|
|
wantFormChecks: map[string]string{
|
|
"botId": "1",
|
|
"dialogId": "chat4878",
|
|
"fields[message]": "hi from bot",
|
|
},
|
|
notWantKeys: []string{
|
|
"fields[replyId]",
|
|
"replyId",
|
|
"SKIP_CONNECTOR",
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "missing visibility defaults to v2 public (backward-compat)",
|
|
metadata: nil,
|
|
wantPath: "/rest/imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send.json",
|
|
wantFormChecks: map[string]string{
|
|
"botId": "1",
|
|
"dialogId": "chat4878",
|
|
"fields[message]": "hi from bot",
|
|
},
|
|
notWantKeys: []string{
|
|
"SKIP_CONNECTOR",
|
|
"fields[replyId]",
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, tc := range cases {
|
|
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
rt := &captureRT{result: `{"result":{"id":1}}`}
|
|
client := newStubClient("test.bitrix24.com", rt)
|
|
ch, _ := newFakeChannelWithClient(t, client)
|
|
ch.SetRunning(true)
|
|
|
|
msg := bus.OutboundMessage{
|
|
ChatID: "chat4878",
|
|
Content: "hi from bot",
|
|
Metadata: tc.metadata,
|
|
}
|
|
if err := ch.Send(context.Background(), msg); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Send error: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(rt.paths) != 1 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected exactly 1 HTTP call, got %d (paths=%v)", len(rt.paths), rt.paths)
|
|
}
|
|
if rt.paths[0] != tc.wantPath {
|
|
t.Errorf("path = %q; want %q", rt.paths[0], tc.wantPath)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
form := rt.reqs[0]
|
|
for k, want := range tc.wantFormChecks {
|
|
if got := form.Get(k); got != want {
|
|
t.Errorf("form[%q] = %q; want %q (full form: %v)", k, got, want, form)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for _, k := range tc.notWantKeys {
|
|
if v := form.Get(k); v != "" {
|
|
t.Errorf("form[%q] should be absent, got %q", k, v)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestSend_OL_EchoPrefixPrepended verifies the openline sender-tag echo: whatever
|
|
// handle.go placed in MetaKeySenderPrefix is prepended verbatim to the outbound
|
|
// text so the Open Channel connector can route the reply back to the right
|
|
// external message. send.go is format-agnostic — handle.go decides the shape
|
|
// ("#msgId" for 3-token, "[name] #msgId" for legacy).
|
|
func TestSend_OL_EchoPrefixPrepended(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cases := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
prefix string
|
|
wantMsg string
|
|
}{
|
|
{
|
|
name: "3-token echo is msgId only",
|
|
prefix: "#777888",
|
|
wantMsg: "#777888 hi from bot",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "legacy echo keeps full [name] #msgId",
|
|
prefix: "[Trung Hee] #7957717404177",
|
|
wantMsg: "[Trung Hee] #7957717404177 hi from bot",
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
for _, tc := range cases {
|
|
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
rt := &captureRT{result: `{"result":{"id":1}}`}
|
|
client := newStubClient("test.bitrix24.com", rt)
|
|
ch, _ := newFakeChannelWithClient(t, client)
|
|
ch.SetRunning(true)
|
|
|
|
msg := bus.OutboundMessage{
|
|
ChatID: "chat4878",
|
|
Content: "hi from bot",
|
|
Metadata: map[string]string{
|
|
MetaKeyVisibility: VisibilityPublic,
|
|
MetaKeySenderPrefix: tc.prefix,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
if err := ch.Send(context.Background(), msg); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Send error: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if len(rt.reqs) != 1 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected exactly 1 HTTP call, got %d", len(rt.reqs))
|
|
}
|
|
if got := rt.reqs[0].Get("fields[message]"); got != tc.wantMsg {
|
|
t.Errorf("fields[message] = %q; want %q", got, tc.wantMsg)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestBuildAddressMention covers the address-user resolver that prepends the
|
|
// `[USER=<id>][/USER]` BBCode to outbound replies in group chats. The format
|
|
// is intentionally empty-named so Bitrix renders the user's current display
|
|
// name from id at delivery time (sidesteps escaping for names with BBCode
|
|
// metacharacters and reflects renames between turns).
|
|
//
|
|
// Consumer-side gating (cmd/gateway_consumer_normal.go) is responsible for
|
|
// only setting `bitrix_address_user_id` in group inbounds and skipping
|
|
// synthetic senders. This test pins the channel-side behaviour given that
|
|
// gating contract.
|
|
func TestBuildAddressMention(t *testing.T) {
|
|
cases := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
meta map[string]string
|
|
botID int
|
|
want string
|
|
}{
|
|
{
|
|
name: "no_metadata_returns_empty",
|
|
meta: nil,
|
|
botID: 940,
|
|
want: "",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "empty_user_id_returns_empty",
|
|
meta: map[string]string{"bitrix_address_user_id": ""},
|
|
botID: 940,
|
|
want: "",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "whitespace_user_id_returns_empty",
|
|
meta: map[string]string{"bitrix_address_user_id": " "},
|
|
botID: 940,
|
|
want: "",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "real_user_id_returns_bbcode",
|
|
meta: map[string]string{"bitrix_address_user_id": "62"},
|
|
botID: 940,
|
|
want: "[USER=62][/USER]",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "trims_user_id_whitespace",
|
|
meta: map[string]string{"bitrix_address_user_id": " 62 "},
|
|
botID: 940,
|
|
want: "[USER=62][/USER]",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
// Self-mention guard: bot's own numeric id matches addressee →
|
|
// suppress to avoid weird "@Bot Synity" prefix in bot's own message.
|
|
name: "self_mention_suppressed",
|
|
meta: map[string]string{"bitrix_address_user_id": "940"},
|
|
botID: 940,
|
|
want: "",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
// Bot id unknown (channel not yet started) → don't apply guard,
|
|
// trust the consumer's gating. Returning the BBCode is harmless;
|
|
// Bitrix will render whatever user the id resolves to.
|
|
name: "unknown_bot_id_skips_self_guard",
|
|
meta: map[string]string{"bitrix_address_user_id": "940"},
|
|
botID: 0,
|
|
want: "[USER=940][/USER]",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
// Synthetic openline per-participant id is not a real Bitrix user —
|
|
// emitting [USER=openlines:...] would render as literal garbage.
|
|
name: "synthetic_openline_id_suppressed",
|
|
meta: map[string]string{"bitrix_address_user_id": "openlines:tamgiac:chat4878:111222"},
|
|
botID: 940,
|
|
want: "",
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
for _, tc := range cases {
|
|
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
got := buildAddressMention(tc.meta, tc.botID)
|
|
if got != tc.want {
|
|
t.Errorf("buildAddressMention(%v, %d) = %q; want %q", tc.meta, tc.botID, got, tc.want)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// (Send() integration with httptest server is covered by existing send tests
|
|
// — adding a new httptest pipeline just for the prepend would duplicate that
|
|
// scaffolding for what is logically a single string-concat call site. The
|
|
// helper test above pins the behaviour; trust the existing send pipeline
|
|
// for chunk routing.)
|