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* refactor(bitrix24): rename "Path B" framing to maintainer-specified naming [B24:2794] Per maintainer hard rule #10 (no generic "Path A/B" framing) from PR #1061 review. The Bitrix24 MCP auto-onboard flow is Bitrix-specific glue ("Bitrix24 OAuth -> existing mcp_user_credentials bridge"), NOT a generic MCP architecture pattern. Naming convention applied consistently: - First mention per file: full "Bitrix24 OAuth -> existing mcp_user_credentials bridge" (matches maintainer comment verbatim). - Subsequent mentions in same file: shortened "mcp_user_credentials bridge". - Test/log context referencing literal endpoint /api/auto-onboard: keep "auto-onboard" reference (it's the actual API endpoint name). Changes are documentation-only: - Rename in code comments + test descriptions + plan docs. - Clarify framing in mcp_client.go + provisioner.go doc comments to emphasize Bitrix-specific glue (not generic MCP infra). - Reuse existing mcp_user_credentials table + MCPServerStore methods (no schema / store / abstraction change). Files: - cmd/gateway.go (factory registration doc) - internal/channels/bitrix24/{channel,factory,mcp_client,provisioner}.go - internal/channels/bitrix24/{mcp_client,provisioner}_test.go - plan/goclaw-mcp-integration.md (21 occurrences) Verified: go build + MCP-related tests pass (TestProvision*, TestInitMCPProvisioner*, TestMCPClient*). Phase 1 of Path C execution per plans/reports/decision-log-260519-1555-bitrix24-pr-fork-decision.md. * fix: confine outbound media paths to agent workspace [B24:2794] Tool MEDIA:<path> output reached channel file-upload sinks (Bitrix imbot.v2.File.upload, Telegram sendDocument, etc.) verbatim via parseMediaResult, with no workspace-boundary check. A malicious or buggy tool emitting MEDIA:/etc/passwd could exfiltrate arbitrary files to chat. Extract the EvalSymlinks+Rel containment from extractMediaFromContent into a shared confineToWorkspace helper and apply it at the parseMediaResult sink in processToolResult. Fixing at the source/egress boundary protects every channel at once rather than per-channel. Paths that escape the workspace are dropped and logged (security.media_path_rejected). Add TestConfineToWorkspace (boundary unit) and TestParseMediaResultConfinedToWorkspace (sink regression for H2). * feat(bitrix24): support inbound + outbound media via imbot.v2 File API [B24:2794] Bitrix24 channel was text-only; attachments were parsed but dropped. - Inbound: download chat files via imbot.v2.File.download (one-time URL), forward to the agent with MIME preserved (internal/channels/bitrix24/download.go). - Outbound: upload agent media to the chat via imbot.v2.File.upload (internal/channels/bitrix24/send_media.go). - Add BaseChannel.HandleMessageMedia to preserve MIME/filename through the bus. - Per-channel media_max_mb cap (default 20) applies to both directions. Tests: 92 pass (internal/channels/bitrix24 + internal/channels), go vet clean (PG + sqliteonly). * refactor(bitrix24): migrate messaging/bot-list/unregister to imbot v2 API [B24:2794] Move outbound REST calls to the imbot v2 family (keeps register on v1): - imbot.message.add -> imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send (fields.message shape, live-verified) - imbot.bot.list (+ legacy imbot.list fallback) -> imbot.v2.Bot.list; add botListRows to normalize the v2 {bots:[...]} envelope, legacy array, and id-keyed map forms - imbot.unregister -> imbot.v2.Bot.unregister Bot registration stays on v1 imbot.register: v2 imbot.v2.Bot.register changes the event-delivery model (per-event handler URLs -> eventMode), which would require rewriting the inbound event parser. No user-facing behavior change. Tests: bitrix24 package green; go vet ./... clean. * feat(bitrix24): route whisper via v1 SKIP_CONNECTOR + add v2 replyId [B24:2794] Bot was leaking HiddenMessage (whisper) replies to the external Zalo connector because every outbound call went through imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send, which has no equivalent of the v1 SKIP_CONNECTOR flag. Branch the outbound path on inbound visibility: whisper → imbot.message.add + SKIP_CONNECTOR=Y (v1, send_v1.go) public → imbot.v2.Chat.Message.send + fields.replyId (v2, send_v2.go) Pipeline: events.go parse data[PARAMS][PARAMS][COMPONENT_ID]=HiddenMessage into EventParams.IsHiddenMessage (form + JSON variants) handle.go set bitrix_visibility on InboundMessage.Metadata consumer forward visibility + message_id into OutboundMessage send.go resolveSendOptions + sendChunk dispatcher + shared callWithRateLimitRetry helper metadata_keys.go single source of truth for the keys + values Defaults preserve pre-refactor behaviour: callers that don't populate bitrix_visibility still go through v2 public, and replyId is omitted unless a numeric bitrix_message_id arrives in metadata. Tests: TestParseEvent_FormURLEncoded_IsHiddenMessage (3 cases) TestParseEvent_JSON_IsHiddenMessage (3 cases) TestResolveSendOptions (8 cases) TestSend_BranchesOnVisibility (4 cases) * feat(bitrix24): openline sender-tag echo on replies [B24:2794] Openline sender-tag echo (this change): - Capture the connector sender tag ("[name #id]:" or "[name] #id:") from inbound openline group messages, strip it from the body the agent sees, and re-prepend the canonical "[name] #id:" form to the reply so the Open Channel connector routes the answer back to the right external user. - New sender_prefix.go helper (+ test) accepts both inbound layouts and emits one canonical form; scoped to messages carrying the tag, so plain chats are unaffected. - metadata_keys.go: MetaKeySenderPrefix; handle.go capture/strip/stash; gateway_consumer_normal.go forwards the key; send.go prepends it on the first chunk before chunking. Bundled bitrix24 channel-core work already on this branch: - handle.go: @mention is the sole trigger for both staff and connector customers; unmentioned traffic is dropped (was: drop all connector msgs). - isGroupMessageType: treat SONET_GROUP "B" as a group. - handle_test.go, mcp_client_test.go: cover the above. * feat(bitrix24): accept colon-less openline sender tag, echo [name] #id [B24:2794] The Open Channel connector dropped the trailing colon from its sender tag: inbound now arrives as "[Name] #id <msg>" (was "[Name] #id: <msg>"). The id-bearing patterns required the colon, so the tag fell through to the name-only branch and the reply echoed "[Name]" — dropping the #id the connector needs to route the answer back. - sender_prefix.go: make the trailing ":" optional on both id layouts ([name #id] / [name] #id, with or without colon) and echo the canonical "[name] #id" (no colon) to match the connector's current format. Bare "[name]" (no id) still echoes "[name]" for Open Channel only. - handle.go: gate the bare name-only layout to Open Channel (isOpenChannel) so ordinary group chats starting with "[x] ..." are left untouched. - sender_prefix_test.go: cover colon/no-colon x id-inside/id-outside, the name-only openline case, and the non-openline no-op. * fix: security and robustness fixes from the bitrix24 channel review [B24:2794] - download.go: block redirect-based SSRF on inbound media. CheckRedirect re-validates each hop (http(s) only, reject private/loopback/link-local hosts, cap hops); the initial portal-domain pin is no longer bypassable via a 3xx to an internal service. Public-host redirects still allowed. - handle.go: extract/echo the openline sender tag only for Open Channel sessions (was: any group chat), removing bogus prefixes in CRM group chats and narrowing the forged-tag misroute surface. - loop_tools.go + loop_media.go: confine result.Media to the agent / team / tenant-allowed roots (new confineToAnyRoot) before a channel uploads it, so a prompt-injected out-of-workspace path (e.g. /etc/passwd) cannot exfiltrate, while legitimate cross-workspace media (team files, delegatee output) still flows. - send_media.go: bounded outbound read via io.LimitReader replaces the os.Stat + os.ReadFile pair, closing the TOCTOU size-cap bypass; cap a single message's outbound attachments at 10 (mirrors inbound). - register.go: paginate imbot.v2.Bot.list (limit/offset + hasNextPage, capped at 40 pages) so verify/lookup see bots past the first 50. - mcp_client.go: redact access_token / refresh_token / client_secret from an echoed MCP error body before it is logged or returned (+ test). * fix(security): validate resolved dial IP on Bitrix media redirects [B24:2794] The inbound media download redirect guard only string-checked the redirect hostname (isPrivateOrLoopback on req.URL.Hostname()), so a redirect to a public hostname that resolves to 127.0.0.1 / 169.254.169.254 / an RFC1918 address — or a DNS-rebinding swap between check and dial — still passed the guard and the client would connect. Reported in PR review. Add security.NewRedirectFollowingSafeClient: it follows redirects but validates the RESOLVED destination IP of every hop at dial time via net.Dialer.Control, reusing the existing blocked-CIDR list. The IP it checks is the IP actually dialed, so both redirect-to-internal and DNS rebinding are refused, while legitimate public CDN redirects still succeed. download.go now uses it instead of the hostname-string guard. Tests: deterministic dial-control table (loopback / link-local / private / multicast / unspecified / public, v4 + v6), malformed/non-IP addr, test bypass, loopback-dial-blocked client wiring, and redirect cap + scheme checks. * feat(bitrix24): per-participant Zalo openline identity from 3-token sender tag [B24:2794] Parse the connector's "[Name] #uid #msgId" sender tag so each external customer in a shared Open Channel group gets its own contact + USER.md instead of collapsing onto the connector proxy id. Identity minting is gated on IS_CONNECTOR=Y to reject operator forged tags. Echo back the msgId only ("#msgId") on replies; keep the legacy single-number and name-only layouts unchanged. Zero DB migration. - sender_prefix.go: parseOpenlineSenderTag() classifies 3-token / legacy / name-only - handle.go: synthetic senderID "openlines:{instance}:{chat}:{uid}" + participant_user_id metadata, gated on FromIsConnector - gateway_consumer_normal.go: deriveGroupUserID() routes participant -> per-person scope, group fallback otherwise - send.go: buildAddressMention numeric-id guard so synthetic ids don't emit invalid [USER=...] BBCode - MetaKeyMessageID kept as Bitrix MESSAGE_ID (drives v2 fields.replyId); connector msgId surfaced only via echo prefix --------- Co-authored-by: DangTinh311 <dangtinh31193@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Chinh Dang <chinhdang@192.168.68.104>
210 lines
6.5 KiB
Go
210 lines
6.5 KiB
Go
package bitrix24
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import "testing"
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func TestExtractOpenlineSenderPrefix(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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in string
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allowNameOnly bool
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wantPrefix string
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wantRest string
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}{
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{
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name: "id after brackets, no colon (current connector format)",
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in: "[Thân Công Huy] #7941945550666 @Ngọc Thúy kiểm tra lịch",
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wantPrefix: "[Thân Công Huy] #7941945550666",
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wantRest: "@Ngọc Thúy kiểm tra lịch",
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},
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{
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name: "id after brackets, with colon (legacy)",
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in: "[Thân Công Huy] #1623524631958449211: alo",
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wantPrefix: "[Thân Công Huy] #1623524631958449211",
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wantRest: "alo",
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},
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{
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name: "id inside brackets, with colon (legacy)",
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in: "[Thân Công Huy #1623524631958449211]: alo",
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wantPrefix: "[Thân Công Huy] #1623524631958449211",
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wantRest: "alo",
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},
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{
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name: "id inside brackets, no colon",
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in: "[Thân Công Huy #1623524631958449211] alo",
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wantPrefix: "[Thân Công Huy] #1623524631958449211",
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wantRest: "alo",
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},
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{
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name: "id no colon, no name-only flag — still matches",
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in: "[Minh Zip] #42 chào",
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wantPrefix: "[Minh Zip] #42",
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wantRest: "chào",
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},
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{
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name: "name only — openline (allowNameOnly)",
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in: "[Minh Zip] móa user hỏi hóc xương cá thế nhỉ",
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allowNameOnly: true,
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wantPrefix: "[Minh Zip]",
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wantRest: "móa user hỏi hóc xương cá thế nhỉ",
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},
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{
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// id format wins over name-only, so the id is never dropped.
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name: "id present — not clipped to name-only",
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in: "[Thân Công Huy] #7941945550666 hello",
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allowNameOnly: true,
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wantPrefix: "[Thân Công Huy] #7941945550666",
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wantRest: "hello",
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},
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{
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// NOT an Open Channel → bare name-only ignored so ordinary group
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// chat text starting with "[x] …" is left untouched.
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name: "name only — ignored when not openline",
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in: "[Minh Zip] móa user hỏi",
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allowNameOnly: false,
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wantPrefix: "",
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wantRest: "[Minh Zip] móa user hỏi",
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},
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{
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name: "plain message — no tag",
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in: "chào shop, cho hỏi giá",
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allowNameOnly: true,
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wantPrefix: "",
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wantRest: "chào shop, cho hỏi giá",
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},
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{
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name: "readable mention — not an openline tag",
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in: "@Ngọc Thúy (ID:62) giúp em",
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allowNameOnly: true,
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wantPrefix: "",
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wantRest: "@Ngọc Thúy (ID:62) giúp em",
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},
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// Characterization: current behavior locked before the 3-token refactor.
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// The single number after the brackets is a per-message connector id; it
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// must keep flowing through extractOpenlineSenderPrefix unchanged so the
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// legacy echo path is untouched.
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{
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name: "legacy 1-number after brackets (msgId) — characterization",
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in: "[Trung Hee] #7957717404177 alo bot",
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wantPrefix: "[Trung Hee] #7957717404177",
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wantRest: "alo bot",
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},
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{
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name: "legacy 1-number inside brackets — characterization",
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in: "[Trung Hee #7957717404177]: alo",
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wantPrefix: "[Trung Hee] #7957717404177",
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wantRest: "alo",
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},
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}
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for _, tc := range cases {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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gotPrefix, gotRest := extractOpenlineSenderPrefix(tc.in, tc.allowNameOnly)
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if gotPrefix != tc.wantPrefix {
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t.Errorf("prefix = %q, want %q", gotPrefix, tc.wantPrefix)
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}
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if gotRest != tc.wantRest {
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t.Errorf("rest = %q, want %q", gotRest, tc.wantRest)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// TestParseOpenlineSenderTag pins the structured 3-token parser. It distinguishes
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// the new "[Name] #uid #msgId" layout (two numbers) from the legacy single-number
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// msgId layout, the bare name-only layout, and no tag at all. The parser only
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// classifies shape — the IS_CONNECTOR forged-tag gate lives in handle.go.
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func TestParseOpenlineSenderTag(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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in string
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wantName string
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wantUID string
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wantMsgID string
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wantFormat OpenlineSenderTagFormat
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wantRest string
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}{
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{
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name: "3-token standard",
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in: "[Trung Hee] #111222 #777888 alo bot",
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wantName: "Trung Hee",
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wantUID: "111222",
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wantMsgID: "777888",
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wantFormat: TagFormatThreeToken,
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wantRest: "alo bot",
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},
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{
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name: "3-token with trailing colon",
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in: "[Thân Công Huy] #9999 #8888: kiểm tra",
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wantName: "Thân Công Huy",
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wantUID: "9999",
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wantMsgID: "8888",
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wantFormat: TagFormatThreeToken,
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wantRest: "kiểm tra",
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},
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{
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// One number → legacy: uid empty, msgId = the only number.
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name: "legacy 1-number → TagFormatLegacy",
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in: "[Trung Hee] #7957717404177 alo",
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wantName: "Trung Hee",
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wantUID: "",
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wantMsgID: "7957717404177",
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wantFormat: TagFormatLegacy,
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wantRest: "alo",
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},
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{
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name: "legacy 1-number inside brackets → TagFormatLegacy",
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in: "[Trung Hee #7957717404177]: alo",
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wantName: "Trung Hee",
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wantUID: "",
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wantMsgID: "7957717404177",
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wantFormat: TagFormatLegacy,
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wantRest: "alo",
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},
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{
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name: "name only → TagFormatNameOnly",
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in: "[Minh Zip] hỏi giá",
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wantName: "Minh Zip",
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wantFormat: TagFormatNameOnly,
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wantRest: "hỏi giá",
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},
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{
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name: "no tag → TagFormatNone",
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in: "chào shop",
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wantFormat: TagFormatNone,
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wantRest: "chào shop",
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},
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{
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// The shape parses regardless of source — handle.go's IS_CONNECTOR
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// gate is what stops an operator forged tag from minting identity.
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name: "forged-looking 2-number shape still parses (gate is in handle.go)",
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in: "[Victim] #111222 #777888 do nó bị văng",
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wantName: "Victim",
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wantUID: "111222",
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wantMsgID: "777888",
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wantFormat: TagFormatThreeToken,
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wantRest: "do nó bị văng",
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},
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}
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for _, tc := range cases {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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got := parseOpenlineSenderTag(tc.in)
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if got.Name != tc.wantName {
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t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", got.Name, tc.wantName)
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}
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if got.UID != tc.wantUID {
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t.Errorf("UID = %q, want %q", got.UID, tc.wantUID)
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}
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if got.MsgID != tc.wantMsgID {
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t.Errorf("MsgID = %q, want %q", got.MsgID, tc.wantMsgID)
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}
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if got.Format != tc.wantFormat {
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t.Errorf("Format = %d, want %d", got.Format, tc.wantFormat)
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}
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if got.Rest != tc.wantRest {
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t.Errorf("Rest = %q, want %q", got.Rest, tc.wantRest)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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