mirror of
https://github.com/tiennm99/goclaw.git
synced 2026-10-14 08:18:19 +00:00
* feat(mcp): MCP OAuth 2.1 client — full implementation with tests
Implements a complete MCP OAuth 2.1 authorization flow for tool servers that
require user-delegated access, covering all layers from DB to UI.
- discovery.go: RFC 9728 protected-resource → RFC 8414 AS metadata → OIDC
fallback chain with 5-min in-memory cache and InvalidateCache()
- dcr.go: RFC 7591 Dynamic Client Registration with response size guard
- flow.go: PKCE (S256) authorization code flow — StartFlow(), ExchangeCode(),
ClientCredentials(), auto-cleanup of expired flows; carries AS issuer through
PendingFlow for status display
- refresher.go: OAuthTokenProvider with in-memory token cache, automatic refresh
on expiry, per-user vs global slot isolation, InvalidateCache/InvalidateServer
- migrations/000074 + SQLite schema: mcp_oauth_tokens with AES-256-GCM encrypted
access/refresh tokens, partial unique index for global vs per-user rows,
ON DELETE CASCADE from mcp_servers
- store.MCPOAuthTokenStore: Upsert, Get/GetUser, Delete/DeleteUser, and
DeleteServerOAuthTokens (purge all rows for a server)
- PostgreSQL + SQLite implementations
- POST /v1/mcp/oauth/start — discovery + optional DCR + PKCE redirect URL;
client_credentials completes server-side (no redirect) and returns completed=true
- GET /v1/mcp/oauth/callback — exchange code, persist token, publish WS event;
payload built via json.Marshal (no reflected XSS via error_description)
- GET /v1/mcp/oauth/status/{id}, DELETE /v1/mcp/oauth/token/{id} — admin-gated
- POST /v1/mcp/oauth/discover/{id} — on-demand discovery probe
- All outbound calls go through the SSRF-safe client with pinned IPs
- pkg/protocol/mcp_events.go: EventMCPOAuthComplete routed only to the initiating
user (admins in-tenant included); fail-closed across tenants
- getUserMCPTools() injects Authorization: Bearer from OAuthTokenProvider; on a
401 for OAuth servers it purges the cached token so the next turn re-resolves
- handleUpdateServer purges all OAuth tokens (global + per-user), drops the
refresher cache, and evicts the pool when a server's URL or OAuth config
(client_id / endpoints / grant_type / scope / auth_type) changes — so the
status UI and agent never use a token minted for the old resource/AS
- MCPOAuthDialog (WS-driven), unified user-credentials dialog, OAuth settings
fields; handles the no-redirect client_credentials completion
- internal/mcp/oauth/*_test.go: discovery cache, PKCE, DCR, refresher
- internal/http/mcp_oauth_test.go + mcp_update_oauth_purge_test.go: routes, auth
gating, WS event, purge-on-URL/OAuth-config-change
- tests/integration: store + encryption + tenant isolation, E2E start→callback,
DeleteServerOAuthTokens
- internal/gateway/event_filter_test.go, internal/agent/loop_mcp_user_test.go
* fix(mcp): return 400 on OAuth callback with code but missing state
The callback handler rendered a 200 HTML page whenever code or state was
absent. An auth code WITH a missing state is a malformed / CSRF-risk
callback (state is the CSRF token), so reject that case with HTTP 400.
A bare hit with neither code nor state (user opening the URL directly),
provider errors, and exchange failures keep their 200 HTML popup page.
Adds a status code parameter to writeCallbackHTML. Fixes the
TestOAuthCallbackMissingState integration regression while keeping
TestHandleCallbackMissingCodeAndState (no params -> 200) green.
* fix(mcp): scope-based OAuth auth + honor manual OAuth endpoints
Addresses the two MCP/OAuth security-review findings.
Finding 1 — authorization. mcp_oauth_tokens is tenant-scoped, but
start/status/revoke were gated only by requireAuth(RoleAdmin), an RBAC
role check, not tenant membership, so a RoleAdmin caller could act on a
tenant they don't administer. A blanket requireTenantAdmin would have
broken per-user self-service, which the UI exposes (the per-user
MCPUserCredentialsDialog shows an "Authorize" button to regular users for
their own credentials). Instead mirror the existing per-user MCP
credentials model (resolveTargetUserID in mcp_user_credentials.go):
- start/status/revoke accept any authenticated user; each handler calls
authorizeOAuthScope.
- a caller may manage their OWN per-user token (self-service); the
global/server token (user_id="") and other users' tokens require
tenant-admin (owner bypass), so a RoleAdmin that is not a tenant admin
is rejected.
- discover stays admin-only (it only previews AS metadata for a server).
Add a TenantStore dependency. Tests cover self-service, on-behalf-of-
another (403), and global-by-non-tenant-admin (403).
Finding 2 — honor manual OAuth config end-to-end. The UI sent use_dcr /
auth_endpoint / token_endpoint and the update path fingerprinted them for
purge, but handleStart always discovered + DCR'd and ignored them. Now:
- use_dcr=false (a *bool, so legacy/absent stays discover+DCR) skips
discovery/registration and uses the operator endpoints, SSRF-validated.
- token_endpoint is always required; auth_endpoint only for auth-code
grants — client_credentials needs no authorization URL, matching the UI
which hides that field for that grant.
- the refresher already refreshes against the stored token_endpoint and
the callback persists it, so manual-mode tokens refresh correctly.
- oauthFingerprint includes use_dcr (nil normalized to true) so toggling
DCR mode purges stale tokens.
- the web form only serializes manual endpoints when use_dcr is off.
Audited all MCP dialogs (form, global OAuth, per-user credentials, grants,
tools): OAuth dialogs handle completed/auth_url identically and read
config from stored server settings; runtime connect uses the stored token
via the refresher (no re-discovery).
Tests: manual auth-code + client_credentials endpoints, missing/SSRF
endpoints, and the full self/global/on-behalf authorization matrix.
132 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
132 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
package http
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"encoding/json"
|
|
"net/http"
|
|
"net/http/httptest"
|
|
"testing"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/google/uuid"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/security"
|
|
"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/store"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// setupUpdatePurgeHandler builds an MCPHandler wired with an in-memory server
|
|
// store (seeded with one OAuth-enabled server), an OAuth token store holding a
|
|
// global + per-user token for that server, and a recording pool evictor.
|
|
func setupUpdatePurgeHandler(t *testing.T, settings string) (*http.ServeMux, uuid.UUID, *mockOAuthTokenStore, *mockPoolEvictor) {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
setAdminToken(t, "test-admin-token")
|
|
|
|
id := uuid.New()
|
|
srvStore := newMockMCPServerForOAuth()
|
|
srvStore.servers[id] = &store.MCPServerData{
|
|
BaseModel: store.BaseModel{ID: id},
|
|
Name: "test-server",
|
|
Transport: "streamable-http",
|
|
URL: "http://127.0.0.1:9/old",
|
|
Settings: json.RawMessage(settings),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
oauthStore := newMockOAuthTokenStore()
|
|
oauthStore.global[id.String()] = &store.MCPOAuthToken{ServerID: id}
|
|
oauthStore.perUser[id.String()+":alice"] = &store.MCPOAuthToken{ServerID: id, UserID: "alice"}
|
|
|
|
evictor := &mockPoolEvictor{}
|
|
h := NewMCPHandler(srvStore, nil, nil)
|
|
h.SetOAuthStore(oauthStore)
|
|
h.SetPoolEvictor(evictor)
|
|
|
|
mux := http.NewServeMux()
|
|
h.RegisterRoutes(mux)
|
|
return mux, id, oauthStore, evictor
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const oauthSettingsClientC1 = `{"oauth":{"auth_type":"oauth","client_id":"c1","token_endpoint":"http://127.0.0.1:9/token"}}`
|
|
|
|
func TestHandleUpdateServerPurgesOAuthOnURLChange(t *testing.T) {
|
|
security.SetAllowLoopbackForTest(true)
|
|
defer security.SetAllowLoopbackForTest(false)
|
|
|
|
mux, id, oauthStore, evictor := setupUpdatePurgeHandler(t, oauthSettingsClientC1)
|
|
|
|
body := map[string]any{"url": "http://127.0.0.1:9/new"}
|
|
req := adminRequest(http.MethodPut, "/v1/mcp/servers/"+id.String(), body)
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
mux.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200; body: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
if oauthStore.deletes == 0 {
|
|
t.Error("expected OAuth tokens to be purged on URL change")
|
|
}
|
|
if _, ok := oauthStore.global[id.String()]; ok {
|
|
t.Error("global token should have been deleted")
|
|
}
|
|
if _, ok := oauthStore.perUser[id.String()+":alice"]; ok {
|
|
t.Error("per-user token should have been deleted")
|
|
}
|
|
if evictor.evictServerCalls == 0 {
|
|
t.Error("expected EvictServer to be called on URL change")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestHandleUpdateServerPurgesOAuthOnOAuthConfigChange(t *testing.T) {
|
|
security.SetAllowLoopbackForTest(true)
|
|
defer security.SetAllowLoopbackForTest(false)
|
|
|
|
mux, id, oauthStore, evictor := setupUpdatePurgeHandler(t, oauthSettingsClientC1)
|
|
|
|
// Same URL, but client_id changes c1 -> c2 → tokens for c1 are now invalid.
|
|
body := map[string]any{
|
|
"settings": map[string]any{
|
|
"oauth": map[string]any{
|
|
"auth_type": "oauth",
|
|
"client_id": "c2",
|
|
"token_endpoint": "http://127.0.0.1:9/token",
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
req := adminRequest(http.MethodPut, "/v1/mcp/servers/"+id.String(), body)
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
mux.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200; body: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
if _, ok := oauthStore.global[id.String()]; ok {
|
|
t.Error("global token should have been deleted on OAuth config change")
|
|
}
|
|
if evictor.evictServerCalls == 0 {
|
|
t.Error("expected EvictServer to be called on OAuth config change")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestHandleUpdateServerKeepsOAuthOnUnrelatedChange(t *testing.T) {
|
|
security.SetAllowLoopbackForTest(true)
|
|
defer security.SetAllowLoopbackForTest(false)
|
|
|
|
mux, id, oauthStore, evictor := setupUpdatePurgeHandler(t, oauthSettingsClientC1)
|
|
|
|
// Change an unrelated field; URL and oauth config are untouched.
|
|
body := map[string]any{"tool_prefix": "tp_"}
|
|
req := adminRequest(http.MethodPut, "/v1/mcp/servers/"+id.String(), body)
|
|
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
mux.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
|
|
|
|
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200; body: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
if oauthStore.deletes != 0 {
|
|
t.Errorf("tokens must NOT be purged on unrelated change, deletes = %d", oauthStore.deletes)
|
|
}
|
|
if _, ok := oauthStore.global[id.String()]; !ok {
|
|
t.Error("global token should still exist")
|
|
}
|
|
if evictor.evictServerCalls != 0 {
|
|
t.Errorf("EvictServer must NOT be called on unrelated change, calls = %d", evictor.evictServerCalls)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|