Files
goclaw/internal/http/mcp_user_credentials_test.go
thotam 0ae55991bb feat(mcp): MCP OAuth 2.1 client for tool servers (#1196)
* feat(mcp): MCP OAuth 2.1 client — full implementation with tests

Implements a complete MCP OAuth 2.1 authorization flow for tool servers that
require user-delegated access, covering all layers from DB to UI.

- discovery.go: RFC 9728 protected-resource → RFC 8414 AS metadata → OIDC
  fallback chain with 5-min in-memory cache and InvalidateCache()
- dcr.go: RFC 7591 Dynamic Client Registration with response size guard
- flow.go: PKCE (S256) authorization code flow — StartFlow(), ExchangeCode(),
  ClientCredentials(), auto-cleanup of expired flows; carries AS issuer through
  PendingFlow for status display
- refresher.go: OAuthTokenProvider with in-memory token cache, automatic refresh
  on expiry, per-user vs global slot isolation, InvalidateCache/InvalidateServer

- migrations/000074 + SQLite schema: mcp_oauth_tokens with AES-256-GCM encrypted
  access/refresh tokens, partial unique index for global vs per-user rows,
  ON DELETE CASCADE from mcp_servers

- store.MCPOAuthTokenStore: Upsert, Get/GetUser, Delete/DeleteUser, and
  DeleteServerOAuthTokens (purge all rows for a server)
- PostgreSQL + SQLite implementations

- POST   /v1/mcp/oauth/start      — discovery + optional DCR + PKCE redirect URL;
  client_credentials completes server-side (no redirect) and returns completed=true
- GET    /v1/mcp/oauth/callback   — exchange code, persist token, publish WS event;
  payload built via json.Marshal (no reflected XSS via error_description)
- GET    /v1/mcp/oauth/status/{id}, DELETE /v1/mcp/oauth/token/{id} — admin-gated
- POST   /v1/mcp/oauth/discover/{id} — on-demand discovery probe
- All outbound calls go through the SSRF-safe client with pinned IPs

- pkg/protocol/mcp_events.go: EventMCPOAuthComplete routed only to the initiating
  user (admins in-tenant included); fail-closed across tenants

- getUserMCPTools() injects Authorization: Bearer from OAuthTokenProvider; on a
  401 for OAuth servers it purges the cached token so the next turn re-resolves

- handleUpdateServer purges all OAuth tokens (global + per-user), drops the
  refresher cache, and evicts the pool when a server's URL or OAuth config
  (client_id / endpoints / grant_type / scope / auth_type) changes — so the
  status UI and agent never use a token minted for the old resource/AS

- MCPOAuthDialog (WS-driven), unified user-credentials dialog, OAuth settings
  fields; handles the no-redirect client_credentials completion

- internal/mcp/oauth/*_test.go: discovery cache, PKCE, DCR, refresher
- internal/http/mcp_oauth_test.go + mcp_update_oauth_purge_test.go: routes, auth
  gating, WS event, purge-on-URL/OAuth-config-change
- tests/integration: store + encryption + tenant isolation, E2E start→callback,
  DeleteServerOAuthTokens
- internal/gateway/event_filter_test.go, internal/agent/loop_mcp_user_test.go

* fix(mcp): return 400 on OAuth callback with code but missing state

The callback handler rendered a 200 HTML page whenever code or state was
absent. An auth code WITH a missing state is a malformed / CSRF-risk
callback (state is the CSRF token), so reject that case with HTTP 400.
A bare hit with neither code nor state (user opening the URL directly),
provider errors, and exchange failures keep their 200 HTML popup page.

Adds a status code parameter to writeCallbackHTML. Fixes the
TestOAuthCallbackMissingState integration regression while keeping
TestHandleCallbackMissingCodeAndState (no params -> 200) green.

* fix(mcp): scope-based OAuth auth + honor manual OAuth endpoints

Addresses the two MCP/OAuth security-review findings.

Finding 1 — authorization. mcp_oauth_tokens is tenant-scoped, but
start/status/revoke were gated only by requireAuth(RoleAdmin), an RBAC
role check, not tenant membership, so a RoleAdmin caller could act on a
tenant they don't administer. A blanket requireTenantAdmin would have
broken per-user self-service, which the UI exposes (the per-user
MCPUserCredentialsDialog shows an "Authorize" button to regular users for
their own credentials). Instead mirror the existing per-user MCP
credentials model (resolveTargetUserID in mcp_user_credentials.go):
- start/status/revoke accept any authenticated user; each handler calls
  authorizeOAuthScope.
- a caller may manage their OWN per-user token (self-service); the
  global/server token (user_id="") and other users' tokens require
  tenant-admin (owner bypass), so a RoleAdmin that is not a tenant admin
  is rejected.
- discover stays admin-only (it only previews AS metadata for a server).
Add a TenantStore dependency. Tests cover self-service, on-behalf-of-
another (403), and global-by-non-tenant-admin (403).

Finding 2 — honor manual OAuth config end-to-end. The UI sent use_dcr /
auth_endpoint / token_endpoint and the update path fingerprinted them for
purge, but handleStart always discovered + DCR'd and ignored them. Now:
- use_dcr=false (a *bool, so legacy/absent stays discover+DCR) skips
  discovery/registration and uses the operator endpoints, SSRF-validated.
- token_endpoint is always required; auth_endpoint only for auth-code
  grants — client_credentials needs no authorization URL, matching the UI
  which hides that field for that grant.
- the refresher already refreshes against the stored token_endpoint and
  the callback persists it, so manual-mode tokens refresh correctly.
- oauthFingerprint includes use_dcr (nil normalized to true) so toggling
  DCR mode purges stale tokens.
- the web form only serializes manual endpoints when use_dcr is off.

Audited all MCP dialogs (form, global OAuth, per-user credentials, grants,
tools): OAuth dialogs handle completed/auth_url identically and read
config from stored server settings; runtime connect uses the stored token
via the refresher (no re-discovery).

Tests: manual auth-code + client_credentials endpoints, missing/SSRF
endpoints, and the full self/global/on-behalf authorization matrix.
2026-06-21 22:27:44 +07:00

83 lines
2.3 KiB
Go

package http
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/bus"
"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/store"
"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/pkg/protocol"
)
// countMCPCacheInvalidate counts CacheKindMCP cache-invalidate events.
func countMCPCacheInvalidate(events []bus.Event) int {
n := 0
for _, e := range events {
if e.Name != protocol.EventCacheInvalidate {
continue
}
if p, ok := e.Payload.(bus.CacheInvalidatePayload); ok && p.Kind == bus.CacheKindMCP {
n++
}
}
return n
}
// Saving and deleting per-user MCP credentials must broadcast a CacheKindMCP
// cache-invalidate so pooled per-user connections are evicted and the new/removed
// credentials take effect immediately (instead of waiting for idle TTL).
func TestMCPUserCredentialsEmitCacheInvalidateOnSetAndDelete(t *testing.T) {
srvStore := newMockMCPServerForOAuth()
mb := bus.New()
var mu sync.Mutex
var events []bus.Event
mb.Subscribe("test-capture", func(e bus.Event) {
mu.Lock()
events = append(events, e)
mu.Unlock()
})
h := NewMCPUserCredentialsHandler(srvStore, nil, mb)
serverID := uuid.New()
ctxWith := func(r *http.Request) *http.Request {
ctx := store.WithTenantID(store.WithUserID(r.Context(), "user-1"), uuid.New())
return r.WithContext(ctx)
}
// SET credentials.
setReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPut,
"/v1/mcp/servers/"+serverID.String()+"/user-credentials",
strings.NewReader(`{"api_key":"k"}`))
setReq.SetPathValue("id", serverID.String())
setReq = ctxWith(setReq)
setRec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.handleSet(setRec, setReq)
if setRec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("handleSet status = %d, want 200; body: %s", setRec.Code, setRec.Body.String())
}
// DELETE credentials.
delReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete,
"/v1/mcp/servers/"+serverID.String()+"/user-credentials", nil)
delReq.SetPathValue("id", serverID.String())
delReq = ctxWith(delReq)
delRec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.handleDelete(delRec, delReq)
if delRec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("handleDelete status = %d, want 200; body: %s", delRec.Code, delRec.Body.String())
}
mu.Lock()
got := countMCPCacheInvalidate(events)
mu.Unlock()
if got < 2 {
t.Errorf("expected >=2 CacheKindMCP events (set + delete), got %d", got)
}
}