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https://github.com/tiennm99/goclaw.git
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* feat(collaboration): isolate delegated artifacts and child runs Isolate delegated inputs and outputs behind secure artifact exchange lifecycles. Scope Agent Link tasks by tenant and root agent, and enforce delegation spawn-tree boundaries. Add process-wide child-run admission and preserve logical media paths across native, MCP, and sandbox execution. * fix(collaboration): harden delegated task isolation Enforce tenant and root-agent task scope across migrations and stores. Add exactly-once async completion delivery, delegated sandbox boundaries, and confined artifact and media recovery across runtime surfaces. * fix(collaboration): recover interrupted async tasks * fix(collaboration): normalize persisted child-run status --------- Co-authored-by: ntduc <ntduc@cpp.ai.vn>
164 lines
6.0 KiB
Go
164 lines
6.0 KiB
Go
package mcp
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import (
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"context"
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"testing"
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"time"
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mcpgo "github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go/mcp"
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"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/bus"
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"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/config"
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"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/tools"
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)
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// fakeBridgeTool is a minimal tools.Tool for registry-driven bridge tests.
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type fakeBridgeTool struct{ name string }
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func (f *fakeBridgeTool) Name() string { return f.name }
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func (f *fakeBridgeTool) Description() string { return "fake " + f.name }
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func (f *fakeBridgeTool) Parameters() map[string]any { return map[string]any{"type": "object"} }
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func (f *fakeBridgeTool) Execute(context.Context, map[string]any) *tools.Result {
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return &tools.Result{ForLLM: "ok"}
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}
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func bridgeTestRegistry(names ...string) *tools.Registry {
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reg := tools.NewRegistry()
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for _, n := range names {
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reg.Register(&fakeBridgeTool{name: n})
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}
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return reg
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}
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// Without an agent policy in ctx (anonymous caller, or agent without a
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// tools_config), the bridge must fall back to the conservative legacy set —
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// deriving from a nil policy would WIDEN exposure for unauthenticated callers.
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func TestBridgeToolAllowed_NoAgentPolicy_FallsBackToLegacySet(t *testing.T) {
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reg := bridgeTestRegistry("read_file", "use_skill")
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pe := tools.NewPolicyEngine(&config.ToolsConfig{})
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ctx := context.Background()
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if !bridgeToolAllowed(reg, pe, ctx, "read_file") {
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t.Error("read_file is in the legacy set — must stay allowed for policy-less callers")
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}
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if bridgeToolAllowed(reg, pe, ctx, "use_skill") {
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t.Error("use_skill is NOT in the legacy set — must stay blocked for policy-less callers")
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}
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}
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// With a verified agent policy in ctx, the bridge derives its tool surface
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// from that policy — the fix for the BridgeToolNames drift (#1373): tools the
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// agent's policy allows (like use_skill) become callable; tools outside the
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// agent's allow list are rejected even if the legacy set contained them.
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func TestBridgeToolAllowed_AgentPolicyDerivesSurface(t *testing.T) {
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reg := bridgeTestRegistry("read_file", "use_skill", "datetime")
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pe := tools.NewPolicyEngine(&config.ToolsConfig{})
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ctx := tools.WithToolAgentPolicy(context.Background(),
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&config.ToolPolicySpec{Allow: []string{"use_skill", "datetime"}})
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if !bridgeToolAllowed(reg, pe, ctx, "use_skill") {
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t.Error("use_skill allowed by agent policy — bridge must expose it")
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}
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if !bridgeToolAllowed(reg, pe, ctx, "datetime") {
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t.Error("datetime allowed by agent policy — bridge must expose it")
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}
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if bridgeToolAllowed(reg, pe, ctx, "read_file") {
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t.Error("read_file NOT in the agent allow list — bridge must reject it")
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}
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}
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// Hard-excluded tools can never cross the bridge, regardless of policy.
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func TestBridgeToolAllowed_HardExclusionsWinOverPolicy(t *testing.T) {
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reg := bridgeTestRegistry("spawn", "create_forum_topic")
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pe := tools.NewPolicyEngine(&config.ToolsConfig{})
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ctx := tools.WithToolAgentPolicy(context.Background(),
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&config.ToolPolicySpec{Allow: []string{"spawn", "create_forum_topic"}})
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for _, name := range []string{"spawn", "create_forum_topic"} {
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if bridgeToolAllowed(reg, pe, ctx, name) {
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t.Errorf("%s is bridge-excluded — policy must not re-enable it", name)
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}
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}
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}
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// Nil policy engine (legacy constructor path) keeps the legacy static behavior.
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func TestBridgeToolAllowed_NilEngine_LegacyBehavior(t *testing.T) {
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reg := bridgeTestRegistry("exec", "use_skill")
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ctx := tools.WithToolAgentPolicy(context.Background(),
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&config.ToolPolicySpec{Allow: []string{"use_skill"}})
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if !bridgeToolAllowed(reg, nil, ctx, "exec") {
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t.Error("nil engine: legacy set must apply (exec allowed)")
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}
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if bridgeToolAllowed(reg, nil, ctx, "use_skill") {
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t.Error("nil engine: legacy set must apply (use_skill blocked)")
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}
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}
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// The tools/list filter must show each caller exactly the surface it can call.
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func TestBridgeToolFilter_ListsMatchCallableSurface(t *testing.T) {
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reg := bridgeTestRegistry("read_file", "use_skill")
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pe := tools.NewPolicyEngine(&config.ToolsConfig{})
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filter := newBridgeToolFilter(reg, pe)
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listed := []mcpgo.Tool{{Name: "read_file"}, {Name: "use_skill"}}
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// Anonymous caller → legacy set only.
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got := filter(context.Background(), listed)
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if len(got) != 1 || got[0].Name != "read_file" {
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t.Errorf("anonymous list = %v, want [read_file]", toolNames(got))
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}
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// Policy'd agent → derived surface.
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ctx := tools.WithToolAgentPolicy(context.Background(),
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&config.ToolPolicySpec{Allow: []string{"use_skill"}})
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got = filter(ctx, listed)
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if len(got) != 1 || got[0].Name != "use_skill" {
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t.Errorf("policy'd list = %v, want [use_skill]", toolNames(got))
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}
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}
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// Registration must cover the whole registry minus hard exclusions, so a
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// policy'd agent can actually call tools beyond the legacy set (the drift bug).
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func TestBridgeRegisteredToolNames_RegistryMinusExclusions(t *testing.T) {
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reg := bridgeTestRegistry("read_file", "use_skill", "spawn")
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names := bridgeRegisteredToolNames(reg)
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got := make(map[string]bool, len(names))
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for _, n := range names {
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got[n] = true
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}
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if !got["read_file"] || !got["use_skill"] {
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t.Errorf("registered = %v, want read_file + use_skill included", names)
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}
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if got["spawn"] {
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t.Errorf("registered = %v, spawn must be excluded", names)
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}
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}
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func toolNames(ts []mcpgo.Tool) []string {
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out := make([]string, len(ts))
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for i, tt := range ts {
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out[i] = tt.Name
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}
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return out
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}
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func TestForwardMediaToOutboundSkipsDelegationArtifactRun(t *testing.T) {
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msgBus := bus.New()
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ctx := tools.WithToolChannel(context.Background(), "telegram")
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ctx = tools.WithToolChatID(ctx, "chat-id")
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ctx = tools.WithDelegationID(ctx, "delegation-id")
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ctx = tools.WithDelegationArtifactInputs(ctx, "/runtime/inputs")
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forwardMediaToOutbound(ctx, msgBus, "create_image", &tools.Result{
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Media: []bus.MediaFile{{Path: "/runtime/outputs/generated.png", MimeType: "image/png"}},
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})
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waitCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Millisecond)
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defer cancel()
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if msg, ok := msgBus.SubscribeOutbound(waitCtx); ok {
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t.Fatalf("unpublished delegation media forwarded: %#v", msg)
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}
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}
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