Files
goclaw/internal/mcp/manager_oauth_test.go
thotam 0ae55991bb feat(mcp): MCP OAuth 2.1 client for tool servers (#1196)
* feat(mcp): MCP OAuth 2.1 client — full implementation with tests

Implements a complete MCP OAuth 2.1 authorization flow for tool servers that
require user-delegated access, covering all layers from DB to UI.

- discovery.go: RFC 9728 protected-resource → RFC 8414 AS metadata → OIDC
  fallback chain with 5-min in-memory cache and InvalidateCache()
- dcr.go: RFC 7591 Dynamic Client Registration with response size guard
- flow.go: PKCE (S256) authorization code flow — StartFlow(), ExchangeCode(),
  ClientCredentials(), auto-cleanup of expired flows; carries AS issuer through
  PendingFlow for status display
- refresher.go: OAuthTokenProvider with in-memory token cache, automatic refresh
  on expiry, per-user vs global slot isolation, InvalidateCache/InvalidateServer

- migrations/000074 + SQLite schema: mcp_oauth_tokens with AES-256-GCM encrypted
  access/refresh tokens, partial unique index for global vs per-user rows,
  ON DELETE CASCADE from mcp_servers

- store.MCPOAuthTokenStore: Upsert, Get/GetUser, Delete/DeleteUser, and
  DeleteServerOAuthTokens (purge all rows for a server)
- PostgreSQL + SQLite implementations

- POST   /v1/mcp/oauth/start      — discovery + optional DCR + PKCE redirect URL;
  client_credentials completes server-side (no redirect) and returns completed=true
- GET    /v1/mcp/oauth/callback   — exchange code, persist token, publish WS event;
  payload built via json.Marshal (no reflected XSS via error_description)
- GET    /v1/mcp/oauth/status/{id}, DELETE /v1/mcp/oauth/token/{id} — admin-gated
- POST   /v1/mcp/oauth/discover/{id} — on-demand discovery probe
- All outbound calls go through the SSRF-safe client with pinned IPs

- pkg/protocol/mcp_events.go: EventMCPOAuthComplete routed only to the initiating
  user (admins in-tenant included); fail-closed across tenants

- getUserMCPTools() injects Authorization: Bearer from OAuthTokenProvider; on a
  401 for OAuth servers it purges the cached token so the next turn re-resolves

- handleUpdateServer purges all OAuth tokens (global + per-user), drops the
  refresher cache, and evicts the pool when a server's URL or OAuth config
  (client_id / endpoints / grant_type / scope / auth_type) changes — so the
  status UI and agent never use a token minted for the old resource/AS

- MCPOAuthDialog (WS-driven), unified user-credentials dialog, OAuth settings
  fields; handles the no-redirect client_credentials completion

- internal/mcp/oauth/*_test.go: discovery cache, PKCE, DCR, refresher
- internal/http/mcp_oauth_test.go + mcp_update_oauth_purge_test.go: routes, auth
  gating, WS event, purge-on-URL/OAuth-config-change
- tests/integration: store + encryption + tenant isolation, E2E start→callback,
  DeleteServerOAuthTokens
- internal/gateway/event_filter_test.go, internal/agent/loop_mcp_user_test.go

* fix(mcp): return 400 on OAuth callback with code but missing state

The callback handler rendered a 200 HTML page whenever code or state was
absent. An auth code WITH a missing state is a malformed / CSRF-risk
callback (state is the CSRF token), so reject that case with HTTP 400.
A bare hit with neither code nor state (user opening the URL directly),
provider errors, and exchange failures keep their 200 HTML popup page.

Adds a status code parameter to writeCallbackHTML. Fixes the
TestOAuthCallbackMissingState integration regression while keeping
TestHandleCallbackMissingCodeAndState (no params -> 200) green.

* fix(mcp): scope-based OAuth auth + honor manual OAuth endpoints

Addresses the two MCP/OAuth security-review findings.

Finding 1 — authorization. mcp_oauth_tokens is tenant-scoped, but
start/status/revoke were gated only by requireAuth(RoleAdmin), an RBAC
role check, not tenant membership, so a RoleAdmin caller could act on a
tenant they don't administer. A blanket requireTenantAdmin would have
broken per-user self-service, which the UI exposes (the per-user
MCPUserCredentialsDialog shows an "Authorize" button to regular users for
their own credentials). Instead mirror the existing per-user MCP
credentials model (resolveTargetUserID in mcp_user_credentials.go):
- start/status/revoke accept any authenticated user; each handler calls
  authorizeOAuthScope.
- a caller may manage their OWN per-user token (self-service); the
  global/server token (user_id="") and other users' tokens require
  tenant-admin (owner bypass), so a RoleAdmin that is not a tenant admin
  is rejected.
- discover stays admin-only (it only previews AS metadata for a server).
Add a TenantStore dependency. Tests cover self-service, on-behalf-of-
another (403), and global-by-non-tenant-admin (403).

Finding 2 — honor manual OAuth config end-to-end. The UI sent use_dcr /
auth_endpoint / token_endpoint and the update path fingerprinted them for
purge, but handleStart always discovered + DCR'd and ignored them. Now:
- use_dcr=false (a *bool, so legacy/absent stays discover+DCR) skips
  discovery/registration and uses the operator endpoints, SSRF-validated.
- token_endpoint is always required; auth_endpoint only for auth-code
  grants — client_credentials needs no authorization URL, matching the UI
  which hides that field for that grant.
- the refresher already refreshes against the stored token_endpoint and
  the callback persists it, so manual-mode tokens refresh correctly.
- oauthFingerprint includes use_dcr (nil normalized to true) so toggling
  DCR mode purges stale tokens.
- the web form only serializes manual endpoints when use_dcr is off.

Audited all MCP dialogs (form, global OAuth, per-user credentials, grants,
tools): OAuth dialogs handle completed/auth_url identically and read
config from stored server settings; runtime connect uses the stored token
via the refresher (no re-discovery).

Tests: manual auth-code + client_credentials endpoints, missing/SSRF
endpoints, and the full self/global/on-behalf authorization matrix.
2026-06-21 22:27:44 +07:00

95 lines
3.0 KiB
Go

package mcp
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/store"
)
// fakeOAuthProvider is a minimal OAuthTokenProvider for resolveServerCredentials tests.
type fakeOAuthProvider struct {
token string
err error
calls int
}
func (f *fakeOAuthProvider) GetValidToken(_ context.Context, _ uuid.UUID, _ uuid.UUID, _ string) (string, error) {
f.calls++
return f.token, f.err
}
func oauthAccessInfo(apiKey string) store.MCPAccessInfo {
return store.MCPAccessInfo{Server: store.MCPServerData{
BaseModel: store.BaseModel{ID: uuid.New()},
Name: "oauth-srv",
Transport: "streamable-http",
URL: "http://127.0.0.1:1/mcp",
APIKey: apiKey,
Enabled: true,
Settings: json.RawMessage(`{"oauth":{"auth_type":"oauth"}}`),
}}
}
// OAuth server + no token → resolveServerCredentials must return nil (skip),
// NOT fall back to the server-level api_key.
func TestResolveServerCredentials_OAuthSkipsWithoutToken(t *testing.T) {
prov := &fakeOAuthProvider{token: ""}
m := &Manager{oauthTokenProvider: prov}
rs := m.resolveServerCredentials(context.Background(), oauthAccessInfo("shared-server-key"), "")
if rs != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected nil (skip) for OAuth server without token, got headers=%v", rs.headers)
}
if prov.calls == 0 {
t.Error("expected GetValidToken to be consulted")
}
}
// OAuth server + valid token → Authorization must be the token, never the api_key.
func TestResolveServerCredentials_OAuthUsesTokenNotApiKey(t *testing.T) {
m := &Manager{oauthTokenProvider: &fakeOAuthProvider{token: "tok-123"}}
rs := m.resolveServerCredentials(context.Background(), oauthAccessInfo("shared-server-key"), "")
if rs == nil {
t.Fatal("expected resolved server when token present")
}
if got := rs.headers["Authorization"]; got != "Bearer tok-123" {
t.Errorf("Authorization = %q, want %q (token, not server api_key)", got, "Bearer tok-123")
}
}
// OAuth server but no provider wired → skip (cannot obtain a token).
func TestResolveServerCredentials_OAuthNoProviderSkips(t *testing.T) {
m := &Manager{} // oauthTokenProvider == nil
rs := m.resolveServerCredentials(context.Background(), oauthAccessInfo("shared-server-key"), "")
if rs != nil {
t.Fatal("expected nil (skip) for OAuth server with no provider wired")
}
}
// Non-OAuth server → server-level api_key is still injected as before.
func TestResolveServerCredentials_NonOAuthUsesApiKey(t *testing.T) {
m := &Manager{}
info := store.MCPAccessInfo{Server: store.MCPServerData{
BaseModel: store.BaseModel{ID: uuid.New()},
Name: "plain-srv",
Transport: "streamable-http",
URL: "http://127.0.0.1:1/mcp",
APIKey: "shared-server-key",
Enabled: true,
}}
rs := m.resolveServerCredentials(context.Background(), info, "")
if rs == nil {
t.Fatal("expected resolved server for non-OAuth")
}
if got := rs.headers["Authorization"]; got != "Bearer shared-server-key" {
t.Errorf("Authorization = %q, want %q", got, "Bearer shared-server-key")
}
}