Files
thotam 0ae55991bb feat(mcp): MCP OAuth 2.1 client for tool servers (#1196)
* feat(mcp): MCP OAuth 2.1 client — full implementation with tests

Implements a complete MCP OAuth 2.1 authorization flow for tool servers that
require user-delegated access, covering all layers from DB to UI.

- discovery.go: RFC 9728 protected-resource → RFC 8414 AS metadata → OIDC
  fallback chain with 5-min in-memory cache and InvalidateCache()
- dcr.go: RFC 7591 Dynamic Client Registration with response size guard
- flow.go: PKCE (S256) authorization code flow — StartFlow(), ExchangeCode(),
  ClientCredentials(), auto-cleanup of expired flows; carries AS issuer through
  PendingFlow for status display
- refresher.go: OAuthTokenProvider with in-memory token cache, automatic refresh
  on expiry, per-user vs global slot isolation, InvalidateCache/InvalidateServer

- migrations/000074 + SQLite schema: mcp_oauth_tokens with AES-256-GCM encrypted
  access/refresh tokens, partial unique index for global vs per-user rows,
  ON DELETE CASCADE from mcp_servers

- store.MCPOAuthTokenStore: Upsert, Get/GetUser, Delete/DeleteUser, and
  DeleteServerOAuthTokens (purge all rows for a server)
- PostgreSQL + SQLite implementations

- POST   /v1/mcp/oauth/start      — discovery + optional DCR + PKCE redirect URL;
  client_credentials completes server-side (no redirect) and returns completed=true
- GET    /v1/mcp/oauth/callback   — exchange code, persist token, publish WS event;
  payload built via json.Marshal (no reflected XSS via error_description)
- GET    /v1/mcp/oauth/status/{id}, DELETE /v1/mcp/oauth/token/{id} — admin-gated
- POST   /v1/mcp/oauth/discover/{id} — on-demand discovery probe
- All outbound calls go through the SSRF-safe client with pinned IPs

- pkg/protocol/mcp_events.go: EventMCPOAuthComplete routed only to the initiating
  user (admins in-tenant included); fail-closed across tenants

- getUserMCPTools() injects Authorization: Bearer from OAuthTokenProvider; on a
  401 for OAuth servers it purges the cached token so the next turn re-resolves

- handleUpdateServer purges all OAuth tokens (global + per-user), drops the
  refresher cache, and evicts the pool when a server's URL or OAuth config
  (client_id / endpoints / grant_type / scope / auth_type) changes — so the
  status UI and agent never use a token minted for the old resource/AS

- MCPOAuthDialog (WS-driven), unified user-credentials dialog, OAuth settings
  fields; handles the no-redirect client_credentials completion

- internal/mcp/oauth/*_test.go: discovery cache, PKCE, DCR, refresher
- internal/http/mcp_oauth_test.go + mcp_update_oauth_purge_test.go: routes, auth
  gating, WS event, purge-on-URL/OAuth-config-change
- tests/integration: store + encryption + tenant isolation, E2E start→callback,
  DeleteServerOAuthTokens
- internal/gateway/event_filter_test.go, internal/agent/loop_mcp_user_test.go

* fix(mcp): return 400 on OAuth callback with code but missing state

The callback handler rendered a 200 HTML page whenever code or state was
absent. An auth code WITH a missing state is a malformed / CSRF-risk
callback (state is the CSRF token), so reject that case with HTTP 400.
A bare hit with neither code nor state (user opening the URL directly),
provider errors, and exchange failures keep their 200 HTML popup page.

Adds a status code parameter to writeCallbackHTML. Fixes the
TestOAuthCallbackMissingState integration regression while keeping
TestHandleCallbackMissingCodeAndState (no params -> 200) green.

* fix(mcp): scope-based OAuth auth + honor manual OAuth endpoints

Addresses the two MCP/OAuth security-review findings.

Finding 1 — authorization. mcp_oauth_tokens is tenant-scoped, but
start/status/revoke were gated only by requireAuth(RoleAdmin), an RBAC
role check, not tenant membership, so a RoleAdmin caller could act on a
tenant they don't administer. A blanket requireTenantAdmin would have
broken per-user self-service, which the UI exposes (the per-user
MCPUserCredentialsDialog shows an "Authorize" button to regular users for
their own credentials). Instead mirror the existing per-user MCP
credentials model (resolveTargetUserID in mcp_user_credentials.go):
- start/status/revoke accept any authenticated user; each handler calls
  authorizeOAuthScope.
- a caller may manage their OWN per-user token (self-service); the
  global/server token (user_id="") and other users' tokens require
  tenant-admin (owner bypass), so a RoleAdmin that is not a tenant admin
  is rejected.
- discover stays admin-only (it only previews AS metadata for a server).
Add a TenantStore dependency. Tests cover self-service, on-behalf-of-
another (403), and global-by-non-tenant-admin (403).

Finding 2 — honor manual OAuth config end-to-end. The UI sent use_dcr /
auth_endpoint / token_endpoint and the update path fingerprinted them for
purge, but handleStart always discovered + DCR'd and ignored them. Now:
- use_dcr=false (a *bool, so legacy/absent stays discover+DCR) skips
  discovery/registration and uses the operator endpoints, SSRF-validated.
- token_endpoint is always required; auth_endpoint only for auth-code
  grants — client_credentials needs no authorization URL, matching the UI
  which hides that field for that grant.
- the refresher already refreshes against the stored token_endpoint and
  the callback persists it, so manual-mode tokens refresh correctly.
- oauthFingerprint includes use_dcr (nil normalized to true) so toggling
  DCR mode purges stale tokens.
- the web form only serializes manual endpoints when use_dcr is off.

Audited all MCP dialogs (form, global OAuth, per-user credentials, grants,
tools): OAuth dialogs handle completed/auth_url identically and read
config from stored server settings; runtime connect uses the stored token
via the refresher (no re-discovery).

Tests: manual auth-code + client_credentials endpoints, missing/SSRF
endpoints, and the full self/global/on-behalf authorization matrix.
2026-06-21 22:27:44 +07:00

77 lines
2.7 KiB
Go

package mcpoauth
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/security"
)
// DCRRequest is the Dynamic Client Registration request body (RFC 7591).
type DCRRequest struct {
RedirectURIs []string `json:"redirect_uris"`
GrantTypes []string `json:"grant_types"`
ResponseTypes []string `json:"response_types"`
ClientName string `json:"client_name"`
TokenEndpointAuthMethod string `json:"token_endpoint_auth_method"`
}
// DCRResponse is the server response from Dynamic Client Registration.
type DCRResponse struct {
ClientID string `json:"client_id"`
ClientSecret string `json:"client_secret,omitempty"`
ClientIDIssuedAt int64 `json:"client_id_issued_at,omitempty"`
ClientSecretExpiresAt int64 `json:"client_secret_expires_at,omitempty"`
TokenEndpointAuthMethod string `json:"token_endpoint_auth_method,omitempty"`
}
// RegisterClient performs Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591).
// callbackURL is the redirect_uri to register.
func RegisterClient(ctx context.Context, client *http.Client, registrationEndpoint, callbackURL string) (*DCRResponse, error) {
body := DCRRequest{
RedirectURIs: []string{callbackURL},
GrantTypes: []string{"authorization_code", "refresh_token"},
ResponseTypes: []string{"code"},
ClientName: "GoClaw Gateway",
TokenEndpointAuthMethod: "none", // public client — PKCE handles security
}
data, err := json.Marshal(body)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
_, ip, err := security.Validate(registrationEndpoint)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("mcpoauth: SSRF validation failed for registration endpoint: %w", err)
}
ctx = security.WithPinnedIP(ctx, ip)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, registrationEndpoint, bytes.NewReader(data))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("mcpoauth: DCR request failed: %w", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
respBody, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 32*1024))
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated && resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("mcpoauth: DCR returned HTTP %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, string(respBody))
}
var result DCRResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(respBody, &result); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("mcpoauth: DCR response parse error: %w", err)
}
if result.ClientID == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("mcpoauth: DCR response missing client_id")
}
return &result, nil
}