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* feat(mcp): MCP OAuth 2.1 client — full implementation with tests
Implements a complete MCP OAuth 2.1 authorization flow for tool servers that
require user-delegated access, covering all layers from DB to UI.
- discovery.go: RFC 9728 protected-resource → RFC 8414 AS metadata → OIDC
fallback chain with 5-min in-memory cache and InvalidateCache()
- dcr.go: RFC 7591 Dynamic Client Registration with response size guard
- flow.go: PKCE (S256) authorization code flow — StartFlow(), ExchangeCode(),
ClientCredentials(), auto-cleanup of expired flows; carries AS issuer through
PendingFlow for status display
- refresher.go: OAuthTokenProvider with in-memory token cache, automatic refresh
on expiry, per-user vs global slot isolation, InvalidateCache/InvalidateServer
- migrations/000074 + SQLite schema: mcp_oauth_tokens with AES-256-GCM encrypted
access/refresh tokens, partial unique index for global vs per-user rows,
ON DELETE CASCADE from mcp_servers
- store.MCPOAuthTokenStore: Upsert, Get/GetUser, Delete/DeleteUser, and
DeleteServerOAuthTokens (purge all rows for a server)
- PostgreSQL + SQLite implementations
- POST /v1/mcp/oauth/start — discovery + optional DCR + PKCE redirect URL;
client_credentials completes server-side (no redirect) and returns completed=true
- GET /v1/mcp/oauth/callback — exchange code, persist token, publish WS event;
payload built via json.Marshal (no reflected XSS via error_description)
- GET /v1/mcp/oauth/status/{id}, DELETE /v1/mcp/oauth/token/{id} — admin-gated
- POST /v1/mcp/oauth/discover/{id} — on-demand discovery probe
- All outbound calls go through the SSRF-safe client with pinned IPs
- pkg/protocol/mcp_events.go: EventMCPOAuthComplete routed only to the initiating
user (admins in-tenant included); fail-closed across tenants
- getUserMCPTools() injects Authorization: Bearer from OAuthTokenProvider; on a
401 for OAuth servers it purges the cached token so the next turn re-resolves
- handleUpdateServer purges all OAuth tokens (global + per-user), drops the
refresher cache, and evicts the pool when a server's URL or OAuth config
(client_id / endpoints / grant_type / scope / auth_type) changes — so the
status UI and agent never use a token minted for the old resource/AS
- MCPOAuthDialog (WS-driven), unified user-credentials dialog, OAuth settings
fields; handles the no-redirect client_credentials completion
- internal/mcp/oauth/*_test.go: discovery cache, PKCE, DCR, refresher
- internal/http/mcp_oauth_test.go + mcp_update_oauth_purge_test.go: routes, auth
gating, WS event, purge-on-URL/OAuth-config-change
- tests/integration: store + encryption + tenant isolation, E2E start→callback,
DeleteServerOAuthTokens
- internal/gateway/event_filter_test.go, internal/agent/loop_mcp_user_test.go
* fix(mcp): return 400 on OAuth callback with code but missing state
The callback handler rendered a 200 HTML page whenever code or state was
absent. An auth code WITH a missing state is a malformed / CSRF-risk
callback (state is the CSRF token), so reject that case with HTTP 400.
A bare hit with neither code nor state (user opening the URL directly),
provider errors, and exchange failures keep their 200 HTML popup page.
Adds a status code parameter to writeCallbackHTML. Fixes the
TestOAuthCallbackMissingState integration regression while keeping
TestHandleCallbackMissingCodeAndState (no params -> 200) green.
* fix(mcp): scope-based OAuth auth + honor manual OAuth endpoints
Addresses the two MCP/OAuth security-review findings.
Finding 1 — authorization. mcp_oauth_tokens is tenant-scoped, but
start/status/revoke were gated only by requireAuth(RoleAdmin), an RBAC
role check, not tenant membership, so a RoleAdmin caller could act on a
tenant they don't administer. A blanket requireTenantAdmin would have
broken per-user self-service, which the UI exposes (the per-user
MCPUserCredentialsDialog shows an "Authorize" button to regular users for
their own credentials). Instead mirror the existing per-user MCP
credentials model (resolveTargetUserID in mcp_user_credentials.go):
- start/status/revoke accept any authenticated user; each handler calls
authorizeOAuthScope.
- a caller may manage their OWN per-user token (self-service); the
global/server token (user_id="") and other users' tokens require
tenant-admin (owner bypass), so a RoleAdmin that is not a tenant admin
is rejected.
- discover stays admin-only (it only previews AS metadata for a server).
Add a TenantStore dependency. Tests cover self-service, on-behalf-of-
another (403), and global-by-non-tenant-admin (403).
Finding 2 — honor manual OAuth config end-to-end. The UI sent use_dcr /
auth_endpoint / token_endpoint and the update path fingerprinted them for
purge, but handleStart always discovered + DCR'd and ignored them. Now:
- use_dcr=false (a *bool, so legacy/absent stays discover+DCR) skips
discovery/registration and uses the operator endpoints, SSRF-validated.
- token_endpoint is always required; auth_endpoint only for auth-code
grants — client_credentials needs no authorization URL, matching the UI
which hides that field for that grant.
- the refresher already refreshes against the stored token_endpoint and
the callback persists it, so manual-mode tokens refresh correctly.
- oauthFingerprint includes use_dcr (nil normalized to true) so toggling
DCR mode purges stale tokens.
- the web form only serializes manual endpoints when use_dcr is off.
Audited all MCP dialogs (form, global OAuth, per-user credentials, grants,
tools): OAuth dialogs handle completed/auth_url identically and read
config from stored server settings; runtime connect uses the stored token
via the refresher (no re-discovery).
Tests: manual auth-code + client_credentials endpoints, missing/SSRF
endpoints, and the full self/global/on-behalf authorization matrix.
138 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
138 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
package mcpoauth
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/security"
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)
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func TestRegisterClientSuccess201(t *testing.T) {
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security.SetAllowLoopbackForTest(true)
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defer security.SetAllowLoopbackForTest(false)
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
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http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
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return
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}
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var req DCRRequest
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if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
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http.Error(w, "bad json", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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if req.ClientName != "GoClaw Gateway" {
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http.Error(w, "wrong client_name", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(DCRResponse{ClientID: "registered-client-id"})
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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client := security.NewSafeClient(5 * time.Second)
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resp, err := RegisterClient(context.Background(), client, srv.URL, "https://goclaw.example.com/callback")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("RegisterClient() error: %v", err)
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}
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if resp.ClientID != "registered-client-id" {
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t.Errorf("ClientID = %q, want %q", resp.ClientID, "registered-client-id")
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}
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}
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func TestRegisterClientAccepts200(t *testing.T) {
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security.SetAllowLoopbackForTest(true)
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defer security.SetAllowLoopbackForTest(false)
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) // 200, not 201
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(DCRResponse{ClientID: "client-200"})
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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client := security.NewSafeClient(5 * time.Second)
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resp, err := RegisterClient(context.Background(), client, srv.URL, "https://example.com/cb")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("RegisterClient() with HTTP 200 error: %v", err)
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}
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if resp.ClientID != "client-200" {
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t.Errorf("ClientID = %q, want %q", resp.ClientID, "client-200")
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}
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}
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func TestRegisterClientMissingClientID(t *testing.T) {
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security.SetAllowLoopbackForTest(true)
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defer security.SetAllowLoopbackForTest(false)
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
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// Response has no client_id.
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(DCRResponse{})
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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client := security.NewSafeClient(5 * time.Second)
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_, err := RegisterClient(context.Background(), client, srv.URL, "https://example.com/cb")
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected error when client_id missing, got nil")
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}
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if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "client_id") {
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t.Errorf("error should mention client_id, got: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestRegisterClientHTTPError(t *testing.T) {
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security.SetAllowLoopbackForTest(true)
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defer security.SetAllowLoopbackForTest(false)
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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client := security.NewSafeClient(5 * time.Second)
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_, err := RegisterClient(context.Background(), client, srv.URL, "https://example.com/cb")
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected error for HTTP 401, got nil")
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}
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if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "401") {
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t.Errorf("error should mention HTTP status, got: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestRegisterClientResponseTooLarge(t *testing.T) {
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security.SetAllowLoopbackForTest(true)
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defer security.SetAllowLoopbackForTest(false)
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
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// Write > 32KB of data.
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large := make([]byte, 33*1024)
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for i := range large {
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large[i] = 'x'
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}
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// Wrap in valid JSON to pass JSON decode.
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"client_id":"`))
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_, _ = w.Write(large)
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`"}`))
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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client := security.NewSafeClient(5 * time.Second)
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// The response is truncated to 32KB before JSON decode; the JSON will be
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// malformed, so we expect a parse error.
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_, err := RegisterClient(context.Background(), client, srv.URL, "https://example.com/cb")
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected error for oversized response, got nil")
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}
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}
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