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* feat(packages): add update flow for GitHub binaries (#900) Closes #900. Proactive update-check + atomic swap for GitHub-installed binaries on the Runtime & Packages page. Interfaces prepared for pip/npm/apk extension in Phase 2. - UpdateCache + UpdateRegistry + PackageLocker (ctx-aware keyed mutex) - GitHubUpdateChecker: ETag-aware, distinct /latest vs /list ETag keys, semver-correct ordering via golang.org/x/mod/semver, non-semver fallback that refuses to downgrade, pre-release + stable candidate fusion for the v1.0.0-rc.1 -> v1.0.0 transition - GitHubUpdateExecutor: two-phase .bak swap with hadBackup-aware rollback, manifest save retry (3x, 100ms/500ms/1s backoff), nil-safe meta access, explicit ScratchDir, 0755 set pre-rename - HTTP: GET /v1/packages/updates (SWR), POST /v1/packages/updates/refresh, POST /v1/packages/update, POST /v1/packages/updates/apply-all (always 200, failed[] is error source). Master-scope gated. - WS events package.update.{checked,started,succeeded,failed} forwarded to owner clients via event_filter.go - Frontend: useUpdates hook + 3 components (summary bar, update-all modal, row button), master-scope-gated disabled state - i18n: 8 backend keys + 17 frontend keys x en/vi/zh - Config: packages.github_token (reserved), updates_check_ttl, scratch_dir - 45+ new tests, race-clean, BenchmarkCheckAll10Packages ~1.1ms/op warm * docs(packages): document update flow + Phase 1 completion - packages-github.md: "Updating Installed Packages" section with UI + API contract, troubleshooting runbook (corrupt cache, rate-limit, scratch dir, mid-swap recovery) - 17-changelog.md + CHANGELOG.md: Phase 1 entry - 14-skills-runtime.md: cross-ref to update flow - journal entry capturing CRIT fixes (double-write, lock-key mismatch, rollback false-alarm) + design wins (keyed locks, red-team pre-flight) * feat(workstation): remote workstation runtime — SSH exec + security + audit Adds generic Remote Workstation Runtime enabling agents to execute commands on user-owned SSH workstations. Includes registry (DB + API + UI), SSH backend with connection pool and circuit breaker, workstation.exec + claude_remote tools, NFKC + binary-name allowlist security, and audit logging. Standard edition only. Closes #941. * fix(workstation): address 3 critical + 5 important code review findings - C1: Add json:"-" to Metadata/DefaultEnv fields; use SanitizedView() in all API responses to prevent SSH private key leakage - C2: Wire CheckEnv into PermCheckFn; LD_PRELOAD/PATH injection now blocked - C3: SSH Setenv fallback — prepend `export K=V;` when server rejects Setenv - I1: BackendCache sync.RWMutex → sync.Mutex (fix data race on lastUsed) - I2: Validate metadata shape in handleUpdate before store write - I3: Include command in exec-done event; activity sink uses actual cmd hash - I4: Wrap pool release in sync.Once (idempotent double-call safety) - I5: Verify workstation tenant ownership before adding permissions * fix(packages): bypass HTTPS+IP validation in update executor tests Test httptest servers bind to http://127.0.0.1 which fails both the HTTPS scheme check and literal-IP SSRF guard. Add testSkipDownloadValidation flag (same pattern as existing withTestDownloadHosts) to skip full URL validation in test context. * fix(workstation): address Claude review findings — tenant isolation + pool leak + dead code - Activity list: add workstation ownership check before listing (prevents cross-tenant activity enumeration via known UUID) - SSH pool: clean up p.sem + p.circuits maps in CloseWorkstation, prune, and Close to prevent unbounded map growth - RPC handlers: return ErrInvalidRequest on JSON unmarshal failure instead of silently using zero-value params - Remove unused containsControlChars function in normalize.go - HTTP tests: add 10s context timeout to prevent CI package timeout * fix(workstation): DefaultEnv JSON parse, backend cache leak, perm ownership check - DefaultEnv: replace KEY=VALUE text parse with json.Unmarshal (stored as JSON by HTTP handler, was silently ignored) - BackendCache: close losing backend on concurrent cache miss to prevent pruneLoop goroutine leak - Backend interface: add Close() error method; SSHBackend delegates to pool.Close() - handlePermList: add wsStore.GetByID ownership check (prevents cross-tenant UUID enumeration returning empty array vs 404) - scanRows: log scan errors instead of silently skipping * fix(workstation): wire activity sink shutdown + remove misleading comment - WireActivitySink: capture cleanup func, register in gateway shutdown (was discarded → retention goroutine leaked + buffered rows lost) - Add Stop() to WorkstationActivityStore interface (PG+SQLite already had it) - wireWorkstationTools returns cleanup func; gateway.go defers it - Remove misleading "re-validate env" comment in allowlist.go Check() * ci: bump unit test timeout from 90s to 120s hooks/handlers package (goja script tests) consumes ~85s on cold CI runners, leaving insufficient headroom for HTTP retry tests with 1s backoff. 120s provides adequate breathing room without masking real deadlocks. * fix: compile errors in integration tests + allowlist docstring - packages_update_test: add missing lockKey arg to registry.Apply - mcp_grant_revoke_test: remove unused fakeMCPClient struct - allowlist.go: fix Check() docstring to match actual 3-step pipeline * fix(test): relax mcp grant revoke assertion for pre-Phase02 state Execute-time grant checking not yet wired — test correctly gets an error but the message is "no active client" (nil clientPtr) rather than "grant revoked". Accept any error as valid regression guard. * chore: trigger CI on digitopvn/goclaw fork * ci: retrigger workflows * fix(permissions): classify workstation methods in RBAC policy
220 lines
8.4 KiB
Go
220 lines
8.4 KiB
Go
package store
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"time"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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)
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// SanitizedWorkstation is the safe API view of a Workstation — no secret fields.
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// Used in all HTTP/WS responses to prevent credentials from reaching clients.
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type SanitizedWorkstation struct {
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ID uuid.UUID `json:"id"`
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WorkstationKey string `json:"workstationKey"`
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TenantID uuid.UUID `json:"tenantId"`
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Name string `json:"name"`
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BackendType WorkstationBackend `json:"backendType"`
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DefaultCWD string `json:"defaultCwd"`
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Active bool `json:"active"`
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CreatedAt time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
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UpdatedAt time.Time `json:"updatedAt"`
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CreatedBy string `json:"createdBy"`
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MetadataSummary map[string]any `json:"metadataSummary,omitempty"`
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}
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// WorkstationBackend is the backend type for a workstation.
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type WorkstationBackend string
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const (
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BackendSSH WorkstationBackend = "ssh"
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BackendDocker WorkstationBackend = "docker"
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)
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// Workstation represents a remote execution environment registered to a tenant.
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// Metadata and DefaultEnv are stored AES-256-GCM encrypted; in-memory they are plaintext JSON.
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// SECURITY: Metadata and DefaultEnv are excluded from JSON serialization (json:"-") to prevent
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// SSH private keys / passwords from leaking in API responses. Use SanitizedView() for responses.
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type Workstation struct {
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ID uuid.UUID `json:"id"`
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WorkstationKey string `json:"workstationKey"`
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TenantID uuid.UUID `json:"tenantId"`
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Name string `json:"name"`
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BackendType WorkstationBackend `json:"backendType"`
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// Metadata holds backend-specific config (SSH or Docker). Plaintext after decrypt.
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// json:"-" prevents SSH keys/passwords from appearing in API responses.
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Metadata []byte `json:"-"`
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DefaultCWD string `json:"defaultCwd"`
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// DefaultEnv holds a JSON map of env overrides. Plaintext after decrypt.
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// json:"-" prevents env secrets from appearing in API responses.
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DefaultEnv []byte `json:"-"`
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Active bool `json:"active"`
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CreatedAt time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
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UpdatedAt time.Time `json:"updatedAt"`
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CreatedBy string `json:"createdBy"`
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}
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// SanitizedView returns a safe representation for API responses.
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// SSH metadata is summarized (host/port/user/hasKey) without private keys.
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// Docker metadata is summarized (image/containerName) without credentials.
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// Raw Metadata and DefaultEnv bytes are never included.
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func (ws *Workstation) SanitizedView() *SanitizedWorkstation {
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sv := &SanitizedWorkstation{
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ID: ws.ID,
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WorkstationKey: ws.WorkstationKey,
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TenantID: ws.TenantID,
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Name: ws.Name,
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BackendType: ws.BackendType,
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DefaultCWD: ws.DefaultCWD,
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Active: ws.Active,
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CreatedAt: ws.CreatedAt,
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UpdatedAt: ws.UpdatedAt,
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CreatedBy: ws.CreatedBy,
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}
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// Build metadata summary without exposing credentials.
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switch ws.BackendType {
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case BackendSSH:
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if m, err := UnmarshalSSHMetadata(ws.Metadata); err == nil {
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sv.MetadataSummary = map[string]any{
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"host": m.Host,
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"port": m.Port,
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"user": m.User,
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"hasKey": m.PrivateKey != "",
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}
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}
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case BackendDocker:
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if m, err := UnmarshalDockerMetadata(ws.Metadata); err == nil {
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sv.MetadataSummary = map[string]any{
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"image": m.Image,
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"containerName": m.Host,
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}
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}
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}
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return sv
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}
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// AgentWorkstationLink binds an agent to a workstation within a tenant.
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type AgentWorkstationLink struct {
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AgentID uuid.UUID `json:"agentId"`
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WorkstationID uuid.UUID `json:"workstationId"`
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TenantID uuid.UUID `json:"tenantId"`
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IsDefault bool `json:"isDefault"`
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CreatedAt time.Time `json:"createdAt"`
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}
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// SSHMetadata contains SSH-specific connection parameters.
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// Either PrivateKey (inline PEM) or Password must be set for auth.
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// KnownHostsFingerprint is the SHA256 fingerprint of the host's public key (base64).
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// If empty on first connect, TOFU (Trust On First Use) accepts and logs the fingerprint.
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type SSHMetadata struct {
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Host string `json:"host"`
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Port int `json:"port"`
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User string `json:"user"`
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// PrivateKey holds inline PEM-encoded private key material (decrypted by store layer).
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PrivateKey string `json:"privateKey,omitempty"`
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// Password is optional; prefer key-based auth.
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Password string `json:"password,omitempty"`
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// KnownHostsFingerprint is the expected SHA256 fingerprint (e.g. "SHA256:abc...").
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// Empty → TOFU on first connect; subsequent calls must match.
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KnownHostsFingerprint string `json:"knownHostsFingerprint,omitempty"`
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// ConnectTimeoutSec overrides the default 10s TCP dial timeout.
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ConnectTimeoutSec int `json:"connectTimeoutSec,omitempty"`
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}
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// DockerMetadata contains Docker-specific connection parameters.
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type DockerMetadata struct {
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Host string `json:"host"`
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Image string `json:"image"`
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Network string `json:"network,omitempty"`
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SocketPath string `json:"socketPath,omitempty"`
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}
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// UnmarshalSSHMetadata parses and validates SSH metadata bytes.
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func UnmarshalSSHMetadata(raw []byte) (*SSHMetadata, error) {
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var m SSHMetadata
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if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &m); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse: %w", err)
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}
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if m.Host == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("host is required")
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}
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if m.User == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("user is required")
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}
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if m.Port == 0 {
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m.Port = 22
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}
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if m.Port < 1 || m.Port > 65535 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("port %d out of range", m.Port)
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}
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if m.PrivateKey == "" && m.Password == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("privateKey or password is required")
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}
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return &m, nil
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}
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// UnmarshalDockerMetadata parses and validates Docker metadata bytes.
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func UnmarshalDockerMetadata(raw []byte) (*DockerMetadata, error) {
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var m DockerMetadata
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if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &m); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse: %w", err)
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}
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if m.Host == "" && m.SocketPath == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("host or socketPath is required")
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}
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if m.Image == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("image is required")
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}
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return &m, nil
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}
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// ValidateMetadata parses and validates metadata for the given backend type.
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// Returns a non-nil error if the shape is invalid.
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func ValidateMetadata(backend WorkstationBackend, raw []byte) error {
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switch backend {
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case BackendSSH:
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_, err := UnmarshalSSHMetadata(raw)
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return err
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case BackendDocker:
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_, err := UnmarshalDockerMetadata(raw)
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return err
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default:
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return fmt.Errorf("unknown backend: %s", backend)
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}
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}
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// WorkstationStore defines CRUD operations for workstations (tenant-scoped).
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// All mutations include tenant_id in WHERE — never cross-tenant writes.
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type WorkstationStore interface {
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// Create inserts a new workstation. Encrypts metadata + default_env.
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Create(ctx context.Context, ws *Workstation) error
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// GetByID fetches by UUID within the caller's tenant. Returns sql.ErrNoRows if not found.
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GetByID(ctx context.Context, id uuid.UUID) (*Workstation, error)
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// GetByKey fetches by workstation_key within the caller's tenant.
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GetByKey(ctx context.Context, key string) (*Workstation, error)
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// List returns all active workstations for the caller's tenant.
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List(ctx context.Context) ([]Workstation, error)
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// Update applies a field map to a workstation, enforcing tenant_id in WHERE.
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Update(ctx context.Context, id uuid.UUID, updates map[string]any) error
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// SetActive soft-deletes (active=false) or re-activates a workstation.
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SetActive(ctx context.Context, id uuid.UUID, active bool) error
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// Delete permanently removes a workstation (hard delete, tenant-scoped).
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Delete(ctx context.Context, id uuid.UUID) error
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}
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// AgentWorkstationLinkStore manages agent↔workstation bindings.
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type AgentWorkstationLinkStore interface {
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// Link creates a binding between an agent and a workstation.
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Link(ctx context.Context, link *AgentWorkstationLink) error
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// Unlink removes the binding.
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Unlink(ctx context.Context, agentID, workstationID uuid.UUID) error
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// SetDefault marks a workstation as default for an agent (clears prior default).
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SetDefault(ctx context.Context, agentID, workstationID uuid.UUID) error
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// ListForAgent returns all workstations linked to an agent.
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ListForAgent(ctx context.Context, agentID uuid.UUID) ([]AgentWorkstationLink, error)
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// ListForWorkstation returns all agents linked to a workstation.
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ListForWorkstation(ctx context.Context, workstationID uuid.UUID) ([]AgentWorkstationLink, error)
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}
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