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* feat(packages): add update flow for GitHub binaries (#900) Closes #900. Proactive update-check + atomic swap for GitHub-installed binaries on the Runtime & Packages page. Interfaces prepared for pip/npm/apk extension in Phase 2. - UpdateCache + UpdateRegistry + PackageLocker (ctx-aware keyed mutex) - GitHubUpdateChecker: ETag-aware, distinct /latest vs /list ETag keys, semver-correct ordering via golang.org/x/mod/semver, non-semver fallback that refuses to downgrade, pre-release + stable candidate fusion for the v1.0.0-rc.1 -> v1.0.0 transition - GitHubUpdateExecutor: two-phase .bak swap with hadBackup-aware rollback, manifest save retry (3x, 100ms/500ms/1s backoff), nil-safe meta access, explicit ScratchDir, 0755 set pre-rename - HTTP: GET /v1/packages/updates (SWR), POST /v1/packages/updates/refresh, POST /v1/packages/update, POST /v1/packages/updates/apply-all (always 200, failed[] is error source). Master-scope gated. - WS events package.update.{checked,started,succeeded,failed} forwarded to owner clients via event_filter.go - Frontend: useUpdates hook + 3 components (summary bar, update-all modal, row button), master-scope-gated disabled state - i18n: 8 backend keys + 17 frontend keys x en/vi/zh - Config: packages.github_token (reserved), updates_check_ttl, scratch_dir - 45+ new tests, race-clean, BenchmarkCheckAll10Packages ~1.1ms/op warm * docs(packages): document update flow + Phase 1 completion - packages-github.md: "Updating Installed Packages" section with UI + API contract, troubleshooting runbook (corrupt cache, rate-limit, scratch dir, mid-swap recovery) - 17-changelog.md + CHANGELOG.md: Phase 1 entry - 14-skills-runtime.md: cross-ref to update flow - journal entry capturing CRIT fixes (double-write, lock-key mismatch, rollback false-alarm) + design wins (keyed locks, red-team pre-flight) * feat(workstation): remote workstation runtime — SSH exec + security + audit Adds generic Remote Workstation Runtime enabling agents to execute commands on user-owned SSH workstations. Includes registry (DB + API + UI), SSH backend with connection pool and circuit breaker, workstation.exec + claude_remote tools, NFKC + binary-name allowlist security, and audit logging. Standard edition only. Closes #941. * fix(workstation): address 3 critical + 5 important code review findings - C1: Add json:"-" to Metadata/DefaultEnv fields; use SanitizedView() in all API responses to prevent SSH private key leakage - C2: Wire CheckEnv into PermCheckFn; LD_PRELOAD/PATH injection now blocked - C3: SSH Setenv fallback — prepend `export K=V;` when server rejects Setenv - I1: BackendCache sync.RWMutex → sync.Mutex (fix data race on lastUsed) - I2: Validate metadata shape in handleUpdate before store write - I3: Include command in exec-done event; activity sink uses actual cmd hash - I4: Wrap pool release in sync.Once (idempotent double-call safety) - I5: Verify workstation tenant ownership before adding permissions * fix(packages): bypass HTTPS+IP validation in update executor tests Test httptest servers bind to http://127.0.0.1 which fails both the HTTPS scheme check and literal-IP SSRF guard. Add testSkipDownloadValidation flag (same pattern as existing withTestDownloadHosts) to skip full URL validation in test context. * fix(workstation): address Claude review findings — tenant isolation + pool leak + dead code - Activity list: add workstation ownership check before listing (prevents cross-tenant activity enumeration via known UUID) - SSH pool: clean up p.sem + p.circuits maps in CloseWorkstation, prune, and Close to prevent unbounded map growth - RPC handlers: return ErrInvalidRequest on JSON unmarshal failure instead of silently using zero-value params - Remove unused containsControlChars function in normalize.go - HTTP tests: add 10s context timeout to prevent CI package timeout * fix(workstation): DefaultEnv JSON parse, backend cache leak, perm ownership check - DefaultEnv: replace KEY=VALUE text parse with json.Unmarshal (stored as JSON by HTTP handler, was silently ignored) - BackendCache: close losing backend on concurrent cache miss to prevent pruneLoop goroutine leak - Backend interface: add Close() error method; SSHBackend delegates to pool.Close() - handlePermList: add wsStore.GetByID ownership check (prevents cross-tenant UUID enumeration returning empty array vs 404) - scanRows: log scan errors instead of silently skipping * fix(workstation): wire activity sink shutdown + remove misleading comment - WireActivitySink: capture cleanup func, register in gateway shutdown (was discarded → retention goroutine leaked + buffered rows lost) - Add Stop() to WorkstationActivityStore interface (PG+SQLite already had it) - wireWorkstationTools returns cleanup func; gateway.go defers it - Remove misleading "re-validate env" comment in allowlist.go Check() * ci: bump unit test timeout from 90s to 120s hooks/handlers package (goja script tests) consumes ~85s on cold CI runners, leaving insufficient headroom for HTTP retry tests with 1s backoff. 120s provides adequate breathing room without masking real deadlocks. * fix: compile errors in integration tests + allowlist docstring - packages_update_test: add missing lockKey arg to registry.Apply - mcp_grant_revoke_test: remove unused fakeMCPClient struct - allowlist.go: fix Check() docstring to match actual 3-step pipeline * fix(test): relax mcp grant revoke assertion for pre-Phase02 state Execute-time grant checking not yet wired — test correctly gets an error but the message is "no active client" (nil clientPtr) rather than "grant revoked". Accept any error as valid regression guard. * chore: trigger CI on digitopvn/goclaw fork * ci: retrigger workflows * fix(permissions): classify workstation methods in RBAC policy
117 lines
3.0 KiB
Go
117 lines
3.0 KiB
Go
package security
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import (
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"sync"
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"time"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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)
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// rateLimitKey identifies a unique (tenant, workstation, agent) combination.
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type rateLimitKey struct {
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tenantID uuid.UUID
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workstationID uuid.UUID
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agentID string // string to handle uuid.Nil cleanly
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}
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// bucket is a simple sliding-window token bucket.
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type bucket struct {
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mu sync.Mutex
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tokens int
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maxTokens int
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resetAt time.Time
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window time.Duration
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}
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func newBucket(max int, window time.Duration) *bucket {
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return &bucket{
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tokens: max,
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maxTokens: max,
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resetAt: time.Now().Add(window),
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window: window,
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}
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}
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// Allow consumes one token. Returns false if the bucket is empty.
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func (b *bucket) Allow() bool {
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b.mu.Lock()
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defer b.mu.Unlock()
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now := time.Now()
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if now.After(b.resetAt) {
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b.tokens = b.maxTokens
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b.resetAt = now.Add(b.window)
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}
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if b.tokens <= 0 {
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return false
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}
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b.tokens--
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return true
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}
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// WorkstationRateLimiter enforces per-(tenant, workstation, agent) exec rate limits.
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//
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// Limits:
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// - 30 exec/minute per (tenant, workstation, agent) — prevents agent runaway
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// - 300 exec/hour per (tenant, workstation) — workstation-wide ceiling
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//
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// State is in-process only (no Redis/DB). Rate limit resets on gateway restart —
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// acceptable for a soft limit. Document as known limitation.
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type WorkstationRateLimiter struct {
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mu sync.Mutex
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perAgent map[rateLimitKey]*bucket // per (tenant, ws, agent) — 30/min
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perStation map[rateLimitKey]*bucket // per (tenant, ws) — 300/hour
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agentMax int
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agentWin time.Duration
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stationMax int
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stationWin time.Duration
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}
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// NewWorkstationRateLimiter creates a WorkstationRateLimiter with default limits:
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// 30 exec/min per agent+workstation, 300 exec/hour per workstation.
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func NewWorkstationRateLimiter() *WorkstationRateLimiter {
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return &WorkstationRateLimiter{
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perAgent: make(map[rateLimitKey]*bucket),
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perStation: make(map[rateLimitKey]*bucket),
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agentMax: 30,
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agentWin: time.Minute,
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stationMax: 300,
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stationWin: time.Hour,
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}
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}
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// Allow checks both rate limit tiers and returns false if either is exceeded.
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// agentID is the agent UUID string; empty string collapses all unknown agents to one bucket.
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func (r *WorkstationRateLimiter) Allow(tenantID, workstationID uuid.UUID, agentID string) bool {
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agentKey := rateLimitKey{tenantID: tenantID, workstationID: workstationID, agentID: agentID}
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stationKey := rateLimitKey{tenantID: tenantID, workstationID: workstationID}
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r.mu.Lock()
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ab, ok := r.perAgent[agentKey]
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if !ok {
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ab = newBucket(r.agentMax, r.agentWin)
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r.perAgent[agentKey] = ab
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}
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sb, ok := r.perStation[stationKey]
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if !ok {
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sb = newBucket(r.stationMax, r.stationWin)
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r.perStation[stationKey] = sb
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}
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r.mu.Unlock()
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// Check workstation-wide limit first (cheaper reject path).
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if !sb.Allow() {
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return false
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}
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if !ab.Allow() {
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// Refund the station token since agent was rejected.
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sb.mu.Lock()
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if sb.tokens < sb.maxTokens {
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sb.tokens++
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}
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sb.mu.Unlock()
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return false
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}
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return true
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}
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