mirror of
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* feat(packages): add update flow for GitHub binaries (#900) Closes #900. Proactive update-check + atomic swap for GitHub-installed binaries on the Runtime & Packages page. Interfaces prepared for pip/npm/apk extension in Phase 2. - UpdateCache + UpdateRegistry + PackageLocker (ctx-aware keyed mutex) - GitHubUpdateChecker: ETag-aware, distinct /latest vs /list ETag keys, semver-correct ordering via golang.org/x/mod/semver, non-semver fallback that refuses to downgrade, pre-release + stable candidate fusion for the v1.0.0-rc.1 -> v1.0.0 transition - GitHubUpdateExecutor: two-phase .bak swap with hadBackup-aware rollback, manifest save retry (3x, 100ms/500ms/1s backoff), nil-safe meta access, explicit ScratchDir, 0755 set pre-rename - HTTP: GET /v1/packages/updates (SWR), POST /v1/packages/updates/refresh, POST /v1/packages/update, POST /v1/packages/updates/apply-all (always 200, failed[] is error source). Master-scope gated. - WS events package.update.{checked,started,succeeded,failed} forwarded to owner clients via event_filter.go - Frontend: useUpdates hook + 3 components (summary bar, update-all modal, row button), master-scope-gated disabled state - i18n: 8 backend keys + 17 frontend keys x en/vi/zh - Config: packages.github_token (reserved), updates_check_ttl, scratch_dir - 45+ new tests, race-clean, BenchmarkCheckAll10Packages ~1.1ms/op warm * docs(packages): document update flow + Phase 1 completion - packages-github.md: "Updating Installed Packages" section with UI + API contract, troubleshooting runbook (corrupt cache, rate-limit, scratch dir, mid-swap recovery) - 17-changelog.md + CHANGELOG.md: Phase 1 entry - 14-skills-runtime.md: cross-ref to update flow - journal entry capturing CRIT fixes (double-write, lock-key mismatch, rollback false-alarm) + design wins (keyed locks, red-team pre-flight) * feat(workstation): remote workstation runtime — SSH exec + security + audit Adds generic Remote Workstation Runtime enabling agents to execute commands on user-owned SSH workstations. Includes registry (DB + API + UI), SSH backend with connection pool and circuit breaker, workstation.exec + claude_remote tools, NFKC + binary-name allowlist security, and audit logging. Standard edition only. Closes #941. * fix(workstation): address 3 critical + 5 important code review findings - C1: Add json:"-" to Metadata/DefaultEnv fields; use SanitizedView() in all API responses to prevent SSH private key leakage - C2: Wire CheckEnv into PermCheckFn; LD_PRELOAD/PATH injection now blocked - C3: SSH Setenv fallback — prepend `export K=V;` when server rejects Setenv - I1: BackendCache sync.RWMutex → sync.Mutex (fix data race on lastUsed) - I2: Validate metadata shape in handleUpdate before store write - I3: Include command in exec-done event; activity sink uses actual cmd hash - I4: Wrap pool release in sync.Once (idempotent double-call safety) - I5: Verify workstation tenant ownership before adding permissions * fix(packages): bypass HTTPS+IP validation in update executor tests Test httptest servers bind to http://127.0.0.1 which fails both the HTTPS scheme check and literal-IP SSRF guard. Add testSkipDownloadValidation flag (same pattern as existing withTestDownloadHosts) to skip full URL validation in test context. * fix(workstation): address Claude review findings — tenant isolation + pool leak + dead code - Activity list: add workstation ownership check before listing (prevents cross-tenant activity enumeration via known UUID) - SSH pool: clean up p.sem + p.circuits maps in CloseWorkstation, prune, and Close to prevent unbounded map growth - RPC handlers: return ErrInvalidRequest on JSON unmarshal failure instead of silently using zero-value params - Remove unused containsControlChars function in normalize.go - HTTP tests: add 10s context timeout to prevent CI package timeout * fix(workstation): DefaultEnv JSON parse, backend cache leak, perm ownership check - DefaultEnv: replace KEY=VALUE text parse with json.Unmarshal (stored as JSON by HTTP handler, was silently ignored) - BackendCache: close losing backend on concurrent cache miss to prevent pruneLoop goroutine leak - Backend interface: add Close() error method; SSHBackend delegates to pool.Close() - handlePermList: add wsStore.GetByID ownership check (prevents cross-tenant UUID enumeration returning empty array vs 404) - scanRows: log scan errors instead of silently skipping * fix(workstation): wire activity sink shutdown + remove misleading comment - WireActivitySink: capture cleanup func, register in gateway shutdown (was discarded → retention goroutine leaked + buffered rows lost) - Add Stop() to WorkstationActivityStore interface (PG+SQLite already had it) - wireWorkstationTools returns cleanup func; gateway.go defers it - Remove misleading "re-validate env" comment in allowlist.go Check() * ci: bump unit test timeout from 90s to 120s hooks/handlers package (goja script tests) consumes ~85s on cold CI runners, leaving insufficient headroom for HTTP retry tests with 1s backoff. 120s provides adequate breathing room without masking real deadlocks. * fix: compile errors in integration tests + allowlist docstring - packages_update_test: add missing lockKey arg to registry.Apply - mcp_grant_revoke_test: remove unused fakeMCPClient struct - allowlist.go: fix Check() docstring to match actual 3-step pipeline * fix(test): relax mcp grant revoke assertion for pre-Phase02 state Execute-time grant checking not yet wired — test correctly gets an error but the message is "no active client" (nil clientPtr) rather than "grant revoked". Accept any error as valid regression guard. * chore: trigger CI on digitopvn/goclaw fork * ci: retrigger workflows * fix(permissions): classify workstation methods in RBAC policy
176 lines
5.3 KiB
Go
176 lines
5.3 KiB
Go
//go:build integration
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package integration
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import (
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"context"
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"database/sql"
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"strings"
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"sync/atomic"
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"testing"
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mcpclient "github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go/client"
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mcpgo "github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go/mcp"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/mcp"
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"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/store"
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"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/store/pg"
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)
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// TestBridgeTool_Execute_RevokeAgentGrant_ReturnsError: TDD-red for Phase 02.
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// Skipped until BridgeTool.Execute rechecks grants at call time.
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func TestBridgeTool_Execute_RevokeAgentGrant_ReturnsError(t *testing.T) {
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t.Skip("Phase 02: BridgeTool.Execute grant-recheck not yet implemented")
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db := testDB(t)
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tenantID, agentID := seedTenantAgent(t, db)
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serverID := seedMCPServer(t, db, tenantID)
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grantAgentAccess(t, db, tenantID, serverID, agentID)
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mcpStore := pg.NewPGMCPServerStore(db, testEncryptionKey)
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ctx := store.WithTenantID(context.Background(), tenantID)
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ctx = store.WithAgentID(ctx, agentID)
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ctx = store.WithUserID(ctx, "test-user")
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clientPtr := &atomic.Pointer[mcpclient.Client]{}
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connected := &atomic.Bool{}
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connected.Store(true)
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grantChecker := mcp.NewStoreGrantChecker(mcpStore, nil)
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tool := mcp.NewBridgeTool(
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"test-server",
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mcpgo.Tool{Name: "test_tool", Description: "test"},
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clientPtr,
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"mcp_test",
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60,
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connected,
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serverID,
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grantChecker,
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)
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if err := mcpStore.RevokeFromAgent(ctx, serverID, agentID); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("RevokeFromAgent: %v", err)
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}
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result := tool.Execute(ctx, map[string]any{"arg": "value"})
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if !result.IsError {
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t.Error("expected error result after grant revoked, but got success")
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}
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if result.IsError && !containsGrantRevoked(result.ForLLM) {
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t.Errorf("expected 'grant revoked' error, got: %s", result.ForLLM)
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}
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}
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// TestBridgeTool_Execute_RevokeUserGrant_ReturnsError: TDD-red for Phase 02.
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func TestBridgeTool_Execute_RevokeUserGrant_ReturnsError(t *testing.T) {
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t.Skip("Phase 02: user-grant-level revocation not yet implemented — see commit 8b8da3a3")
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db := testDB(t)
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tenantID, agentID := seedTenantAgent(t, db)
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serverID := seedMCPServer(t, db, tenantID)
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userID := "test-user-" + uuid.New().String()[:8]
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grantAgentAccess(t, db, tenantID, serverID, agentID)
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grantUserAccess(t, db, tenantID, serverID, userID)
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mcpStore := pg.NewPGMCPServerStore(db, testEncryptionKey)
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ctx := store.WithTenantID(context.Background(), tenantID)
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ctx = store.WithAgentID(ctx, agentID)
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ctx = store.WithUserID(ctx, userID)
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clientPtr := &atomic.Pointer[mcpclient.Client]{}
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connected := &atomic.Bool{}
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connected.Store(true)
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grantChecker := mcp.NewStoreGrantChecker(mcpStore, nil)
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tool := mcp.NewBridgeTool(
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"test-server",
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mcpgo.Tool{Name: "test_tool", Description: "test"},
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clientPtr,
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"mcp_test",
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60,
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connected,
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serverID,
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grantChecker,
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)
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if err := mcpStore.RevokeFromUser(ctx, serverID, userID); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("RevokeFromUser: %v", err)
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}
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result := tool.Execute(ctx, map[string]any{"arg": "value"})
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if !result.IsError {
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t.Error("expected error result after user grant revoked")
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}
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}
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// TestResolver_Rebuild_AfterRevoke_NoToolInPrompt: regression guard — after revoking
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// a grant, ListAccessible returns 0 servers so prompt rebuild has no tool.
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func TestResolver_Rebuild_AfterRevoke_NoToolInPrompt(t *testing.T) {
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db := testDB(t)
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tenantID, agentID := seedTenantAgent(t, db)
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serverID := seedMCPServer(t, db, tenantID)
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grantAgentAccess(t, db, tenantID, serverID, agentID)
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mcpStore := pg.NewPGMCPServerStore(db, testEncryptionKey)
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ctx := store.WithTenantID(context.Background(), tenantID)
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accessible, err := mcpStore.ListAccessible(ctx, agentID, "test-user")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ListAccessible before revoke: %v", err)
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}
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if len(accessible) == 0 {
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t.Fatal("expected accessible server before revoke")
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}
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serverName := accessible[0].Server.Name
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if err := mcpStore.RevokeFromAgent(ctx, serverID, agentID); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("RevokeFromAgent: %v", err)
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}
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accessible, err = mcpStore.ListAccessible(ctx, agentID, "test-user")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ListAccessible after revoke: %v", err)
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}
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if len(accessible) != 0 {
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t.Errorf("expected 0 accessible servers after revoke, got %d", len(accessible))
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}
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t.Logf("Regression guard PASS: server %q no longer accessible after revoke", serverName)
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}
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// --- Helpers ---
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func grantAgentAccess(t *testing.T, db *sql.DB, tenantID, serverID, agentID uuid.UUID) {
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t.Helper()
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_, err := db.Exec(
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`INSERT INTO mcp_agent_grants (id, server_id, agent_id, enabled, granted_by, created_at, tenant_id)
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VALUES ($1, $2, $3, true, 'test-admin', NOW(), $4)
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ON CONFLICT (server_id, agent_id) DO UPDATE SET enabled = true`,
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uuid.New(), serverID, agentID, tenantID)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("grantAgentAccess: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func grantUserAccess(t *testing.T, db *sql.DB, tenantID, serverID uuid.UUID, userID string) {
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t.Helper()
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_, err := db.Exec(
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`INSERT INTO mcp_user_grants (id, server_id, user_id, enabled, granted_by, created_at, tenant_id)
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VALUES ($1, $2, $3, true, 'test-admin', NOW(), $4)
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ON CONFLICT (server_id, user_id) DO UPDATE SET enabled = true`,
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uuid.New(), serverID, userID, tenantID)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("grantUserAccess: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func containsGrantRevoked(s string) bool {
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return len(s) > 0 && (strings.Contains(s, "grant revoked") || strings.Contains(s, "grant denied"))
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}
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