Files
goclaw/tests/invariants/webhook_tenant_isolation_test.go
Duy /zuey/ ddf8e1099f feat(webhooks): HTTP webhooks to trigger agents with HMAC auth + durable callbacks (#2)
* feat(webhooks): HTTP webhooks to trigger agents with HMAC auth and durable callbacks

Add multi-tenant HTTP webhook endpoints for agent triggering:
- /v1/webhooks/message: send messages to channels
- /v1/webhooks/llm: sync/async LLM prompts with HMAC-signed callbacks
- HMAC-256 + bearer token authentication
- Rate limiting and tenant isolation
- Durable callback worker with exponential backoff
- PG 000056 + SQLite schema v25 migrations
- Unit + integration tests, P0 tenant isolation invariants
- Channel media capability helpers for attachment routing
- Comprehensive webhook documentation and i18n strings

* fix(webhooks): address post-review findings (K1-K10)

Comprehensive post-merge fixes addressing 10 blocking code review issues
and 2 adversarial re-audit findings in webhook-agent-triggering feature:

K1: Fix auth middleware tenant context lookup sequencing — move
    tenant context injection before authenticate() call to prevent
    unscoped secret lookups.

K2: Canonicalize JSON payload format for jsonb compatibility across
    PostgreSQL and SQLite — ensure consistent serialization without
    whitespace variance to prevent hash mismatches.

K3: Add fail-closed JSON parsing in body hash extraction with explicit
    error handling for malformed payloads before HMAC verification.

K4: Fix worker queue wedge by properly draining slot reservations
    when delivery succeeds, preventing permanent slot occupancy.

K5: Implement lease-token optimistic concurrency control to prevent
    duplicate webhook delivery under high concurrency or retry storms.

K6: Add AES-256-GCM encrypted secret storage at rest with fail-fast
    skip-mount when GOCLAW_ENCRYPTION_KEY environment variable unset.

K7: Implement IP allowlist enforcement supporting both CIDR ranges
    and exact IP matching with proper X-Forwarded-For parsing.

K8: Add HMAC replay nonce cache (5min expiry, non-blocking async flush)
    to prevent request replay attacks on webhook handler.

K9: Fix invariant test schema selection — replace hardcoded assumption
    with explicit schema name from config to support multi-schema testing.

K10: Consolidate rate limiters into single shared instance to prevent
     per-endpoint limiter starvation and ensure fair rate limiting.

New database migrations:
- 000057: webhook_calls.lease_token for optimistic concurrency
- 000058: webhooks.encrypted_secret_key for AES-256-GCM encryption

New i18n keys: MsgWebhookIPDenied, MsgWebhookEncryptionUnavailable
(with English, Vietnamese, Chinese translations).

New modules:
- internal/http/webhooks_payload.go: JSON canonicalization + body hash
- internal/http/webhooks_nonce.go: Replay nonce cache implementation
- internal/http/webhooks_idempotency_test.go: Integration tests

Documentation updates:
- docs/webhooks.md: §13-14 security sections, encryption flow
- docs/00-architecture-overview.md: webhook subsystem security overview
- docs/codebase-summary.md: webhook security patterns
- docs/project-changelog.md: webhook fixes changelog

Test coverage: 53 webhook tests + 4 P0 invariant tests all passing.
No tenant isolation violations. All security gates enforced.

* docs(journals): webhook feature ship + fix cycle entries

* fix(webhooks): address Claude review findings

- webhooks_llm.go: remove misleading ptr() helper; use &completedAt
  pattern for error-path audit rows (matches success path)
- webhooks_auth.go: wrap TouchLastUsed context in WithoutCancel so
  background DB update isn't cancelled when HTTP response completes
- store GetByIDUnscoped (PG+SQLite): add NOT revoked / revoked = 0
  filter for defense-in-depth parity with GetByHashUnscoped
- webhooks/sign.go: fix package doc — HMAC key is raw plaintext
  secret bytes, not hex-decoded SHA-256
- webhooks_admin.go: check auth before encKey guard to avoid leaking
  config state to unauthenticated callers
- webhooks_ratelimit.go: two-phase Load→LoadOrStore to avoid per-call
  entry allocation on the hot path

* docs(webhooks): fix Sign() function doc to match actual key input

Function-level comment still referenced hex-decoded SecretHash after
the package-level doc was corrected. Align with actual caller usage
([]byte(rawSecret)).

* fix(webhooks): use WithoutCancel for worker execute DB updates

Terminal status writes in execute() ran through the worker main-loop
ctx, which is cancelled on graceful shutdown. If the outbound send
completed but the status update raced with shutdown, the row stayed
in 'running' and got re-delivered via reclaimStale. WithoutCancel
lets the DB write survive worker cancellation while preserving
propagated values (tenant ID, etc.).

* fix(webhooks): move tctx init before panic defer in worker execute

Panic recovery called updateRetry with raw ctx (no tenant ID), making
requireTenantID fail and the reset-to-retry DB write silently drop.
Row stayed 'running' until reclaimStale (~90s delay). Init tctx first
so defer closure captures tenant-scoped non-cancellable context.

* fix(webhooks): pass tenant-scoped tctx to invokeAgent in worker

execute() was passing the raw worker-loop ctx (no tenant ID) to
invokeAgent → router.Get → PGAgentStore.GetByID. GetByID reads
TenantIDFromContext which returned uuid.Nil, making every lookup
return 'agent not found'. Async LLM webhook calls silently failed
all retries. Pass tctx (already tenant-scoped + WithoutCancel) so
the router resolves the agent correctly.

* fix(tests): resolve integration test compile errors

- Remove duplicate contains() in mcp_grant_revoke_test.go (already
  defined in tts_gemini_live_test.go)
- Update webhooks_admin_test.go RotateSecret call to match current
  5-arg signature (newSecretHash, newPrefix, newEncryptedSecret)

* fix(webhooks): default nil scopes/ip_allowlist to empty slice in Create

PG columns are NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'. Explicit NULL from pqStringArray(nil)
violated the constraint, breaking TestWebhookAdminCRUD/TenantIsolation.
Coerce nil slices to empty []string{} so the default applies at the DB layer.

* chore: trigger CI on digitopvn/goclaw fork

* ci: retrigger workflows

* fix(webhooks): renumber migrations to 000059-000061 for merge train
2026-05-11 13:29:24 +07:00

219 lines
6.4 KiB
Go

//go:build integration
package invariants
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"database/sql"
"encoding/hex"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/store"
"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/store/pg"
)
// webhookListFilter returns a zero-value filter (list all webhooks for the tenant in context).
func webhookListFilter() store.WebhookListFilter {
return store.WebhookListFilter{}
}
// seedWebhook creates a webhook for a tenant.
func seedWebhook(t *testing.T, db *sql.DB, tenantID uuid.UUID, kind string) uuid.UUID {
t.Helper()
webhookID := uuid.New()
rawSecret := "wh_secret_" + webhookID.String()[:8]
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(rawSecret))
hashHex := hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
_, err := db.Exec(`
INSERT INTO webhooks (id, tenant_id, name, kind, secret_prefix, secret_hash)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)
`, webhookID, tenantID, "test-webhook-"+webhookID.String()[:8], kind, "wh_test", hashHex)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed webhook: %v", err)
}
return webhookID
}
// P0: TestWebhookTenantIsolationListGet ensures no tenant can list/get another tenant's webhook.
func TestWebhookTenantIsolationListGet(t *testing.T) {
db := testDB(t)
// Seed 2 independent tenants with their webhooks.
tenantA, _ := seedTenantAgent(t, db)
tenantB, _ := seedTenantAgent(t, db)
webhookAID := seedWebhook(t, db, tenantA, "llm")
webhookBID := seedWebhook(t, db, tenantB, "message")
store := pg.NewPGWebhookStore(db)
ctxA := tenantCtx(tenantA)
ctxB := tenantCtx(tenantB)
// Tenant A lists webhooks — should only see their own.
listA, err := store.List(ctxA, webhookListFilter())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Tenant A list failed: %v", err)
}
for _, w := range listA {
if w.TenantID != tenantA {
t.Errorf("P0 VIOLATION: Tenant A listed webhook with tenant_id=%v (not %v)", w.TenantID, tenantA)
}
if w.ID == webhookBID {
t.Errorf("P0 VIOLATION: Tenant A listed Tenant B's webhook")
}
}
// Tenant B lists webhooks — should only see their own.
listB, err := store.List(ctxB, webhookListFilter())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Tenant B list failed: %v", err)
}
for _, w := range listB {
if w.TenantID != tenantB {
t.Errorf("P0 VIOLATION: Tenant B listed webhook with tenant_id=%v (not %v)", w.TenantID, tenantB)
}
if w.ID == webhookAID {
t.Errorf("P0 VIOLATION: Tenant B listed Tenant A's webhook")
}
}
// Tenant B tries to GET Tenant A's webhook.
_, err = store.GetByID(ctxB, webhookAID)
if err != sql.ErrNoRows {
t.Errorf("P0 VIOLATION: Tenant B was able to GetByID Tenant A's webhook (expected ErrNoRows, got %v)", err)
}
}
// P0: TestWebhookTenantIsolationRotateRevoke ensures no tenant can rotate/revoke another's webhook.
func TestWebhookTenantIsolationRotateRevoke(t *testing.T) {
db := testDB(t)
tenantA, _ := seedTenantAgent(t, db)
tenantB, _ := seedTenantAgent(t, db)
webhookAID := seedWebhook(t, db, tenantA, "llm")
whs := pg.NewPGWebhookStore(db)
ctxA := tenantCtx(tenantA)
ctxB := tenantCtx(tenantB)
// Get the original webhook.
origWH, err := whs.GetByID(ctxA, webhookAID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Tenant A get their webhook: %v", err)
}
origHash := origWH.SecretHash
// Tenant B tries to rotate Tenant A's webhook secret.
newHash := "newsecret_hash_" + uuid.New().String()[:8]
newPrefix := "wh_newprefix"
newEncrypted := "encrypted_secret_b64_payload"
err = whs.RotateSecret(ctxB, webhookAID, newHash, newPrefix, newEncrypted)
if err == nil {
// This is a P0 violation — the rotate should have failed (ErrNoRows or equivalent).
t.Errorf("P0 VIOLATION: Tenant B was able to rotate Tenant A's webhook secret")
// Verify it actually changed (worse violation).
updated, _ := whs.GetByID(ctxA, webhookAID)
if updated.SecretHash != origHash {
t.Errorf("P0 VIOLATION: Secret hash actually changed when Tenant B called RotateSecret")
}
}
// Tenant B tries to revoke Tenant A's webhook.
err = whs.Revoke(ctxB, webhookAID)
if err == nil {
// Check if it actually revoked.
updated, _ := whs.GetByID(ctxA, webhookAID)
if updated.Revoked {
t.Errorf("P0 VIOLATION: Tenant B was able to revoke Tenant A's webhook")
}
}
}
// P0: TestWebhookTenantIsolationUpdate ensures no tenant can update another's webhook.
func TestWebhookTenantIsolationUpdate(t *testing.T) {
db := testDB(t)
tenantA, _ := seedTenantAgent(t, db)
tenantB, _ := seedTenantAgent(t, db)
webhookAID := seedWebhook(t, db, tenantA, "llm")
whs := pg.NewPGWebhookStore(db)
ctxA := tenantCtx(tenantA)
ctxB := tenantCtx(tenantB)
// Get original rate limit.
origWH, err := whs.GetByID(ctxA, webhookAID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("get original webhook: %v", err)
}
origRPM := origWH.RateLimitPerMin
// Tenant B tries to update Tenant A's rate limit.
err = whs.Update(ctxB, webhookAID, map[string]any{
"rate_limit_per_min": 999,
})
if err == nil {
// Check if it actually updated.
updated, _ := whs.GetByID(ctxA, webhookAID)
if updated.RateLimitPerMin != origRPM {
t.Errorf("P0 VIOLATION: Tenant B was able to update Tenant A's rate_limit_per_min from %d to %d",
origRPM, updated.RateLimitPerMin)
}
}
}
// P0: TestWebhookTenantIsolationGetByHash ensures GetByHash never returns cross-tenant webhook.
func TestWebhookTenantIsolationGetByHash(t *testing.T) {
db := testDB(t)
tenantA, _ := seedTenantAgent(t, db)
tenantB, _ := seedTenantAgent(t, db)
// Create webhooks with known secrets.
webhookAID := uuid.New()
secretA := "wh_secret_a_" + webhookAID.String()[:8]
hA := sha256.Sum256([]byte(secretA))
hashA := hex.EncodeToString(hA[:])
_, err := db.Exec(`
INSERT INTO webhooks (id, tenant_id, name, kind, secret_prefix, secret_hash)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 'llm', 'wh_test', $4)
`, webhookAID, tenantA, "test-webhook-"+webhookAID.String()[:8], hashA)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed webhook A: %v", err)
}
whs := pg.NewPGWebhookStore(db)
ctxA := tenantCtx(tenantA)
ctxB := tenantCtx(tenantB)
// Tenant A gets webhook by hash — should succeed.
whA, err := whs.GetByHash(ctxA, hashA)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Tenant A GetByHash failed: %v", err)
}
if whA.TenantID != tenantA {
t.Errorf("Tenant A retrieved webhook with wrong tenant_id: %v", whA.TenantID)
}
// Tenant B gets same hash — should fail (tenant_id check in query).
whB, err := whs.GetByHash(ctxB, hashA)
if err != sql.ErrNoRows {
t.Errorf("P0 VIOLATION: Tenant B GetByHash succeeded (expected ErrNoRows, got %v, webhook=%v)", err, whB)
}
}