fix(admin): second review pass

Correctness
- /api/remote never recorded source.created, so URL, GitHub and connector
  sources had a source.deleted with no matching creation. All three creation
  paths now go through one _audit_source_created helper.
- The prompt-cache rate divided cached tokens by a whole bucket's prompt
  tokens. A bucket is a day and mixes calls whose provider reports a cache
  breakdown with calls whose provider does not, so filtering buckets in the
  client could not separate them and the rate was understated by however much
  traffic ran on a non-reporting provider. The denominator is now computed in
  SQL over the reporting rows.
- The outcome pill matched values nothing writes. Guardrails emit triggered /
  not_evaluated and the device feed emits dispatched; the map had blocked /
  denied / allowed, so a guardrail that fired rendered neutral grey -- the one
  signal the merged feed exists to surface. Fixtures were seeding the
  fictional values, so the tests passed on it too.
- Stream duration_ms timed the consumer. stream_token_usage is a generator,
  so start-to-exhaustion includes the agent loop's tool handling and the SSE
  client's pace; a slow browser recorded ~30s for a sub-second call. It now
  accumulates only the time spent inside next().

Safety
- Activity filters failed open: an unknown facet or unparseable timestamp was
  dropped, and no filter means every row, so a typo widened an audit view and
  on the export streamed the full history. Both are now a 400.
- The search term was interpolated into an ILIKE pattern, so "100%" matched
  everything and "q1_report" matched more than it should. Escaped.
- 0034 set actor_id NOT NULL with no default. A previous-release process
  inserting mid-rollout would raise, and in admin/routes.py that insert shares
  the request transaction, so a role grant beside it would roll back too.

Noise and dead code
- The per-user panel is a security panel: data-plane events file under the
  actor, so an active account's routine deletes pushed a denied login out of
  the 20-row window. It now excludes them; the Activity tab shows everything.
- device_audit_log had no created_at-leading index, so the merged feed
  sequentially scanned that branch every page (migration 0036).
- conversation.deleted_all no longer records when nothing was deleted, and
  agent.updated no longer records an empty field list.
- Dropped by_model from /admin/usage (no consumer; an extra aggregate per page
  load), the duplicate filter surface on AuthEventsRepository that nothing
  called, and the unreachable FLOW_LABELS.schedule entry.
- Type hints on record_event's conn and the remaining unannotated helpers.
This commit is contained in:
arc53-machine committed 2026-09-22 12:47:40 +01:00
1 parent 2ea9d66789
commit 25c82003d7
33 files changed
+635 -206

No files matched your search

+39 -11
View File
@@ -43,23 +43,38 @@ _EXPORT_CHUNK = 1_000
_MAX_SEARCH_LENGTH = 200
class _InvalidFilter(ValueError):
"""A filter argument the caller got wrong. Surfaces as a 400."""
def _facet_list(name: str, allowed: tuple[str, ...]) -> Optional[list[str]]:
"""Parse a repeated/comma-separated query arg, dropping unknown values.
"""Parse a repeated/comma-separated query arg into known facet values.
Rejects unknown values rather than dropping them. Dropping would leave the
request with no filter on that facet, and "no filter" means *everything* --
so a typo or a stale chip would silently widen an audit view instead of
narrowing it, and on the export would stream the whole history.
Args:
name: Query parameter name.
allowed: The permitted values; anything else is ignored rather than
rejected, so an old bookmark degrades instead of erroring.
allowed: The permitted values.
Returns:
The distinct valid values in the order given, or None when absent.
The distinct values in the order given, or None when absent.
Raises:
_InvalidFilter: If any supplied value is not in ``allowed``.
"""
raw: list[str] = []
for value in request.args.getlist(name):
raw.extend(part.strip() for part in value.split(","))
raw.extend(part.strip() for part in value.split(",") if part.strip())
seen: list[str] = []
for value in raw:
if value in allowed and value not in seen:
if value not in allowed:
raise _InvalidFilter(
f"Unknown {name}: {value!r}. Expected one of {', '.join(allowed)}."
)
if value not in seen:
seen.append(value)
return seen or None
@@ -76,14 +91,21 @@ def _event_list() -> Optional[list[str]]:
def _time_arg(name: str) -> Optional[datetime]:
"""Parse an ISO-8601 timestamp query arg, or None when absent/unparseable."""
"""Parse an ISO-8601 timestamp query arg, or None when absent.
Raises:
_InvalidFilter: If present but unparseable. Silently ignoring it would
drop the time bound and return the full history.
"""
raw = (request.args.get(name) or "").strip()
if not raw:
return None
try:
parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(raw.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
except ValueError:
return None
except ValueError as exc:
raise _InvalidFilter(
f"{name} must be an ISO-8601 timestamp, got {raw!r}."
) from exc
# A naive bound is read as UTC, matching how the feed stores timestamps.
return parsed if parsed.tzinfo else parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
@@ -122,7 +144,10 @@ class AdminActivityResource(Resource):
def get(self):
"""Merged audit feed, newest first, with filters and a total."""
page, page_size, offset = _page()
filters = _filters()
try:
filters = _filters()
except _InvalidFilter as exc:
return make_response(jsonify({"success": False, "message": str(exc)}), 400)
with db_readonly() as conn:
repo = ActivityRepository(conn)
total = repo.count(**filters)
@@ -183,7 +208,10 @@ class AdminActivityExportResource(Resource):
jsonify({"success": False, "message": "Invalid format"}), 400
)
limit = max(1, min(_EXPORT_MAX_ROWS, _int_arg("max_rows", _EXPORT_MAX_ROWS)))
filters = _filters()
try:
filters = _filters()
except _InvalidFilter as exc:
return make_response(jsonify({"success": False, "message": str(exc)}), 400)
stamp = datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y%m%d-%H%M%S")
generator = _csv_rows if fmt == "csv" else _ndjson_rows
return Response(
+8 -3
View File
@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ admin_ns = Namespace("admin", description="Admin-only management endpoints", pat
_DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE = 25
_MAX_PAGE_SIZE = 100
# Event namespaces the per-user security panel leaves out; see the drill-down.
_DATA_PLANE_PREFIXES = ("source.", "agent.", "conversation.")
def _int_arg(name: str, default: int) -> int:
try:
@@ -135,8 +138,12 @@ class AdminUserResource(Resource):
},
"roles": sorted({"user", *roles_repo.role_names_for(user_id)}),
"grants": roles_repo.list_for(user_id),
# Identity and access only. Data-plane events file under the
# actor, so an active user's routine deletes would push a
# denied login or a role grant out of a 20-row window.
# The Activity tab, filtered by user, shows everything.
"recent_events": AuthEventsRepository(conn).list_recent(
user_id, limit=20
user_id, limit=20, exclude_events_like=_DATA_PLANE_PREFIXES
),
"counts": AdminStatsRepository(conn).user_counts(user_id),
}
@@ -347,7 +354,6 @@ class AdminUsageResource(Resource):
total = usage_repo.sum_tokens_in_range(
start=start, end=datetime.now(timezone.utc)
)
by_model = usage_repo.tokens_by_model(start=start)
latency = stats_repo.latency_summary(since=start)
top_users = stats_repo.top_token_users(since=start, limit=10)
return make_response(
@@ -362,7 +368,6 @@ class AdminUsageResource(Resource):
# Summed from the series, not from ``by_model``: the latter
# drops rows with no model_id, so it would undercount.
"total_cost": round(sum(row["cost"] for row in series), 4),
"by_model": by_model,
"latency": latency,
"top_users": top_users,
}
+5 -3
View File
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ import logging
from typing import Any, Optional
from flask import has_request_context, request
from sqlalchemy import Connection
from docsgpt.storage.db.repositories.auth_events import AuthEventsRepository
@@ -32,7 +33,7 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def record_event(
conn,
conn: Connection,
event: str,
*,
actor: Optional[str],
@@ -42,8 +43,9 @@ def record_event(
"""Append one audit event, best-effort, inside the caller's transaction.
Args:
conn: Open database connection, inside the action's transaction so the
audit row commits atomically with the change it describes.
conn: Open SQLAlchemy ``Connection`` -- not a Session -- inside the
action's transaction, so the audit row commits atomically with the
change it describes and ``begin_nested`` gives it a real SAVEPOINT.
event: Dotted event name (``source.deleted``, ``agent.created``).
actor: Who performed the action; ``"unknown"`` when unauthenticated.
target: The user acted upon, when the event is about a user. Data-plane
+2 -1
View File
@@ -1294,7 +1294,8 @@ class UpdateAgent(Resource):
updated = bool(result)
else:
updated = agents_repo.update(pg_agent_id, user, update_fields)
if updated:
# An update that changed no field is not an event.
if updated and update_fields:
record_event(
conn,
"agent.updated",
+9 -6
View File
@@ -73,12 +73,15 @@ class DeleteAllConversations(Resource):
try:
with db_session() as conn:
deleted = ConversationsRepository(conn).delete_all_for_user(user_id)
record_event(
conn,
"conversation.deleted_all",
actor=user_id,
deleted=deleted,
)
# Nothing deleted is not an event; the endpoint is idempotent
# and a row here would render as a destructive action.
if deleted:
record_event(
conn,
"conversation.deleted_all",
actor=user_id,
deleted=deleted,
)
except Exception as err:
current_app.logger.error(
f"Error deleting all conversations: {err}", exc_info=True
+56 -20
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import os
import tempfile
import uuid
import zipfile
from typing import Optional
from flask import current_app, jsonify, make_response, request
from flask_restx import fields, Namespace, Resource
@@ -179,6 +180,40 @@ def _source_archive_limits() -> ZipExtractionLimits:
)
def _audit_source_created(
*,
source_id: str,
user: Optional[str],
name: Optional[str],
source_type: str,
task_id: Optional[str],
) -> None:
"""Record ``source.created`` for an accepted ingestion job.
Audited at the request, not in the worker: enqueuing is the user's action.
The ingest may still fail, which the source's own status records.
Every path that mints a ``source_id`` and dispatches must call this --
``source.deleted`` is recorded for remote sources too, and a trail showing
a deletion with no matching creation is worse than no trail.
"""
try:
with db_session() as conn:
record_event(
conn,
"source.created",
actor=user,
source_id=source_id,
name=name,
type=source_type,
task_id=task_id,
)
except Exception as err:
current_app.logger.warning(
"Could not audit source.created for %s: %s", source_id, err, exc_info=True
)
@sources_upload_ns.route("/upload")
class UploadFile(Resource):
@api.expect(
@@ -397,26 +432,13 @@ class UploadFile(Resource):
return make_response(jsonify({"success": False}), 400)
# Predetermined id matches the dedup-claim row; loser GET sees same.
response_task_id = predetermined_task_id or task.id
# Audited here, not in the worker: this is the user action. The
# ingest may still fail, which the source's own status records.
try:
with db_session() as conn:
record_event(
conn,
"source.created",
actor=user,
source_id=str(source_uuid),
name=job_name,
type="local",
task_id=response_task_id,
)
except Exception as err:
current_app.logger.warning(
"Could not audit upload for source %s: %s",
source_uuid,
err,
exc_info=True,
)
_audit_source_created(
source_id=str(source_uuid),
user=user,
name=job_name,
source_type="local",
task_id=response_task_id,
)
# ``source_uuid`` was minted above and passed to the worker as
# ``source_id``; the worker uses it verbatim for every SSE event,
# so the frontend can correlate inbound ``source.ingest.*`` to
@@ -568,6 +590,13 @@ class UploadRemote(Resource):
connector_kwargs["task_id"] = predetermined_task_id
task = ingest_connector_task.apply_async(**connector_kwargs)
response_task_id = predetermined_task_id or task.id
_audit_source_created(
source_id=str(source_uuid),
user=user,
name=data["name"],
source_type=data["source"],
task_id=response_task_id,
)
# ``source_uuid`` was minted above and passed to the
# worker as ``source_id``; the worker uses it verbatim
# for every SSE event, so the frontend can correlate
@@ -601,6 +630,13 @@ class UploadRemote(Resource):
_release_claim(scoped_key)
return make_response(jsonify({"success": False}), 400)
response_task_id = predetermined_task_id or task.id
_audit_source_created(
source_id=str(source_uuid),
user=user,
name=data["name"],
source_type=data["source"],
task_id=response_task_id,
)
response_payload = {
"success": True,
"task_id": response_task_id,