fix: k8s config and silent source ingests

application/api/user/base.py

@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ def _validate_agent_image_upload(file, filename: str) -> None:
 
     with Image.open(stream) as image:
         image_format = (image.format or "").upper()
-        if image_format != image_policy[0]:
+        if image_format not in image_policy[0]:
             raise ValueError("Image content does not match its extension")
         if image.width * image.height > settings.AGENT_IMAGE_MAX_PIXELS:
             raise ValueError("Image exceeds the pixel limit")

application/storage/s3.py

@@ -128,7 +128,9 @@ class S3Storage(BaseStorage):
             metadata = self.s3.head_object(Bucket=self.bucket_name, Key=path)
         except ClientError as exc:
             error_code = str(exc.response.get("Error", {}).get("Code", ""))
-            if error_code in {"404", "NoSuchKey", "NotFound"}:
+            # HEAD on a missing key returns 403 instead of 404 when credentials
+            # lack s3:ListBucket, so access-denied codes also mean "absent".
+            if error_code in {"404", "NoSuchKey", "NotFound", "403", "AccessDenied", "Forbidden"}:
                 raise FileNotFoundError(f"File not found: {path}") from exc
             raise
         return int(metadata["ContentLength"])

application/utils.py

@@ -238,12 +238,15 @@ def validate_function_name(function_name):
     return True
 
 
+# Extension -> (accepted Pillow formats, MIME type). JPEG entries also accept
+# MPO because Pillow reports multi-picture JPEGs (e.g. iPhone portrait photos,
+# Samsung motion photos) as MPO.
 AGENT_IMAGE_FORMATS = {
-    ".gif": ("GIF", "image/gif"),
-    ".jpeg": ("JPEG", "image/jpeg"),
-    ".jpg": ("JPEG", "image/jpeg"),
-    ".png": ("PNG", "image/png"),
-    ".webp": ("WEBP", "image/webp"),
+    ".gif": (("GIF",), "image/gif"),
+    ".jpeg": (("JPEG", "MPO"), "image/jpeg"),
+    ".jpg": (("JPEG", "MPO"), "image/jpeg"),
+    ".png": (("PNG",), "image/png"),
+    ".webp": (("WEBP",), "image/webp"),
 }
 
 

application/worker.py

@@ -375,6 +375,10 @@ def extract_zip_recursive(
         extract_to (str): Destination path for extracted files.
         current_depth (int): Current depth of recursion.
         max_depth (int): Maximum allowed depth of recursion to prevent infinite loops.
+
+    Raises:
+        ZipExtractionError: If the archive fails safety validation, so ingestion
+            fails loudly instead of indexing an empty directory.
     """
     if current_depth > max_depth:
         logging.warning(f"Reached maximum recursion depth of {max_depth}")
@@ -407,7 +411,7 @@ def extract_zip_recursive(
             os.remove(zip_path)
         except OSError:
             pass
-        return
+        raise
     except Exception as e:
         logging.error(
             "Error extracting zip file %s: %s",
@@ -415,7 +419,7 @@ def extract_zip_recursive(
             safe_zip_error_message(e),
             exc_info=True,
         )
-        return
+        raise
 
 
 def download_file(url, params, dest_path):

deployment/k8s/docsgpt-secrets.yaml

@@ -12,8 +12,10 @@ type: Opaque
 #   manually add a MONGO_URI key below (base64-encoded) and apply the
 #   opt-in manifests under deployment/k8s/optional-mongo/. Example:
 #     MONGO_URI: <base64 of mongodb://mongodb-service:27017/docsgpt?retryWrites=true&w=majority>
-# - Before deploying, add JWT_SECRET_KEY below using the base64 encoding of a
-#   strong random value. Every API and worker replica must receive the same key.
+# - JWT_SECRET_KEY below is a known dev-grade default so the stock manifests
+#   boot out of the box. Replace it with the base64 encoding of a strong random
+#   value before exposing the API. Every API and worker replica must receive
+#   the same key.
 #   Example generation: openssl rand -hex 32 | base64
 data:
   LLM_PROVIDER: ZG9jc2dwdA==
@@ -26,4 +28,5 @@ data:
   POSTGRES_URI: cG9zdGdyZXNxbDovL2RvY3NncHQ6ZG9jc2dwdEBwb3N0Z3Jlczo1NDMyL2RvY3NncHQ=
   postgres-user: ZG9jc2dwdA==
   postgres-password: ZG9jc2dwdA==
-  # JWT_SECRET_KEY: <base64-encoded strong random value>
+  # docsgpt-dev-jwt-secret-change-me — CHANGE before exposing the API
+  JWT_SECRET_KEY: ZG9jc2dwdC1kZXYtand0LXNlY3JldC1jaGFuZ2UtbWU=

tests/api/user/test_base.py

@@ -165,6 +165,29 @@ class TestHandleImageUpload:
             assert "user123" in url
             mock_storage.save_file.assert_called_once()
 
+    def test_accepts_multi_picture_jpeg(self, flask_app):
+        from application.api.user.base import handle_image_upload
+
+        # Pillow reports multi-picture JPEGs (e.g. iPhone portrait photos) as
+        # MPO; they must still be accepted under a .jpg extension.
+        buffer = io.BytesIO()
+        frame = Image.new("RGB", (1, 1), color="white")
+        frame.save(buffer, format="MPO", save_all=True, append_images=[frame])
+
+        with flask_app.test_request_context():
+            mock_file = FileStorage(
+                stream=io.BytesIO(buffer.getvalue()), filename="photo.jpg"
+            )
+            mock_storage = Mock()
+
+            url, error = handle_image_upload(
+                Mock(files={"image": mock_file}), "", "user123", mock_storage
+            )
+
+            assert error is None
+            assert url is not None
+            mock_storage.save_file.assert_called_once()
+
     def test_uploads_image_with_non_ascii_basename(self, flask_app):
         from application.api.user.base import handle_image_upload
 

tests/storage/test_s3_storage.py

@@ -270,6 +270,19 @@ class TestS3StorageFileSize:
         with pytest.raises(FileNotFoundError, match="File not found"):
             s3_storage.get_file_size("avatars/missing.png")
 
+    @pytest.mark.unit
+    def test_get_file_size_maps_denied_head_to_file_not_found(
+        self, s3_storage, mock_boto3_client
+    ):
+        # Without s3:ListBucket, HEAD on a missing key returns 403, not 404.
+        mock_boto3_client.head_object.side_effect = ClientError(
+            {"Error": {"Code": "403", "Message": "Forbidden"}},
+            "head_object",
+        )
+
+        with pytest.raises(FileNotFoundError, match="File not found"):
+            s3_storage.get_file_size("avatars/missing.png")
+
 
 class TestS3StoragePresignedUrl:
     """Test response metadata on short-lived direct avatar delivery URLs."""

tests/test_worker_utils.py

@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ class TestExtractZipRecursive:
         assert found, "expected nested zip to be extracted"
 
     def test_nested_archives_share_one_expansion_budget(self, tmp_path):
-        from application.worker import extract_zip_recursive
+        from application.worker import extract_zip_recursive, ZipExtractionError
 
         inner = tmp_path / "inner.zip"
         with zipfile.ZipFile(inner, "w", zipfile.ZIP_STORED) as zf:
@@ -222,7 +222,8 @@ class TestExtractZipRecursive:
         with patch("application.worker.MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_SIZE", limit), patch(
             "application.worker.MAX_COMPRESSION_RATIO", 10_000,
         ):
-            extract_zip_recursive(str(outer), str(extract_to))
+            with pytest.raises(ZipExtractionError):
+                extract_zip_recursive(str(outer), str(extract_to))
 
         assert not (extract_to / "inside.txt").exists()
 

tests/test_zip_extraction_security.py

@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ class TestExtractZipRecursive:
             assert not os.path.exists(os.path.join(extract_to, "inner.zip"))
 
     def test_respects_max_depth(self):
-        """Extraction should stop at max recursion depth."""
+        """Nesting beyond max depth should fail the extraction loudly."""
         with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
             extract_to = os.path.join(temp_dir, "extract")
             os.makedirs(extract_to)
@@ -311,10 +311,8 @@ class TestExtractZipRecursive:
                 f.write(current_content)
 
             # Extract with max_depth=2
-            extract_zip_recursive(zip_path, extract_to, max_depth=2)
-
-            # The deepest nested zips should remain unextracted
-            # (we can't easily verify the exact behavior, but the function should not crash)
+            with pytest.raises(ZipExtractionError):
+                extract_zip_recursive(zip_path, extract_to, max_depth=2)
 
     def test_rejects_path_traversal(self):
         """Zip with path traversal should be rejected and removed."""
@@ -327,7 +325,8 @@ class TestExtractZipRecursive:
             with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "w") as zf:
                 zf.writestr("../../../tmp/malicious.txt", "malicious")
 
-            extract_zip_recursive(zip_path, extract_to)
+            with pytest.raises(ZipExtractionError):
+                extract_zip_recursive(zip_path, extract_to)
 
             # Zip should be removed
             assert not os.path.exists(zip_path)
@@ -348,12 +347,13 @@ class TestExtractZipRecursive:
             with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "w") as zf:
                 zf.writestr(link, "../../outside")
 
-            extract_zip_recursive(zip_path, extract_to)
+            with pytest.raises(ZipExtractionError):
+                extract_zip_recursive(zip_path, extract_to)
 
             assert not os.path.lexists(os.path.join(extract_to, "escape-link"))
 
-    def test_handles_corrupted_zip_gracefully(self):
-        """Corrupted zip should be handled gracefully without crashing."""
+    def test_corrupted_zip_fails_loudly(self):
+        """Corrupted zip should raise so ingestion fails instead of indexing nothing."""
         with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
             zip_path = os.path.join(temp_dir, "corrupted.zip")
             extract_to = os.path.join(temp_dir, "extract")
@@ -363,10 +363,11 @@ class TestExtractZipRecursive:
             with open(zip_path, "wb") as f:
                 f.write(b"This is not a valid zip file")
 
-            # Should not raise, just log error
-            extract_zip_recursive(zip_path, extract_to)
+            with pytest.raises(ZipExtractionError):
+                extract_zip_recursive(zip_path, extract_to)
 
-            # Function should complete without exception
+            # The rejected zip should be removed
+            assert not os.path.exists(zip_path)
 
 
 class TestZipBombProtection: