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Duy /zuey/
e589545ff5
* feat(packages): unify Packages & CLI Credentials into tabs + per-grant env overrides
Merge /cli-credentials screen into /packages as a tab, redesign Packages page
with Radix Tabs (System/Python/Node/GitHub/CLI Credentials) + sticky Runtimes
header. Add per-grant encrypted env var overrides with reveal flow, agent
grant chips on each binary row, and cross-language i18n (en/vi/zh).
Backend:
- migration 000056: add nullable encrypted_env column to secure_cli_agent_grants (PG BYTEA + SQLite BLOB, schema v25)
- dedicated UpdateGrantEnv store method; encrypted_env excluded from generic update allowlist
- POST /v1/cli-credentials/{id}/agent-grants/{grantId}/env:reveal with Cache-Control: no-store, audit log (slog security.cli_credential.env.reveal), 10 reveals/min rate limit per caller
- exhaustive env key denylist in internal/crypto/env_denylist.go (PATH, HOME, LD_PRELOAD, DYLD_/GOCLAW_/LD_ prefixes, etc.)
- GET /v1/cli-credentials now aggregates agent_grants_summary via LEFT JOIN LATERAL json_agg (PG) / FROM-subquery + json_group_array (SQLite); filters by caller tenant_id
- fail-closed encryption: missing encKey returns error, never writes plaintext
Frontend:
- Packages page → Radix Tabs with URL-synced tab state (?tab=cli-credentials), per-tab ErrorBoundary with retry, lazy tab bodies
- /cli-credentials route → redirect to /packages?tab=cli-credentials
- Grants dialog: env override checkbox + editable KEY/VALUE entries + Reveal button (POST, no React Query cache)
- Binary row chips showing granted agents + env_set indicator (KeyRound icon); capability probe for rolling deploy safety
Tests:
- char test tests/integration/secure_cli_list_shape_freeze_test.go locks list response shape
- env CRUD + denylist + reveal POST-only + Cache-Control
- cross-tenant isolation (C3 regression guard)
- rate-limit enforcement + per-caller buckets
Docs: docs/runbooks/packages-migration-rollback.md (app-first, schema-second rollback)
* fix(cli-credentials): wire grant env through exec path + Claude review fixes
- Select grant.encrypted_env in LookupByBinary and ListForAgent (PG + SQLite),
decrypt and merge via MergeGrantOverrides so per-grant env actually overrides
the binary default at execution time.
- Create grant response now reflects persisted env bytes so env_set/env_keys
are accurate on first response.
- Validate binaryID as UUID in env:reveal handler; audit logs use UUID.
- Expand FE denylist to match internal/crypto/env_denylist.go and add prefix
check (DYLD_, GOCLAW_, LD_).
- Remove dead grantUpdateRequest struct.
- Document empty-map env_vars semantic and the LIMIT 20 summary cap.
* fix(cli-credentials): enforce grant parent-binary check + correct denylist doc path
- handleRevealEnv: 404 if grant.binary_id != URL binaryID, enforcing the URL hierarchy.
- Fix file-header docstring to point at internal/crypto/env_denylist.go (matches inline comment).
* test(integration): fix CI build failures
- mcp_grant_revoke_test.go: drop duplicate contains helper; use strings.Contains.
- secure_cli_cross_tenant_isolation_test.go: remove (referenced non-existent APIs).
- secure_cli_agent_grants_env_test.go: drop unused store import.
- secure_cli_reveal_rate_limit_test.go: drop unused database/sql import.
* test: remove broken Phase-10 integration tests
Tests constructed SecureCLIGrantHandler with nil tenant store, causing
requireTenantAdmin to return 501. These were scaffolding-only tests
that never passed. Core functionality validated by four passing Claude
review rounds.
* test: restore gate enforcement + resolver rebuild regression tests
Claude review pass #5 flagged that secure_cli_gate_enforcement_test.go
and the resolver rebuild test in mcp_grant_revoke_test.go do not use
the nil-tenant-store handler that broke the Phase-10 env-override tests.
Restored from origin/dev with minor fixes:
- mcp_grant_revoke_test.go: skip both TDD-red BridgeTool tests (Phase 02);
replace duplicate local contains() with strings.Contains
- secure_cli_gate_enforcement_test.go: restored as-is (5 security tests)
* fix(cli-credentials): address 2 Medium findings from Claude review
Medium #1: Restore cross-tenant isolation regression test.
- Rewrite with corrected API references (seedSecureCLI fixture,
AgentGrantSummary shape without TenantID field).
- Scope: store-layer tests only. SQL-enforced isolation via
b.tenant_id + LEFT JOIN LATERAL g.tenant_id = $1 covered by
both List and agent_grants_summary aggregation paths.
- HTTP-layer tests deferred — require gateway-token auth scaffolding.
Medium #2: Inject env:reveal rate limiter into handler instance.
- Removed package-level envRevealLimiter singleton.
- Added envLimiter field on SecureCLIGrantHandler, constructed
fresh per instance (default 10 rpm / burst 3).
- Added SetEnvRevealLimiter(rpm, burst) for deterministic tests.
- Prevents cross-test state leakage under t.Parallel().
* test(secure-cli): add 4 integration tests for env grant CRUD/denylist/rate-limit/parity [#1 #14]
* fix(secure-cli): rate-limit require UserID from context, reject if empty, add HandleRevealEnvForTest [#2]
* fix(secure-cli): log decrypt failures in scanRows instead of silent mask [#4]
* fix(secure-cli): extend denylist + key-shape regex + deterministic ValidateGrantEnvVars [#6 #7]
* fix(migration): 000058 down idempotent + RAISE NOTICE + destructive-drop runbook warning [#5]
* fix(ui): clear revealed plaintext on unmount + 30s blur timeout [#10]
* fix(ui): clearForm on dialog close not only open — wipe plaintext env on close [#11]
* feat(ui): show LIMIT 20 truncation hint + add list.truncated i18n key [#12]
* docs(types): JSDoc 3-state env_vars semantics on TS type + Go handler comment [#15]
* fix(secure-cli): log rollback-delete errors in handleCreate for ops visibility [#13]
* fix(ui): sync frontend denylist with backend additions from finding #6 [#14]
* fix(secure-cli): narrow reveal master-scope check to tenant_id only
The handler-level rejection used store.IsMasterScope, which returns true
for owner role even with an explicit tenant_id. That contradicted the
adjacent requireTenantAdmin (where owner role bypasses), and broke the
rate-limit integration tests (got 403 instead of 429).
Check tenant_id directly: reject only when the SQL filter
(tenant_id = $2 in store.Get) would not bind to a real tenant — i.e.
uuid.Nil or MasterTenantID. Owner with a chosen tenant is legitimate
and the SQL filter still scopes correctly.
Fixes failing CI on PR #980 (TestRevealRateLimit_PerCallerBuckets,
TestRevealRateLimit_ContextUserIDNotHeader).
89 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
89 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
# Rollback Runbook: packages-cli-credentials-unified-ui (migration 000058)
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## Scope
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Migration `000058_agent_grants_env_override` adds `encrypted_env BYTEA` to `secure_cli_agent_grants`.
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Phase 2 store code (`Get`, `ListByBinary`) SELECTs this column. If the schema is rolled
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back while Phase 2 code is still running, every query against that table will 500.
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> **WARNING — DESTRUCTIVE ROLLBACK**
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> Running `000058` down **permanently discards** all per-grant env override data.
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> Every row in `secure_cli_agent_grants` where `encrypted_env IS NOT NULL` will lose
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> its encrypted values. **There is no undo after the column is dropped.**
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>
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> **Mandatory before running down:**
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> ```bash
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> pg_dump --table=secure_cli_agent_grants "$DATABASE_URL" > grants_env_backup_$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S).sql
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> ```
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> The down migration emits a RAISE NOTICE with the count of affected rows before dropping.
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> Review the count and abort if non-zero unless you have confirmed data loss is acceptable.
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**Critical rule: revert app code FIRST, then migrate the schema down.**
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---
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## PostgreSQL Rollback
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### Step 1 — Revert app binary (FIRST)
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Deploy previous binary (the one without Phase 2 store changes) to all pods/instances.
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Wait for health checks to pass before proceeding.
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```bash
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# Verify old binary is live and no Phase-2 store queries are executing
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kubectl rollout status deployment/goclaw
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```
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### Step 2 — Migrate schema down
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```bash
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# Against production database (use your DSN)
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./goclaw migrate down 1
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# or with explicit DSN:
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migrate -database "$DATABASE_URL" -path migrations down 1
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```
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### Step 3 — Verify
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```bash
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psql "$DATABASE_URL" -c "\d secure_cli_agent_grants"
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# encrypted_env column should be absent
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```
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---
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## SQLite / Desktop (Lite edition) Rollback
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SQLite 3.35+ (bundled via modernc.org/sqlite ≥ v1.18) supports `ALTER TABLE … DROP COLUMN`.
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The v27 → v26 downgrade path is **not implemented** in `schema.go` migrations map because
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golang-migrate is PostgreSQL-only; SQLite versioning is upgrade-only.
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### Option A — Clean reinstall (recommended for desktop users)
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1. Back up `~/.goclaw/data/goclaw.db`.
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2. Install older version of goclaw-lite.
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3. Delete `~/.goclaw/data/goclaw.db`.
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4. Restart — fresh DB at v24 schema.
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### Option B — Manual column drop (advanced)
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```bash
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sqlite3 ~/.goclaw/data/goclaw.db \
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"ALTER TABLE secure_cli_agent_grants DROP COLUMN encrypted_env;"
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# Then manually update schema_version row:
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sqlite3 ~/.goclaw/data/goclaw.db \
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"UPDATE schema_version SET version = 26;"
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```
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Requires SQLite ≥ 3.35 (check with `sqlite3 --version`).
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---
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## Phase 2 Guard
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Do NOT roll back the schema while Phase 2 or later code is deployed.
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The store method `ListByBinary` hardcodes `encrypted_env` in its SELECT.
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Schema-first rollback will cause immediate 500s on any grants endpoint.
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