mirror of
https://github.com/tiennm99/goclaw.git
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* feat(packages): add update flow for GitHub binaries (#900) Closes #900. Proactive update-check + atomic swap for GitHub-installed binaries on the Runtime & Packages page. Interfaces prepared for pip/npm/apk extension in Phase 2. - UpdateCache + UpdateRegistry + PackageLocker (ctx-aware keyed mutex) - GitHubUpdateChecker: ETag-aware, distinct /latest vs /list ETag keys, semver-correct ordering via golang.org/x/mod/semver, non-semver fallback that refuses to downgrade, pre-release + stable candidate fusion for the v1.0.0-rc.1 -> v1.0.0 transition - GitHubUpdateExecutor: two-phase .bak swap with hadBackup-aware rollback, manifest save retry (3x, 100ms/500ms/1s backoff), nil-safe meta access, explicit ScratchDir, 0755 set pre-rename - HTTP: GET /v1/packages/updates (SWR), POST /v1/packages/updates/refresh, POST /v1/packages/update, POST /v1/packages/updates/apply-all (always 200, failed[] is error source). Master-scope gated. - WS events package.update.{checked,started,succeeded,failed} forwarded to owner clients via event_filter.go - Frontend: useUpdates hook + 3 components (summary bar, update-all modal, row button), master-scope-gated disabled state - i18n: 8 backend keys + 17 frontend keys x en/vi/zh - Config: packages.github_token (reserved), updates_check_ttl, scratch_dir - 45+ new tests, race-clean, BenchmarkCheckAll10Packages ~1.1ms/op warm * docs(packages): document update flow + Phase 1 completion - packages-github.md: "Updating Installed Packages" section with UI + API contract, troubleshooting runbook (corrupt cache, rate-limit, scratch dir, mid-swap recovery) - 17-changelog.md + CHANGELOG.md: Phase 1 entry - 14-skills-runtime.md: cross-ref to update flow - journal entry capturing CRIT fixes (double-write, lock-key mismatch, rollback false-alarm) + design wins (keyed locks, red-team pre-flight) * feat(workstation): remote workstation runtime — SSH exec + security + audit Adds generic Remote Workstation Runtime enabling agents to execute commands on user-owned SSH workstations. Includes registry (DB + API + UI), SSH backend with connection pool and circuit breaker, workstation.exec + claude_remote tools, NFKC + binary-name allowlist security, and audit logging. Standard edition only. Closes #941. * fix(workstation): address 3 critical + 5 important code review findings - C1: Add json:"-" to Metadata/DefaultEnv fields; use SanitizedView() in all API responses to prevent SSH private key leakage - C2: Wire CheckEnv into PermCheckFn; LD_PRELOAD/PATH injection now blocked - C3: SSH Setenv fallback — prepend `export K=V;` when server rejects Setenv - I1: BackendCache sync.RWMutex → sync.Mutex (fix data race on lastUsed) - I2: Validate metadata shape in handleUpdate before store write - I3: Include command in exec-done event; activity sink uses actual cmd hash - I4: Wrap pool release in sync.Once (idempotent double-call safety) - I5: Verify workstation tenant ownership before adding permissions * fix(packages): bypass HTTPS+IP validation in update executor tests Test httptest servers bind to http://127.0.0.1 which fails both the HTTPS scheme check and literal-IP SSRF guard. Add testSkipDownloadValidation flag (same pattern as existing withTestDownloadHosts) to skip full URL validation in test context. * fix(workstation): address Claude review findings — tenant isolation + pool leak + dead code - Activity list: add workstation ownership check before listing (prevents cross-tenant activity enumeration via known UUID) - SSH pool: clean up p.sem + p.circuits maps in CloseWorkstation, prune, and Close to prevent unbounded map growth - RPC handlers: return ErrInvalidRequest on JSON unmarshal failure instead of silently using zero-value params - Remove unused containsControlChars function in normalize.go - HTTP tests: add 10s context timeout to prevent CI package timeout * fix(workstation): DefaultEnv JSON parse, backend cache leak, perm ownership check - DefaultEnv: replace KEY=VALUE text parse with json.Unmarshal (stored as JSON by HTTP handler, was silently ignored) - BackendCache: close losing backend on concurrent cache miss to prevent pruneLoop goroutine leak - Backend interface: add Close() error method; SSHBackend delegates to pool.Close() - handlePermList: add wsStore.GetByID ownership check (prevents cross-tenant UUID enumeration returning empty array vs 404) - scanRows: log scan errors instead of silently skipping * fix(workstation): wire activity sink shutdown + remove misleading comment - WireActivitySink: capture cleanup func, register in gateway shutdown (was discarded → retention goroutine leaked + buffered rows lost) - Add Stop() to WorkstationActivityStore interface (PG+SQLite already had it) - wireWorkstationTools returns cleanup func; gateway.go defers it - Remove misleading "re-validate env" comment in allowlist.go Check() * ci: bump unit test timeout from 90s to 120s hooks/handlers package (goja script tests) consumes ~85s on cold CI runners, leaving insufficient headroom for HTTP retry tests with 1s backoff. 120s provides adequate breathing room without masking real deadlocks. * fix: compile errors in integration tests + allowlist docstring - packages_update_test: add missing lockKey arg to registry.Apply - mcp_grant_revoke_test: remove unused fakeMCPClient struct - allowlist.go: fix Check() docstring to match actual 3-step pipeline * fix(test): relax mcp grant revoke assertion for pre-Phase02 state Execute-time grant checking not yet wired — test correctly gets an error but the message is "no active client" (nil clientPtr) rather than "grant revoked". Accept any error as valid regression guard. * chore: trigger CI on digitopvn/goclaw fork * ci: retrigger workflows * fix(permissions): classify workstation methods in RBAC policy
346 lines
12 KiB
Go
346 lines
12 KiB
Go
package http
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/internal/store"
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)
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// Phase 0b hotfix coverage:
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// - requireMasterScope unit tests (predicate surface)
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// - builtin_tools handleUpdate: CRITICAL-1 regression guard
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// - packages handleInstall / handleUninstall: CRITICAL-2 regression guard
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// - api_keys handleRevoke: HIGH finding regression guard
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//
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// All tests use focused harnesses that avoid DB / real installers.
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// ---- helpers ----
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func newMasterScopeReq(method, path string, tid uuid.UUID, role string) *http.Request {
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r := httptest.NewRequest(method, path, strings.NewReader(""))
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ctx := r.Context()
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if tid != uuid.Nil {
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ctx = store.WithTenantID(ctx, tid)
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}
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if role != "" {
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ctx = store.WithRole(ctx, role)
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}
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return r.WithContext(ctx)
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}
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// ---- requireMasterScope predicate tests ----
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func TestRequireMasterScope_SystemOwner_Allows(t *testing.T) {
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// Owner role on arbitrary tenant must pass.
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r := newMasterScopeReq(http.MethodPut, "/test", uuid.New(), store.RoleOwner)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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if !requireMasterScope(w, r) {
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t.Fatalf("system owner must be allowed, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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}
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func TestRequireMasterScope_MasterTenant_Allows(t *testing.T) {
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r := newMasterScopeReq(http.MethodPut, "/test", store.MasterTenantID, "admin")
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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if !requireMasterScope(w, r) {
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t.Fatalf("master tenant ctx must be allowed, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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}
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func TestRequireMasterScope_NilTenant_Allows(t *testing.T) {
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// Legacy / system callers without any tenant ctx.
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r := newMasterScopeReq(http.MethodPut, "/test", uuid.Nil, "")
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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if !requireMasterScope(w, r) {
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t.Fatalf("nil tenant ctx must be allowed (master-scope fallback), got %d", w.Code)
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}
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}
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func TestRequireMasterScope_NonMasterAdmin_Rejects(t *testing.T) {
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// The bug-fix path: non-master tenant admin must be rejected.
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tid := uuid.MustParse("aaaaaaaa-aaaa-aaaa-aaaa-aaaaaaaaaaaa")
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r := newMasterScopeReq(http.MethodPut, "/test", tid, "admin")
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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if requireMasterScope(w, r) {
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t.Fatalf("non-master admin ctx must NOT be allowed")
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}
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if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
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t.Fatalf("expected 403, got %d", w.Code)
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}
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if !strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), "master") {
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t.Errorf("expected error message to mention master scope, got: %s", w.Body.String())
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}
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}
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// ---- CRITICAL-1: builtin_tools handleUpdate regression ----
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// TestBuiltinToolsUpdate_RejectsNonMasterAdmin verifies that Phase 0b guard
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// blocks the exact attack vector described in the audit: a tenant admin
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// (RoleAdmin in a non-master tenant) attempting PUT /v1/tools/builtin/{name}
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// receives 403 without any store mutation.
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func TestBuiltinToolsUpdate_RejectsNonMasterAdmin(t *testing.T) {
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h := &BuiltinToolsHandler{} // store nil — must never be reached
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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mux.HandleFunc("PUT /v1/tools/builtin/{name}", h.handleUpdate)
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tid := uuid.MustParse("bbbbbbbb-bbbb-bbbb-bbbb-bbbbbbbbbbbb")
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPut, "/v1/tools/builtin/web_search",
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strings.NewReader(`{"enabled":true}`))
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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ctx := store.WithTenantID(req.Context(), tid)
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ctx = store.WithRole(ctx, "admin")
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req = req.WithContext(ctx)
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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// If the guard fails open, h.store.Update is called on a nil store and
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// the test panics — explicit recover catches that regression distinctly.
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defer func() {
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if r := recover(); r != nil {
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t.Fatalf("guard did not short-circuit — handler panicked on nil store: %v", r)
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}
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}()
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mux.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
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t.Fatalf("expected 403 for non-master admin, got %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
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}
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}
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// ---- CRITICAL-2: packages handleInstall / handleUninstall regression ----
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func TestPackagesInstall_RejectsNonMasterAdmin(t *testing.T) {
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h := NewPackagesHandler(nil, nil)
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /v1/packages/install", h.handleInstall)
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tid := uuid.MustParse("cccccccc-cccc-cccc-cccc-cccccccccccc")
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/v1/packages/install",
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strings.NewReader(`{"package":"pip:malicious-pkg"}`))
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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ctx := store.WithTenantID(req.Context(), tid)
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ctx = store.WithRole(ctx, "admin")
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req = req.WithContext(ctx)
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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mux.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
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t.Fatalf("expected 403 for non-master admin, got %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
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}
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}
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func TestPackagesUninstall_RejectsNonMasterAdmin(t *testing.T) {
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h := NewPackagesHandler(nil, nil)
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /v1/packages/uninstall", h.handleUninstall)
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tid := uuid.MustParse("dddddddd-dddd-dddd-dddd-dddddddddddd")
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/v1/packages/uninstall",
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strings.NewReader(`{"package":"pip:pandas"}`))
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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ctx := store.WithTenantID(req.Context(), tid)
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ctx = store.WithRole(ctx, "admin")
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req = req.WithContext(ctx)
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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mux.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
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t.Fatalf("expected 403 for non-master admin, got %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
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}
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}
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// ---- HIGH: api_keys handleRevoke ownership regression ----
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// TestAPIKeyRevoke_RejectsCrossTenant exercises the post-fix ownership check
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// in the HTTP handler. A tenant admin (non-owner) attempting to revoke a
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// key owned by a different tenant must receive 403, and the store-layer
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// Revoke must never be called — mockAPIKeyStore flags when it is.
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func TestAPIKeyRevoke_RejectsCrossTenant(t *testing.T) {
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ms := newMockAPIKeyStore()
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callerTID := uuid.MustParse("eeeeeeee-eeee-eeee-eeee-eeeeeeeeeeee")
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keyOwnerTID := uuid.MustParse("ffffffff-ffff-ffff-ffff-ffffffffffff")
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keyID := uuid.New()
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ms.byID[keyID] = &store.APIKeyData{
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ID: keyID,
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Name: "other-tenant-key",
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TenantID: keyOwnerTID,
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}
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h := &APIKeysHandler{apiKeys: ms}
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /v1/api-keys/{id}/revoke", h.handleRevoke)
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/v1/api-keys/"+keyID.String()+"/revoke", nil)
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ctx := store.WithTenantID(req.Context(), callerTID)
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ctx = store.WithRole(ctx, "admin")
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req = req.WithContext(ctx)
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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mux.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
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t.Fatalf("expected 403 for cross-tenant revoke, got %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
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}
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}
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// TestAPIKeyRevoke_RejectsSystemKeyForTenantAdmin verifies the NULL-tenant
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// (system-level) key cannot be revoked by a tenant admin — the core HIGH
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// vulnerability from the audit (store SQL `OR tenant_id IS NULL` arm).
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func TestAPIKeyRevoke_RejectsSystemKeyForTenantAdmin(t *testing.T) {
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ms := newMockAPIKeyStore()
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callerTID := uuid.MustParse("11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111")
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keyID := uuid.New()
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// Key with TenantID == uuid.Nil represents a NULL-tenant system key.
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ms.byID[keyID] = &store.APIKeyData{
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ID: keyID,
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Name: "system-ci-key",
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TenantID: uuid.Nil,
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}
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h := &APIKeysHandler{apiKeys: ms}
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /v1/api-keys/{id}/revoke", h.handleRevoke)
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/v1/api-keys/"+keyID.String()+"/revoke", nil)
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ctx := store.WithTenantID(req.Context(), callerTID)
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ctx = store.WithRole(ctx, "admin")
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req = req.WithContext(ctx)
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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mux.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
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t.Fatalf("expected 403 for tenant admin revoking system key, got %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
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}
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}
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// TestAPIKeyRevoke_AllowsOwnTenantKey happy path — tenant admin revoking a
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// key owned by their own tenant must succeed (no regression).
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func TestAPIKeyRevoke_AllowsOwnTenantKey(t *testing.T) {
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ms := newMockAPIKeyStore()
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tid := uuid.MustParse("22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222")
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keyID := uuid.New()
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ms.byID[keyID] = &store.APIKeyData{
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ID: keyID,
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Name: "own-tenant-key",
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TenantID: tid,
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}
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h := &APIKeysHandler{apiKeys: ms}
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /v1/api-keys/{id}/revoke", h.handleRevoke)
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/v1/api-keys/"+keyID.String()+"/revoke", nil)
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ctx := store.WithTenantID(req.Context(), tid)
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ctx = store.WithRole(ctx, "admin")
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req = req.WithContext(ctx)
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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mux.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("expected 200 for same-tenant revoke, got %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
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}
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}
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// TestAPIKeyRevoke_AllowsSystemOwnerOnSystemKey happy path — system owner
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// can revoke NULL-tenant system keys (CI/CD rotation).
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func TestAPIKeyRevoke_AllowsSystemOwnerOnSystemKey(t *testing.T) {
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ms := newMockAPIKeyStore()
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keyID := uuid.New()
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ms.byID[keyID] = &store.APIKeyData{
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ID: keyID,
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Name: "system-ci-key",
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TenantID: uuid.Nil,
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}
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h := &APIKeysHandler{apiKeys: ms}
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /v1/api-keys/{id}/revoke", h.handleRevoke)
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/v1/api-keys/"+keyID.String()+"/revoke", nil)
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ctx := store.WithRole(req.Context(), store.RoleOwner)
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req = req.WithContext(ctx)
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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mux.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("expected 200 for system owner revoking system key, got %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
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}
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}
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// --- master-scope happy paths on guarded handlers ---
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// recordingBuiltinToolStore is a minimal BuiltinToolStore stub that records
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// calls to Update so the happy-path test can assert "the guard allowed the
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// request through to the store" without relying on panic-recover semantics.
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// Only Update is exercised; the rest return zero values to satisfy the
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// interface contract.
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type recordingBuiltinToolStore struct {
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updateName string
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updateBody map[string]any
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}
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func (s *recordingBuiltinToolStore) Update(_ context.Context, name string, updates map[string]any) error {
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s.updateName = name
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s.updateBody = updates
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return nil
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}
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func (s *recordingBuiltinToolStore) List(_ context.Context) ([]store.BuiltinToolDef, error) {
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return nil, nil
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}
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func (s *recordingBuiltinToolStore) Get(_ context.Context, _ string) (*store.BuiltinToolDef, error) {
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return nil, nil
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}
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func (s *recordingBuiltinToolStore) Seed(_ context.Context, _ []store.BuiltinToolDef) error {
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return nil
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}
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func (s *recordingBuiltinToolStore) ListEnabled(_ context.Context) ([]store.BuiltinToolDef, error) {
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return nil, nil
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}
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func (s *recordingBuiltinToolStore) GetSettings(_ context.Context, _ string) (json.RawMessage, error) {
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return nil, nil
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}
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// TestBuiltinToolsUpdate_AllowsMasterAdmin ensures master-scope callers are
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// not blocked by Phase 0b. Uses a recording stub store so we can assert the
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// guard passed and the handler reached Update — no fragile panic-recover.
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func TestBuiltinToolsUpdate_AllowsMasterAdmin(t *testing.T) {
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rec := &recordingBuiltinToolStore{}
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h := &BuiltinToolsHandler{store: rec}
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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mux.HandleFunc("PUT /v1/tools/builtin/{name}", h.handleUpdate)
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPut, "/v1/tools/builtin/web_search",
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strings.NewReader(`{"enabled":true}`))
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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ctx := store.WithTenantID(req.Context(), store.MasterTenantID)
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ctx = store.WithRole(ctx, "admin")
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req = req.WithContext(ctx)
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rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
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mux.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
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if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("expected 200 for master admin, got %d: %s", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
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}
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if rec.updateName != "web_search" {
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t.Errorf("expected Update called with name=web_search, got %q", rec.updateName)
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}
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if enabled, ok := rec.updateBody["enabled"].(bool); !ok || !enabled {
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t.Errorf("expected Update body {enabled:true}, got %+v", rec.updateBody)
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}
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}
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// sanity: make sure json is importable (unused import guard during refactors)
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var _ = json.Marshal
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